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ERY PROCESS IN DOUBLE AUCTION MARKETS
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
This study investigates how agent-based modeling can be used to evaluate the price dis-
covery process in double auction markets. The study is limited to single-unit continuous
double auctions, and especially to constrained zero-intelligence (ZI-C) trader markets
rst introduced by Gode and Sunder (1993a).
STRUCTURE
First, I evaluate the earlier models and construct an agent-based model using the guide-
lines from the literature. In particular, the idea is to create an agent-based model as
simple as possible, because the earlier literature in agent-based modeling lacks synthesis
about the modeling principles used. After having created the model, I compare its re-
sults comprehensively against the earlier literature. In addition, I concentrate especially
to evaluating the methods of Cli and Bruten (1997) to analyze ZI-C trader markets as
their ideas have inuenced literature substantially, but have been recently questioned by
Othman (2008).
RESULTS
The results indicate that the methods of Cli and Bruten (1997) can be improved. Espe-
cially, it appears that the probability density functions (PDF) of bids and asks proposed
by Cli and Bruten (1997) have to be constructed in a slightly dierent manner than
what was originally proposed. However, the results also suggest that after rening the
ideas of Cli and Bruten (1997), it is possible to describe the PDF of transaction prices
in ZI-C trader markets. Generally, the results suggest that the earlier literature has over-
looked the importance of the evolution in the trader population participating in the ZI-C
market. In addition, the results indicate that the trading in ZI-C trader markets closely
mimics a sequence of trades that would take place on the Marshallian path, which has
been previously suggested, but not comprehensively analyzed by Brewer et al. (2002).
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AGENTTIPOHJAINEN MALLINTAMINEN MENETELMANA HINNANLOYTAMIS-
PROSESSIN ARVIOINNISSA TUPLAHUUTOKAUPOISSA
TAVOITTEET
Tutkimuksen tavoitteena on perehtya siihen kuinka agenttipohjaista mallintamista voidaan
kayttaa hinnanloytamisprosessin tarkastelussa tuplahuutokaupoissa. Tutkimuksessa ra-
joitutaan tarkastelemaan jatkuvia yhden hyodykkeen tuplahuutokauppoja, ja erityisesti
rajoitetun nollaalykkyyden (ZI-C) omaavia agentteja, jotka Gode ja Sunder (1993a) esit-
telivat ensimmaisen kerran uraauurtavassa tyossaan.
RAKENNE
Rakennan agenttipohjaisen mallin kayttamalla hyvakseni aiempaa kirjallisuutta ja sii-
na esiteltyja metodeja. Tavoitteenani on pyrkia rakentamaan mahdollisimman yksinker-
tainen malli, koska aiempi agenttipohjaista mallintamista kasitteleva kirjallisuus kasit-
taa useita erilaisia heterogeenisia malleja eika yleista mallinrakennuskehikkoa nayttaisi
olevan. Arvioin rakentamaani mallia vertaamalla mallin tuloksia aiemmin kirjallisuudessa
esitettyihin tuloksiin. Lisaksi tarkastelen Clin ja Brutenin (1997) kayttamia metodeja
analysoida ZI-C markkinoita, koska ne ovat vaikuttaneet paljon aikaisempaan kirjallisuu-
teen mutta toisaalta ne on kyseenalaistettu muutama vuosi sitten Othmanin (2008)
toimesta.
TULOKSET
Tulokset osoittavat etta Clin ja Brutenin (1997) kayttamia metodeja voidaan parantaa.
Tulosten perusteella nayttaa ensinnakin silta, etta myynti- ja ostotarjousten tiheysfunk-
tiot ZI-C markkinoilla tulee muodostaa hiukan eri tavalla kuin mita Cli ja Bruten alun
perin ehdottivat. Toisaalta tulokset tukevat myos sita, etta pienilla muutoksilla Clif-
n ja Brutenin ideoita voidaan kayttaa hintojen tiheysfunktioiden karakterisointiin ZI-C
markkinoilla. Yleisesti ottaen tulokset osoittavat, etta aiempi kirjallisuus on ylenkat-
sonut agenttipopulaation evoluution vaikutusta ZI-C markkinoihin. Tulosten perusteella
nayttaa erityisesti silta, etta kaupankaynti ZI-C markkinoilla tapahtuu likimaaraisesti
Marshallin polkua pitkin kuten Brewer et al. (2002) ovatkin ehdottaneet asiaa sen tarkem-
min kuitenkaan analysoimatta.
AVAINSANAT
agenttipohjainen mallintaminen, nollaalykkyys, hinnanloytamisprosessi, jatkuva tupla-
huutokauppa
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1 Introduction
Market microstructure studies the microfoundations of economic theory, and is currently
also an area of intense research. As an area of nance, market microstructure can be
dened as the study of processes that transform investor demands into quantities and
prices (Madhavan, 2000; O'Hara, 1995). The earlier literature has examined, for exam-
ple, price discovery, market structure, market design and transparency of the markets
(Madhavan, 2000). These areas cover dierent parts of real markets and reect the fact
that the general need for knowledge about markets must have been one of the main rea-
sons why market microstructure literature has been rapidly growing during the last few
decades.1 One would also expect this trend to continue as the increasing use of dierent
electronic marketplaces, suggested for example by Biais et al. (2005), should only increase
the demand for market microstructure research in near future.
1.1 Background
The fundamental problem in the earlier economic theory is that a large part of it abstracts
from the exact mechanisms of trading. This basically means that the researchers assume
the market to be a black box and more importantly in many cases assume it to work
eciently (O'Hara, 1995, p. 1). However, as the downturn in end of 2000s again showed,
there is demand for a deeper understanding of the markets. By studying the microstruc-
ture of dierent markets, one can try to nd answers to some of the questions concerning,
for example, investors' incentives behind trading stocks. While market microstructure
research has already answered some very important questions (Biais et al., 2005), there
still remains many open questions concerning real markets to be answered. Such ques-
tions relevant for this thesis concern, for example, the exact trading mechanisms used
and the price discovery2 in one particular mechanism. In general, better understanding of
how markets function could constitute better regulatory frameworks and maybe even the
formulation of new trading mechanisms designed for example for new electronic markets.
Theoretical models introduced in the earlier market microstructure literature have re-
lied mostly on analytical tools. As Hommes (2006) claims, \In the traditional literature,
simple analytically tractable models have been the main cornerstones and mathemat-
ics has been the main tool of analysis". Thus, mathematics has provided researchers a
way to describe the behavior of a trader. At the same time, many traditional models
have used assumptions, which have constrained the model designers heavily. In general,
1 See for example the reviews by Madhavan (2000) and Biais et al. (2005); both of these surveys review
an extensive amount of recent literature in market microstructure research. 2 For example Biais et al.
(1999) and Madhavan and Panchapagesan (2000) dene price discovery process as the price formation
process where traders interact with each other and the result is the price of the asset.
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the assumptions used have contributed to models, which do not describe the real markets
accurately, but have instead constrained the model to answer a couple of interesting ques-
tions. An example of the assumptions used in traditional models are the assumptions for
the Walrasian equilibrium: individual optimality, correct expectations, market clearing
and the strong form of Walras' law of which the last one in eect means that the total
value of excess supply in markets is zero (Tesfatsion, 2006). As Tesfatsion argues, one
way to create an agent-based model, is to remove, for example, the traditional expecta-
tion about market clearing and replace it with something else that is dependable on the
model. It is quite intuitive that such agent-based models are especially interesting from
a modeling point of view, if they are able to describe the real markets more accurately.
Agent-based modeling is a quickly developing part of nance and economics and even
its own denition may still change. One of the early pioneers, Tesfatsion (2006), de-
nes agent-based computational economics to be \the computational study of economic
processes modeled as dynamic systems of interacting agents". This denition well high-
lights the fact that agent-based models are often best understood as computer simula-
tions of interacting agents. According to Tesfatsion, the agents can range from \active
data-gathering decision-makers with sophisticated learning capabilities to passive world
features with no cognitive functioning". In general, this means that dierent agents may
be, for example, traders, consumers, workers, families, rms or governments.
Real markets can be modeled more accurately using computational methods. As an
approach, the agent-based modeling uses primarily numerical methods, and the earlier
literature in agent-based modeling has taken a step away from the analytic models by
adding features that cannot be evaluated using analytic methods. One example of this in
practice is to allow all dierent agents in the model to have heterogeneous expectations
about the future prices.3 As many real markets consist of a large number of heterogeneous
agents interacting with each other, such a model would seem more appropriate than a
traditional analytic model which assumes homogeneous agents.
However, even with the numerical methods one has to make compromises. In agent-
based models this usually means that the agents have to be assumed to be boundedly
rational instead of having exactly correct expectations. In eect, boundedly rational
means that the agent has limited time and resources when calculating, for example, the
expectations about the future (Hommes, 2006). However, in practice this may only mean
that the agents form their expectations about the future using statistical methods,4 which
would at least intuitively seem to be well in line with the capabilities of human traders.
In general, the analytic models are usually forced to assume one or two dierent groups
3 This is a simplied example of the one explained by Chiarella et al. (2009). 4 For example Arthur
et al. (1997) use inductive reasoning and statistical methods to create expectations for their agents about
the future prices.
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of agents, while a computer model might have hundreds of agents that all have small
dierences in their expectations about the future. Thus, when compared to analytic
models, the agent-based models should be at least able to create such initial conditions
that the resulting agent-based model resembles the real market more closely.
However, the more complicated models have also had their drawbacks. By creating
more complex models, the researchers have created complex systems, which might in
many cases be hard to comprehensively understand. In addition to complex models,
numerous models have also used dierent frameworks. The number of dierent models
and frameworks presented in the earlier research is well shown in the surveys by LeBaron
(2006), Tesfatsion (2006), Duy (2006) and Hommes (2006). All this suggests that it is
possible to draw the conclusion that the agent-based modeling as a discipline is still in
the middle of its development and lacks synthesis about the general principles used in
modeling.
1.2 Limitations
This study will be limited to continuous double auction, henceforth referred to as CDA,
markets. For example, Farmer et al. (2005) dene the CDA as an auction where each
trader can submit both buy and sell orders as long as the market is open, and the market
is cleared after each trader has submitted a buy or a sell order. More specically, I
limit to single-unit continuous double auctions, henceforth referred to as SCDA. In a
normal CDA, the traders can submit orders that correspond to any quantity of the asset,
while in a SCDA all the orders are restricted to quote only a single unit. Farmer et
al. also note that \continuous double auction is the most widely used method of price
formation in modern nancial markets" as is also suggested by the surveys of Madhavan
(2000) and Biais et al. (2005). Thus, using a CDA framework should guarantee that
the models created will not abstract too much from the real markets as the CDA is
regarded generally a good approximation of how limit order-book trading takes place in
real markets. In addition, SCDA has been used in this context in the earlier literature;
see, for example, the model by Chiarella and Iori (2002). Keeping the models close to the
reality is important, as, for example, the ndings of Gode and Sunder (1993a) suggest
that the limit order-book trading has a fundamental meaning to the eciency5 of the
CDA markets.
However, the double auction framework also imposes challenges as it is clearly more
complex than some of the frameworks assumed in the earlier market microstructure lit-
erature. Although in the literature the CDA is regarded generally as a very ecient
5 Gode and Sunder (1993a) dene the eciency of the markets as the ratio of the surplus extracted by
all the traders and the possible surplus that could have been extracted by all the traders.
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allocation mechanism, characterizing the optimal behavior of the trader in such an auc-
tion seems to be very hard as noted, for example, by Huang et al. (2002). A good
example of this in practice is the fact that in the double auction literature the optimal
trader behavior in a double auction has only been characterized in simplied auction
settings6.
1.3 Research questions and results
This thesis will attempt to argue how a small step towards the synthesis in agent-based
modeling could be taken when the interest is in price discovery. It seems evident that the
agent-based models should be as tractable as possible, but at the same time they should
give answers to questions, where analytic tools cannot reach. One especially intuitive
way to proceed on this path is to start the modeling of the markets from a model that
is as simple as possible. This thesis will try to nd out whether this modeling problem
could be answered by using the zero-intelligence traders, which will be henceforth referred
to as ZI-traders. Such agents were rst introduced by Gode and Sunder (1993a) to the
agent-based modeling framework and have inspired a large amount of research afterwards.
Gode and Sunder (1993a) dened ZI-traders in SCDA markets as agents, who submit
randomly buy and sell orders from independent and identical uniform distributions over
an interval from 1 to 200. They named such traders as ZI-U traders, where U stands
for unconstrained and highlights the fact that ZI-U traders do not take into account
their valuation of the asset when trading. In contrast to ZI-U traders, Gode and Sunder
(1993a) also dened ZI-C traders, who take into account their individual valuations when
submitting buy and sell orders. Models in this line of research base their foundations on
a set of very simple assumptions, which can be modied by adding features one at a time.
Thus, using ZI-traders should be a way, which allows one to control the complexity of the
model as well as it is possible with the present knowledge about the agent-based models.
This could mean that the modeler would have the possibility to keep track of the model
behavior while developing the model systemically in a step-by-step manner.
It also appears that ZI-trader market has to be evaluated using simulations instead
constructing and analyzing an analytic model. An analytic Markov model of the ZI-
trader market could be constructed, because the only factor contributing to the evolution
of the trader population is the previous population of traders7. Thus, it seems that,
for example, the ZI-C model could be analyzed analytically, although to the best of my
knowledge such analysis has not been proposed yet. However, the reason for the lack of
6 See, for example, a recent study about a double auction mechanism by Chu (2009). 7 The population
of traders participating in the market at time t depends only about the population of traders that
participated in the market at time t  1.
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analytic studies is probably the fact that building such a model is problematic8. With
already ve buyers and sellers the amount of states in the Markov model equals 252, and
the amount of states in a model with 75 buyers and 75 sellers9 is approximately 1044.
Thus, when designing a Markov model of the ZI-C trader market, one would have to
take into account this problem somehow or to limit to even simpler models than the ones
presented in this thesis.
Essentially, I will add to the earlier literature by carefully examining the properties
of the ZI-trader markets and comparing the price discovery process in dierent types of
ZI-trader markets. In practice, this means that I will carefully review the earlier results
about the ZI-C10 trader markets, and then build on them when discussing the price
discovery process. After that I will carefully look at the dierent demand and supply
settings that were introduced into the ZI-C trader literature by Cli and Bruten (1997).
The work of Cli and Bruten (1997) has also been widely recognized as one of the
strongest critique for the ZI-C trader approach. However, in contrast to Cli and Bruten
(1997), the results presented in this thesis show that the price discovery process in ZI-C
trader markets is closely related to how the traders are matched to trade and how the
population of traders participating in the market evolves over time. Although the ideas
presented in this thesis are straightforward and actually based on the ideas and results
presented already by Gode and Sunder (1993a), it seems that the earlier literature has
generally overlooked the evolution of the trader population when discussing the price
discovery process in ZI-C trader markets. For example, the seminal work by Cli and
Bruten (1997) concentrated on the overall price determination process, i.e. on the dis-
tribution of transaction prices, and left the evolution in the trader population aside. In
this thesis I will argue how such reasoning led Cli and Bruten (1997) to underestimate
the importance of the changes in the trader population for the price discovery process.
The results suggest that by using the ideas presented by Cli and Bruten (1997) more
carefully, it appears to be possible to explain the price discovery process in the ZI-C
trader markets. Especially, it appears that the probability density functions (PDFs) of
bids and asks proposed by Cli and Bruten (1997) have to be constructed in a slightly
8 A natural way to form a Markov chain model is to dene the state of the chain as the population
of buyers and sellers interacting in the market at certain moment t. The idea is that when a trade
takes place the state of the chain also changes. When taking into account every possible trade that can
take place, such a model with n buyers and m sellers would have
 
n
n 1
 
m
m 1

possible states after one
trade has taken place, because a single buyer can trade with any of the m sellers. Similarly, after two
trades have taken place, there are
 
n
n 2
 
m
m 2

possible states. Thus, all in all the model would havePmin(n;m)
i=0
 
n
i
 
m
i

possible states, and the amount of states in the model increases exponentially with
the number of agents in the model. 9 These amounts corresponds to the amounts of agents used in the
ZI-C trader models presented in this thesis. 10 ZI-U traders have been generally overshadowed in the
literature by ZI-C traders, because the behavior of ZI-U traders is completely random while the behavior
of ZI-C traders resembled in some ways the behavior of humans in the experiments of Gode and Sunder
(1993a).
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dierent manner than what was originally proposed. However, the results also suggest
that after rening the ideas of Cli and Bruten (1997), it is possible to describe the
probability density function of transaction prices in ZI-C trader market. Generally, the
results suggest that the earlier literature has overlooked the importance of the evolution
in the trader population participating in the ZI-C market, which strengthens the ideas
of Brewer et al. (2002), who claimed that the convergence of transaction prices in ZI-
C markets is based on the fact that intramarginal11 traders leave the market. Thus,
it seems that the correct way to analyze the behavior of ZI-C markets is to look at
how the population of traders changes over time and how the changes contribute to the
characteristics of the market.
1.4 Structure of the thesis
This thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter two will begin by explicitly dening the
concept of single-unit continuous double auction and showing a characterizing example of
the SCDA trading process taking place in real exchanges. After that the quest for a step
towards the synthesis will begin with an extensive review of the previous literature. The
relevant literature can be loosely divided into the following areas: market microstructure,
agent-based modeling and double auctions. The methodology used will be reviewed in
the fourth chapter by elaborating how the dierent models used in this thesis were imple-
mented using Python programming language and, in particular, its simulation package
SimPy. The fth chapter presents the results for the ZI-trader model by beginning from
the seminal results presented by Gode and Sunder (1993a), continuing with the critique
for the methods of Cli and Bruten (1997) and ending with the results for the dierent
demand and supply settings in the spirit of Cli and Bruten (1997). The last chapter
concludes the thesis.
11 Intramarginal traders are either buyers, whose valuation is larger than the equilibrium price, or sellers,
whose valuations is smaller than the equilibrium price.
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2 Single-unit continuous double auction
A double auction has got two sides, i.e. buyers and sellers, and traders on both sides can
submit oers to express their intentions instead of only one side (Friedman, 1991). This
is the main dierence between the double auction and the usual example of an auction,
i.e. the English auction that is better known as the open ascending price auction. In
an English auction only buyers are allowed to submit oers, i.e. bids, to express their
willingness to buy the auctioned asset. In contrast to the English auction, in a double
auction, traders submit oers, i.e. quotes, which are either bids or asks depending on the
intentions of the trader. Buyers submit bids, which specify both the amount of the asset
and the price that the buyer is ready to at most pay for a single asset. Similarly, sellers
submit asks, which specify both the amount of the asset and the price that the seller at
least demands for selling a single asset.
The two prexes continuous and single-unit are used to limit the double auctions
and also this study signicantly. First, the single-unit prex in front of the word double
auction refers to the fact that in the double auctions described in this thesis bids and
asks are restricted to trade a single unit of the asset at a time if not explicitly dened
otherwise. This simplication helps in understanding the double auctions and makes the
examples easier to follow. Such a simplication also ts the scope of this thesis well,
because, in the models presented later, the traders are restricted to use only single-unit
quotes. The second prex will be elaborated in the following subsection.
2.1 Continuous clearing
A double auction may be cleared using dierent mechanisms, and continuous clearing is
only one example of possible clearing mechanisms. In essence, the clearing mechanism is
used to dene how the bids submitted by the buyers are matched with the asks submitted
by the sellers (Gode and Sunder, 1993b). The idea is that in a continuously cleared double
auction the market is cleared each time a quote arrives at the market place (Gode and
Sunder, 1993b). In practice, continuous clearing means that the traders can submit quotes
at any time the market is active. The denition \any time the market is active" means
in the real world that any time period market is active is comparable to an interval of
positive real numbers, R+. This means that there is an innite number of possible time
moments in each interval for a quote to arrive at the market.
Although, for example, Gode and Sunder (1993b), Gode and Sunder (1993a) and
Gode and Sunder (2004) all use term continuous double auction, their denition of the
continuous double auction is dierent from the one given here. The essential dierence
is that the models by Gode and Sunder are restricted to work only in discrete time,
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while the denition given above does not use a discrete denition of time. Thus, the
denition given here is only one possibility, but it is denitely more elaborate than, for
example, the one given by Gode and Sunder; the discretization is only an approximation
of the "continuous" time in the real world. To the best of my knowledge, the agent-based
models presented in the literature have been based on discrete-time simulations and the
same ideas are also followed when constructing models in this thesis. Thus, although
there are approaches to also simulate without using the discrete denition for time, such
models are not constructed in this thesis to keep the presentation as close as possible to
the one in the literature.
The fact that traders may submit quotes whenever the market is active makes the
continuously cleared double auction a practical way to organize trading in exchanges with
a large amount of traders participating in the exchange. A good example is the change
from the call-auction used in the 19th century in New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)
to the continuously cleared double auction. The general dierence between the two is
the fact that a continuous double auction allows the traders to arrive at any time at
the market place and trade, while in a call auction the traders have to be present in
the market exactly at the time the call auction takes place (Kregel, 1992). According
to the intuitive arguments of Kregel, the change in the mechanism was derived from the
vast increase in the demand to trade in the NYSE, which in essence means that the
continuous double auction tted the exchange with increased demand better than the
call-auction. The success of the continuous double auction is also highlighted by the fact
that today the continuously cleared double auction is used in some of the most important
stock exchanges, which include Paris Bourse, NYSE, Toronto Stock Exchange and Nasdaq
(Madhavan, 2000). Thus, it appears to be essential to try to take the condition \at any
time market is active" at least somehow into account when modeling the price discovery
process in stock markets. One possibility is to use discrete time simulations, which are
presented in this thesis.
I will next characterize how the clearing mechanism works in a continuously cleared
single-unit double auction. In practice, continuous clearing means that when a quote
arrives, it is immediately compared against the quotes in the limit order book. In the
following presentation, I will only specify the price of each quote, because all the quotes
submitted are restricted to trade only a single unit of the asset. If the quote arriving at
the market is a bid, then it is matched against the asks in the limit order book. The
idea in matching the submitted bid to the asks in the limit order book, is to match the
submitted bid to the ask with the lowest price, i.e. the lowest ask or better known as
the best ask, in the limit order book. This means that in practice a trade takes place
immediately when the price in the submitted bid is larger or equal to the lowest ask price
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in the limit order book. If the price of the submitted bid is lower than the lowest ask,
then the submitted bid is appended to the limit order book. On the other hand, if the
quote arriving at the market is an ask, then it is matched against the bids in the limit
order book. The idea in matching the submitted ask to the bids in the limit order book
is to match the submitted ask to the bid with the highest price, i.e. the highest bid or
better known as the best bid, in the limit order book. In practice, a trade takes place
immediately, if the price of the submitted ask is lower or equal to the price of the highest
bid. If the price of the submitted ask is larger than the highest bid, then the submitted
ask is appended to the limit order book.
2.2 An example of a single-unit continuous double auction
In practice, the continuous clearing means that the limit order book has two queues: one
for the bids and one for the asks. When creating a model of the limit order book, the
solution is to keep the limit order books ordered by the prices and time priorities, which
means that the smallest ask and the highest bid can be easily found. The ordering with
time priorities in addition to the price priority is derived from the fact that usually the
limit order books also obey a time priority (Chiarella and Iori, 2002). This means that
the quotes that have been appended earlier to the limit order book have to leave the limit
order book by trade or by cancellation before a quote with a later time priority can be
cleared with a submitted quote.
Table 1: An example of a single-unit continuous double auction. It is assumed in the following
that all quotes, i.e. bids and asks, correspond to single units of asset, which allows one to
consider only the prices of bids and asks when dening them. At the beginning, time t = 0, the
limit order book has got three bids at prices f1,2,3g and three asks at prices f4,5,7g. At time
t = 1, an ask at price p = 6 arrives and is appended to the limit order book. At time t = 3, a
bid at price p = 4 arrives and it matches the lowest ask, which means that a trade takes place.
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 4
bids asks ask=6 bids asks bid=4 bids asks
3 7 3 7 3 7
2 5 2 6 2 6
1 4 1 5 1 5
4
An example of the clearing of the limit order book is given in table 1. There the limit
order book at time t = 0 consists of bids at prices f3,2,1g and asks at prices f7,5,4g. At
time t = 2 an asks at price 6, which was submitted at time t = 1, is appended to the
limit order book, because there exists no matching bid in the limit order book. Such a
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quote is better known as a limit order in the literature, because the submitted quote does
not lead immediately to a trade. However, the bid at price 4 submitted at time t = 3
is matched at time t = 4 with the lowest ask in the limit order book, because both the
submitted bid and the lowest ask have the same price 4. This means that the submitted
bid leads to a trade, and a quote that leads immediately to a trade is better known as a
market order in the literature.
There is one important issue that is vital to understand about the limit order-book
trading in a CDA. All of the quotes that are in the limit order book also have to obey
the immediate clearing condition. Thus, if there existed one bid and one ask in the limit
order book so that the price of the ask would be lower or equal to the price of the bid,
then a trade would take place immediately and the bid and the ask would be cleared
away from the limit order book. This means that assuming that the immediate clearing
condition is satised, we know that for all bids and asks in the limit order book it has to
be that the price bi of the bid i 2 N is always smaller than the price aj of any ask j 2 N
in the limit order book: bi < aj8i; j 2 N.
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3 Literature review
To create the foundation for this thesis, this chapter will review the most important
parts of literature in agent-based modeling. The rst section will briey discuss real and
articial stock markets in general and dene some of their main elements. This discussion
is an important building block for the following analysis of the previous literature, because
it denes most of the important concepts appearing in real markets from the agent-based
modeling point of view. The discussion is also meant to give perspective for the reader on
how a real stock market could be articially constructed in a plausible way. The section
following the rst will continue by briey discussing the general view about agent-based
models and give a few examples of models used in the earlier agent-based modeling
literature bearing in mind the concepts dened in the rst section.
After the rst two sections, the reader should have some idea about the agent-based
modeling literature. The sections following the rst two will concentrate on reviewing
the ZI-trader models, which forms the backbone for the chapter concerning the ZI-trader
model and results. The third section begins by taking a look at the seminal work of Smith
(1962) in the eld of experimental economics, which initially inspired the zero-intelligence
trader framework introduced by Gode and Sunder (1993a). The fourth section describes
ZI-trader models, which are the core of this thesis. The fth section will conclude the
review by examining the critique of the zero-intelligence trader model combined with the
latest achievements.
3.1 About the real and articial stock markets in general
There are certain characteristics that many real stock markets in general share, and
these characteristics are naturally relevant also for constructing articial stock markets.
Boer-Sorban (2008, p. 9) identies six main factors that appear in real markets. These
characteristics also seem to be in line with the ones reported in the seminal work concern-
ing the market microstructure of stock markets by O'Hara (1995, pp. 8-12). The factors
identied by Boer-Sorban (2008, p. 9) are traded instruments, orders and quotes, market
participants, trading sessions, execution systems and market rules. In the following, these
concepts excluding market rules will be elaborated with respect to agent-based modeling.
Market rules are left outside the contemplation, because they are considered as market
specic. Thus, market rules are irrelevant for the following analysis, which tries to isolate
some of the most important features common for most of the stock markets from the
agent-based modeling point of view.
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3.1.1 Market participants
The agents used in the articial market models typically correspond to investors and
market makers. These groups of participants can be used to form a crude approximation
of the interaction between the real market participants. In general, according to Boer-
Sorban (2008, p. 13) the participants in the real stock markets, i.e. traders, can be
roughly divided into two distinct groups: investors and market organization. In real
markets, investor can be any market participant, for example, an individual or a fund,
who does not belong to the market organization (Boer-Sorban, 2008, p. 13). If one looks
at the agent-based models presented in the surveys about the eld by LeBaron (2006),
Duy (2006) and Hommes (2006), it seems that it has not yet been that important to
exactly determine whether the investors were individuals or funds, but instead the models
have only assumed some investors that interact with each other. The reason has probably
been to reduce the complexity of the model as much as possible.
Similarly as investors, also the market organization in real markets can be divided into
groups. Boer-Sorban (2008, p. 13) divides traders belonging to the market organization
into two groups: brokers and market makers. According to her, the dierence between
the two groups is in their behavior: the brokers trade for their customers, while market
makers are responsible for creating the prerequisites that make the trading of brokers
possible. In practice, this usually means that market makers provide bid and ask quotes,
and guarantee liquidity to those quotes within certain limited amounts. This is, for
example, the case in NYSE, where the market makers, i.e. the specialists, quote bid and
ask prices that they guarantee to hold up to some particular number of assets bought or
sold (O'Hara, 1995, pp. 9-11).
In the agent-based modeling literature, one widely recognized example of a model
including the market organization has been presented by Das (2001). His model has a
single market maker and several investors, and the model itself appears to be a good
example of the models implemented in the literature. It seems that similarly as in the
model by Das, also more generally in the literature the brokers12, integral parts of the
quote-driven real exchanges, have been left outside the articial market models. The
reason has probably again been the ambition to create as simple models as possible. It
also seems that leaving them out has not yet been a problem, because already such simple
and crude models have proven quite good in explaining for example the stylized facts of
the prices of nancial assets in real markets (LeBaron, 2006; Hommes, 2006).
12 Refer for example to the agent-based models presented in the surveys about the eld by LeBaron
(2006), Duy (2006) and Hommes (2006).
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3.1.2 Traded instruments
The earlier articial market literature seems to have used on many occasions a single
traded instrument, which agents have valued in dierent ways. In general, the traded
instrument has been dened as any asset, which can be sold in real stock exchanges
(Boer-Sorban, 2008, p. 11). A single representative asset seems to have been preferable
over multiple dierent assets when looking at the earlier literature from the modeling
perspective. The main reason for this preference has probably been that the researchers
have tried to keep the number of parameters in the model as small as possible13. This
cautious simplication seems to be quite appropriate, because the literature lacks even
today synthesis about the other general modeling principles that should be used. Another
point to make is that a single asset can also be considered a feasible assumption when
compared to real markets, because the single asset may be thought of for example as a
share of an exchange-traded index fund.
Another important point of view from the modeling perspective is that the assets
used in models have had a certain value for the agents. This property has been probably
derived from the fact that many models in the literature seem to have assumed that the
willingness to trade is based on the dierential between the price of the asset in the market
and the value of the asset expected by the agent14. This assumption seems even intuitively
quite feasible as also argued by Boer-Sorban (2008, p. 12), because the real markets seem
to support the fact that the market price of a stock does not always correspond to the real
value, for example, measured by the liquidation value of the company. Thus, the agents
participating in the market may have dierent judgements about the correct valuation
of the asset in question. In general, one can conclude that the assumption of a single
representative asset used in the earlier literature seems quite appropriate, if the articial
markets presented in the literature are compared to the real markets.
3.1.3 Orders and quotes
Trading in many real markets is based on orders and quotes, which the traders use to
express their intentions in the markets. These concepts have been used in some articial
market models although many models have also diverged from them and instead assumed
in some cases a more simplied framework than the one specied by orders and quotes15.
In real markets, an order is used to specify an asset, a price and an amount of it to be sold
or bought, and orders can be either market or limit orders (Boer-Sorban, 2008, p. 12).
The dierence between the two classes or orders is following. A market order is executed
13 See for example the model by Chiarella and Iori (2002) and their argumentation about the used
assumptions. 14 See for example the surveys by Hommes (2006), Duy (2006) and LeBaron (2006).
15 See for example the reviews by LeBaron (2006), Hommes (2006) and Duy (2006).
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immediately at the best available price, while a limit order species a certain limit price,
which has to satised for the order to be executed (Boer-Sorban, 2008, p. 12). To be
more specic, limit orders are always appended to the limit order book, which contains all
available limit orders, while market orders are matched against a corresponding limit order
that exist in the limit order book. For example, for a market buy order, a corresponding
limit order would be a limit sell order, which has a lower or equal exercise price and
smaller or equal amount of assets. However, even in this simplied case the market rules
would be ultimately used determine how the matching of orders would be exactly done.
A general implication from these denitions for market and limit orders is that a market
order can be executed only, if there exists a limit order that fullls the market order. Also
in this case, the market rules are used to decide, how the market orders, which fulll the
amount of assets for an limit order only partially, will be matched. It is good to also note
that limit and market order trading also mean that the limit order book has to contain
at least a single limit order for a trade to take place.
Quotes and orders are dierent from each other, but also share many characteristics.
Quotes are, for example, used in a similar fashion as orders, and market makers quote
both price and quantity at the same time (Boer-Sorban, 2008, p. 15). The important
dierence between a quote and an order is the fact that a quote is placed by a market
maker, while an order is placed by a trader (Boer-Sorban, 2008, p. 15). A bid quote
implies that the market will buy a specied amount at a certain price. Similarly an ask
quote will imply that the market maker is ready to sell a specied amount at a certain
price. These principles are used in major world exchanges, which include for example
Paris Bourse, NYSE, Toronto Stock Exchange and Nasdaq (Madhavan, 2000).
There are a number of important concepts related to orders and quotes, which have
to be dened in detail. These concepts are extensively used in real markets, which
entails that it is natural to use them also when analyzing and constructing articial stock
markets. The two most important ones are two interrelated concepts: bid-ask spread
and liquidity. First, the bid-ask spread for a pure limit order book can be dened as
the dierence between the lowest ask price and the highest bid price Boer-Sorban (2008,
p. 12). Similarly, a market maker provides her customers with the bid-ask spread by
quoting both her bid and ask quotes. Second, both orders and quotes are closely related
to liquidity, which can be loosely dened as the ability to either buy or sell an asset at a
price close to the current market price (Boer-Sorban, 2008, p. 26). Traders can be seen
to oer liquidity by posting either orders or quotes and to take liquidity by accepting
already available orders or quotes (Boer-Sorban, 2008, p. 12).
Agent-based models have used both orders and quotes. The decisions to use either
one has depended on whether the model created has included market organization or
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not. At the moment, it seems that although there are also models including the market
organization, it is probably wise to still try to produce models as simple as possible, which
essentially means that the market organization is left more or less unnoticed. Adding the
market organization to the model should at least in principal increase the complexity of
the model: a pure limit order book model has only buyers and sellers, while in a model
with market organization the market makers would have to be included in the model in
addition to the buyers and the sellers. Although there might be models, which do not
follow this argumentation, at least the present literature appears to suggest these kinds
of simple dierences between the structures of the models16.
3.1.4 Execution systems, trading sessions and timing of the market
There are also a few concepts related to the structure of execution systems. According
to Boer-Sorban (2008, p. 14), the execution systems in real markets can be quote-driven,
order-driven or a hybrid of these two. In a quote-driven system, market makers participate
in every trade and are the only source of liquidity in the market, while in a order-driven
market buyers and sellers meet without intermediation. In a hybrid system, the traders
can choose between the limit order book and market makers. It seems that of those few
studies in agent-based modeling literature that have used a double auction setting, most
have implemented either the quote-driven or the order-driven system. This seems again
quite natural, because the hybrid system would again only increase the complexity of the
already complex models. A general dierence in agent-based models arising from these
denitions is also very intuitive: the order-driven models have needed only investors,
while the quote-driven models have in addition to investors needed also at least a single
market maker.
The structure of the trading sessions may also be an important determinant of market
prices. Earlier agent-based models have assumed dierent trading sessions structures,
which seems understandable as the session structures dier also in real markets. The
basic division between trading sessions is based on the degree of continuity of time, which
refers to the fact whether trading takes place continuously or periodically. Madhavan
(2000) deals the trading sessions in real markets based on the degree of continuity to two:
call market sessions and continuous sessions. In a call market session, the traders trade
at well-specied times, while in a continuous sessions traders are allowed to trade any
time the market is open. As indicated by both Boer-Sorban (2008, p. 95) and Madhavan
(2000), continuous sessions are in practice very common and used, for example, in Nasdaq,
NYSE and Paris Bourse.
However, Boer-Sorban (2008, p. 64) also notes that the trading sessions used in
16 Compare for example the model by Gode and Sunder (1993a) to the model by Das (2001).
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articial markets seem to be often call market sessions instead of continuous sessions. The
Best intuitive reason for this is again probably the complexity; in continuous sessions some
parts of the model, like agents decision problem, become easily very complex, because
there are more options to choose from than in call market sessions. In practice, there
are also markets that combine the call market and continuous sessions. For example,
in NYSE the trading begins with a call auction and then continues with a continuous
auction during the day (O'Hara, 1995, p. 10). Implementing such a market structure
in an articial market would certainly be interesting, but currently it seems that the
rst step is to develop models that use continuous trading sessions instead of call market
sessions, because that is one of the simplest ways to create models that mimic the real
markets more accurately.
Also the exact timing of the markets, i.e. the submission and execution of orders and
quotes, is important although it has been left more or less unnoticed in the agent-based
modeling literature as suggested by Boer-Sorban (2008, pp. 12,78-80). It seems that it
would be crucial to note that in real markets one can submit a market order, which is
not executed. This may occur in real markets, although at the time of submitting the
order the limit order book contained a corresponding limit order (Boer-Sorban, 2008, p.
12). Such an occasion is easy to construct theoretically, when the following conditions
are met: orders are handled in the arrival order, it takes a certain constant time, say 2
time units, for the orders to move to the market place and the traders can place orders
asynchronously in continuous or discrete time. These three facts together mean that when
agent A sends her order at time t = 0, when the limit order book contains a matching
limit order l, it might still be that another agent B has sent her order that matches the
same limit order l in the limit order book already at time t =  1. If agent A had no
knowledge about the order of agent B, then this would mean that agent A would think
that her order will be a market order although it will actually be a limit order. Such
happens, because the order of agent B would arrive at time t = 1 at the market place
and it would be cleared with limit order l. Thus, when the order of agent A would arrive
at time t = 2 at the market place, it would be appended to limit order book, if the order
did not match any other limit order in the limit order book than limit order l.
Thus, the timing of the markets has an impact on how the trading actually takes
place, because in principle every market order has a positive probability not to get exe-
cuted. However, in the earlier agent-based modeling literature such non-executed market
orders seem to have been mostly left outside the modeling frameworks. One important
reason has probably been that there exist also other open questions, like the price dis-
covery process discussed in this thesis, which have been seen as more important from the
modeling perspective. However, it is good to note that one of the rst ones to notice this
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dierence was Boer-Sorban (2008), and as her results suggest that the timing issue seems
to matter and should be considered in the future research.
3.1.5 Conclusions
The dierent concepts that have now been presented can be together used to form an
articial model of the stock market. As has already become apparent, dierent models
have used some of the concepts of real stock markets and have left some untouched.
Generally, the reason has probably mostly been the ambition to keep the models as
simple as possible17. Having now tried to capture the most important elements of the
real markets, it is important to notice that even if all these concepts were used in a single
model, such a model would still not be a complete description of the reality. Thus, there
still exist something that has not been dened: the traders decision-making mechanism.
When modeling, one has to dene both the market structure and the decision-making
mechanisms to create a model that could at least be thought as a crude approximation of
the real markets. These two aspects have been major issues in the earlier models, and so
also make the main dierences between dierent models as will be shown in the following
section.
3.2 A general view on agent-based modeling
Agent-based models have begun gathering attention during the last two decades. I will in
the following categorize the dierent models, introduce a few dierent models and discuss
them to give a thorough view of the agent-based modeling in general.
3.2.1 Few- and many-type models
One way to categorize the dierent models into two subgroups is to divide them into few-
type and many-type models (LeBaron, 2006). The dierence between these two types
lies the number of dierent trading strategies used by agents in the model. Trading
strategy can on the high level, sucient for now, dened as a strategy that explicitly
tells the agent how to trade a risky asset. Intuitively increasing the number of strategies
also increases the complexity of the model, because the number of dierent strategies
interacting with each other increases the complexity of the model. Increased complexity
of the model also creates another dierence between the simplest few-type models and the
many-type models: the few-type models are more analytic when compared to the many-
type models, which can be only assessed using simulations (LeBaron, 2006). Thus, a
17 This is the only argument that the previous authors, like Chiarella and Iori (2002), have used in
limiting their studies.
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large number of dierent model characteristics means that the model has to be evaluated
using computational experiments, because nding any analytical solutions is impossible.
The rst models introduced in the literature were few-type models according to
LeBaron (2006). One of the rst ones to introduce two types of dierent investors into
models was Zeeman (1974). He denes in his paper two dierent groups of investors,
i.e. chartists and fundamentalists, and a model for them using dierential equations and
catastrophe theory. Although this model is not essentially an agent-based model18, it is a
good example of the ideas used also in creating the agent-based models. In the model of
Zeeman (1974), the chartists are assumed to be investors, who base their decisions on the
state of the market. In contrast to the chartist, the fundamentalist base their decisions
on fundamental value of the asset in question. Zeeman's model relates the proportion of
chartist and the excess demand of fundamentalists at a certain moment to the rate of
change of the stock index. In short, the global dynamics that the model produces for a
stock exchange are following when an initial assumption used is that the fundamentalist
money is inserted into the market (Zeeman, 1974):
1. Rising price of the index attracts more chartists to the market, which creates a bull
market.
2. The increasing proportion of chartists will eventually make the fundamentalists
leave the market as the price of the index rises too high when compared to the
fundamental value.
3. When a large enough part of the fundamentalists has left the market, the chartist
are no more able to create prots with the rising markets. This turns the bull
markets to bear.
4. After the index has reached a suciently low value, a slow recovery begins as the
fundamentalist start reinvesting.
This simple model presents one idea about how the bear and bull markets could be created
in the markets. It also seems that Zeeman's model has been able to characterize something
valuable from the point of view of researchers, because according to Hommes (2006) many
similar behavioral elements have been used also in the more recent heterogeneous agent-
based models.
Another carrying theme in the agent-based modeling literature has been to analyze the
outputs of the articial markets against the outputs of real markets. In practice, such
18 This model is not an agent-based model in the sense dened for example by LeBaron (2006), because
the model is not a simulation of individual agents. Instead the model uses dierential equations to
characterize the dierent behaviors today often described using agents.
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experiments are done by comparing, for example, the price behavior produced by the
model to the real market price behavior as presented in the reviews by LeBaron (2006),
Hommes (2006) and Duy (2006). Some authors have tried to create such markets,
which would create a price behavior that mimics the real market price behavior as closely
as possible. One example of such a model was presented by Day and Huang (1990),
whose model was one of the rst ones to create stochastically uctuating prices and
randomly switching bear and bull markets. The model is created using two dierent
types of investors: - and -investors. The -investors can be best thought of as the
fundamentalist dened by Zeeman, because the -investors try to buy when prices are
below the fundamental value and sell when prices are above the fundamental value. On
the other hand, the -investors can be thought of as the \market sheep", who chase the
market prices similarly as the chartist presented by Zeeman (1974). In essence, the model
of Day and Huang (1990) seems to in many ways implement the ideas of Zeeman (1974)
in a simulation context, and is able to create some characteristics of real market price
behavior using such only a few assumptions.
The model of Day and Huang (1990) is important also from a theoretical point of
view. Using their simple model, the authors are able to show, that when the strength
of fundamentalist -investors is high enough, the prices converge to a point where no
net trading occurs. According to the authors, this can be seen as a situation where
there is no trading on information. On the other hand, when the strength of the chartist
-investors is large enough, the model creates a sequence of irregular bull and bear
markets. Unfortunately as also the authors note, the model is nowhere close to be seen
as a characterization of real markets as the model misses, for example, many important
endogenous feedback mechanisms.
3.2.2 Other dierences between the earlier models
Few- and many-type models are only one way to categorize the dierent agent-based mod-
els presented in the literature. I will next give a few more categorizations to highlight
the dierences between the earlier models in the literature. In general, one can proba-
bly say that the most important dierences between the models are in what is dened
exogenously and what is left endogenously dened by the model. Market price seems to
have been naturally endogenous in the earlier models. Market price also seems generally
to be one of the most important issues that the earlier models have generated as many
authors claim that their model is able to generate the common stylized facts for market
prices (LeBaron, 2006; Hommes, 2006; Duy, 2006).
Although in the earlier models the price is endogenously created, there are many
dierences between the price generation mechanisms. The branch of models based on the
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traditional nance literature, i.e. starting from Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), assumes a
Walrasian auctioneer mechanism. With such a mechanism all the agents know that in
every period the aggregate demand has to equal aggregate supply. In practice, for agents
this means that they optimize their portfolio assuming that the prices have to be set so
that an equilibrium prevails.
In reality, the Walrasian auctioneer mechanism can be described as a two-step proce-
dure as suggested by O'Hara (1995, p. 7) and Tesfatsion (2006). During the rst step, all
the traders inform sequentially the auctioneer about their demands at each price know-
ing that no trade will yet take place. During the second step, the auctioneer allows the
traders to trade at an equilibrium price determined during the rst step. Thus, by using
the Walrasian auctioneer mechanism, the earlier models have inserted an assumption of a
sequential equilibrium into each agents optimization problem. This assumption has been
criticized as too unrealistic, for example, by Boer-Sorban (2008), because it assumes that
all the traders are present in the market at the same time. As suggested in this thesis ear-
lier, for example, the trading in NYSE evolved from a call-auction to continuous double
auction, because all the traders were not able to be present in the same place at the same
time (Kregel, 1992). However, complementary mechanisms have been also introduced in
the earlier literature.
LeBaron (2006) divides the dierent price formation mechanism into four categories:
slow adjustment, equilibrium clearing, order book simulation and random trading. Slow
adjustment refers to a mechanism, where the market price is changed proportionally
to the excess demand by a market maker. An example of equilibrium clearing is the
Walrasian auctioneer mechanism, where all agents optimize their holdings knowing that
the market must clear. Order book simulation is based on simulating a order book, which
includes both buy and sell orders. An example of random trading is a situation where
agents randomly meet and trade, if both nd it protable.
Another dierence between the models lies in the fact what models assume about
trader types (LeBaron, 2006). Some models assume that xed proportions of dierent
agents interact in the model during the simulation. In such cases, the proportions are
taken as exogenous parameters. On the other hand, some models assume that the pro-
portions of dierent agents interacting in the market are determined endogenously. Such
models might, for example, assume that the traders change their behavior depending on
which agent type would have created best prots in the past.
A general view on agent-based models been now been presented. Hopefully, the reader
has gotten a rm grip on the possible dierences between the existing models. Next I will
present more elaborately the ZI-trader model and its primary applications. Essentially,
the reason to choose to start modeling using ZI-traders is based on the fact that the model
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with ZI-traders are the simplest agent-based models that the earlier literature exhibits.
3.3 Experimental economics and the seminal work of Smith
(1962)
ZI-traders that will be presented in the next section are in principal based on the experi-
mental framework presented by Smith (1962). Thus, to be able to understand ZI-markets
it is good to rst have a look at the framework for experimental economics presented al-
ready in the 1960s. I will next rst present carefully the framework, results and methods
from the article by Smith (1962). In his seminal work in experimental economics, Smith
(1962) presented a framework that can be used to design, implement and asses an exper-
iment with human subjects in a double auction market. The general idea characterizing
the spirit of experimental economics is well presented by Smith (1962) when expressing
caution about his experiments, which
\are intended as simulations of certain key features of the organized mar-
kets and of competitive market generally, rather than as direct, exhaustive
simulations of any particular organized exchange".
This expression of caution applies well also to the simulations presented in this thesis,
because it is certainly hard to imagine a model that would capture all the relevant features
of real exchanges. In his article, Smith (1962) presents results from nine dierent market
types, which are dierent from each other in terms of demand and supply schedules. The
following discussion will reveal how the experiments were organized in practice.
3.3.1 Framework
The experimental procedure used by Smith (1962) is based on dividing the human sub-
jects into two subgroups: buyers and sellers. The selected buyers are informed of their
private valuations, and are explained that they are not allowed to buy the asset at a price
that exceeds their valuation. Similarly, the selected sellers are informed of their private
valuations, and are explained that they are not allowed to sell the asset at a price that
is lower than their valuation. In addition, both buyers and sellers are explained that by
engaging in a transaction, they make a pure prot that is determined by the excess of
their transaction price p and their valuation v. For sellers, the prot is the dierence
between the transaction price p and the valuation v determined as p v, while for buyers
the prot is the dierence between the valuation v and the transaction price p determined
as v   p. All the traders, i.e. buyers and sellers, are allowed to trade a single asset once,
and after that they leave the market.
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The valuations given to buyers and sellers can also be used to determine the theoreti-
cal demand and supply curves, i.e. the demand and supply schedules, and the theoretical
equilibrium price and quantity. Smith (1962) emphasizes the use of the word \theoreti-
cal", because in a real exchange none of the participants, i.e. neither traders or market
organization, know the exact valuations of other participants. Another good reason to
use the word theoretical is the fact that the demand and supply schedules change imme-
diately after the rst trade has taken place, because one seller and one buyer leave the
market. Thus, after each transaction the demand and supply curves change. However,
in an experimental setting the knowledge about the valuations appears to be very note-
worthy, because, for example, the theoretical price appears to have a strong relation with
the transaction prices in the experiments of Smith (1962).
In practice, the theoretical demand and supply curves follow straight from the knowl-
edge about the valuations of individual traders. As the theoretical demand curve depicts
the amount demanded at each price, it is possible to count the number of agents willing
to buy at a particular price to form the demand curve. Similarly, the supply curve can
be created by counting the number of agents willing to sell at a particular price. On
the other hand, the theoretical equilibrium price and quantity can be determined by the
intersection of the constructed demand and supply curves. The interesting results is that
also the experiments reported by Smith (1962) also suggest that the transaction prices
tend towards the theoretical equilibrium price as time progresses in his experiments.
In addition, the demand and supply curves seem to have certain forms. It is worth
noting that as the buyers are ready to buy at any price lower than their valuation, the
number of buyers willing to buy an asset can only decrease with the price. This means
that the demand curve as a function of quantity is always decreasing, but not strictly.
Similarly, because the sellers are ready to sell at any price higher than their valuation,
the number of sellers ready to sell an asset can only increase with the price. Thus, the
supply curve as a function of quantity is always increasing, but not strictly. As noted by
Smith, it is worth recognizing that using these denitions for demand and supply curves,
the curves stipulate the maximum amounts of bought (demand) and sold (supply) at any
price in the market. This follows straight from fact that the human traders participating
in the market are instructed to act according to their valuations, and from the fact that
the demand and supply curves are created by using the valuations of the traders in the
manner as described above.
The idea of Smith (1962) was to deal the experiments in individual trading days. In
practice this meant that each of the experiments conducted by Smith (1962) lasted several
trading periods, or days, which all had a time limit from 5 to 10 minutes depending on the
number of participants. Smith (1962) explains that the period continued at most to the
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time limit, but the period also ended if the bids and asks did no longer lead to transactions.
In practice, this meant that one or two nal calls were made before announcing that the
market was ocially closed. After a period had ended, another was immediately started,
and the traders were reinitialized with their initial values, which meant that all of them
were again given the right to trade a single asset during the new period using the same
valuations that they were given in the beginning of the whole experiment. This process
continued until a certain number of completed periods, depending on the experiment,
was reached. However, as Smith (1962) notes, one issue that does not appear in real
markets and appears in the experimental markets is the fact that the demand and supply
conditions were in most cases held constant when a new period was started; real markets
in contrast are likely to experience uctuating demand and supply. To control for this
issue, Smith also experienced with markets where demand and supply were changed at
some point of the experiment.
Smith (1962) also controlled the information available to the participants carefully.
The idea was to keep the traders' information set as close as possible to the situation
appearing in real markets. In practice, this meant that traders had no knowledge of
other traders' valuations other than the transaction prices, bids and oers they witnessed
appearing in the market.
3.3.2 Results
Smith (1962) measured the overall convergence of transaction prices towards the equi-
librium price by introducing the coecient of convergence  of transaction prices from
the equilibrium price. To dene the coecient of convergence, I will rst dene the root
mean squared deviation of transaction prices from the equilibrium price p0, henceforth
referred to as RMSD. The RMSD for prices pi, i = 1; 2; ::; n and equilibrium price p
 can
be dened as
RMSD =
vuut nX
i=1
(pi   p)2
n
: (1)
Smith (1962) counted RMSD using all of the transaction prices available from a single
period and the theoretical equilibrium price. Using the above presentation for the RMSD
in equation 1, the coecient of convergence  can be calculated by dividing the product
of RMSD and 100 with the theoretical equilibrium price p as follows
 = 100
qPn
i=1
(pi p)2
n
p
: (2)
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In essence, the coecient of convergence in equation 2 measures the distance of the
transaction prices pi from the equilibrium price p
.
The results of Smith (1962) show a strong tendency of transaction prices to tend
towards the theoretical equilibrium. The results Smith (1962) presents show that the
coecients of convergence decrease monotonically in all of the other tests except test 819.
The experiments performed by Smith (1962) were dierent from each other in terms of
the type of the demand and supply schedules used. In some of the tests demand and
supply were symmetric in terms of a vertical line drawn at the level of equilibrium price,
while in other tests the market exhibited excess demand or excess supply for the traded
asset. Smith (1962) found also some evidence of the fact that the prediction of the static
equilibrium requires knowledge about the shapes of the supply and demand curves and
about their intersection; strongest evidence found by Smith (1962) was about the fact
that a at, i.e. perfectly elastic, supply curve leads to an empirical equilibrium price that
is higher than the theoretical equilibrium price. However, Smith (1962) suggested further
research on this issue.
3.4 Models with zero-intelligence traders
Gode and Sunder (1993a) were the rst ones to propose the ZI-traders in their seminal
paper, which compared the eciency of the CDA markets populated by dierent trader
types. Essentially Gode and Sunder (1993a) showed that by replacing the human traders
in a continuous double auction market by \zero-intelligence" programs, the eciency
of the CDA market may still stay close to the same level. According to them, the ZI-
traders with a budget constraint are sucient to raise the eciency of the CDA market
to a level that is comparable to the level that human subjects reach in an experimental
setting. This made the authors claim that the eciency of the continuous double auction
is mainly derived from its structure, which means that the eciency is independent of
the trader's capabilities like reasoning and cognition. In essence, this would mean that a
high eciency of the markets could be achieved even with very simple trader behavior.
I will in the following rst present carefully the original model of Gode and Sunder
(1993a). After that I will proceed to presenting the claims and the results introduced
in the article by Gode and Sunder (1993a) that were partly already visited above. This
section will end with a review of the critique that the ZI-trader model has aroused in the
literature.
19 In the test 8, the double auction was changed to an auction, where only sellers were allowed to quote
prices. This means that test 8 can be more or less ignored this time, because it was not about testing
double auctions.
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3.4.1 Framework by Gode and Sunder (1993a)
Initially Gode and Sunder (1993a) dened zero-intelligence traders as programs, which
generate \random bids and oers" in the following way. At the beginning of the experi-
ment, each agent was either chosen to be a buyer or a seller and was given an individual
valuation vi for each unit i = 1; 2; :::;m to be sold or bought. During the experiment,
buyers created bids and sellers oers, which were independent draws from identical uni-
form distributions on a range from minimum price 1 to maximum price 200. The fact
that such agents do not remember, observe or seek to maximize prots induced Gode
and Sunder (1993a) to name their traders as zero-intelligence traders. Gode and Sunder
(1993a) named such simplest form zero-intelligence traders as ZI-U traders. Such nam-
ing convention was supposed to highlight the dierence of ZI-U traders as unconstrained
traders to the constrained traders introduced later.
Algorithm 1 summarizes the behavior of a simple ZI-U agent when the agent is selected
to participate in the market. The ZI-U agent has to have a eld indicating its own
valuation v although the ZI-U agent does not use it when trading. The valuation is
needed, because it is used to measure the prots the agent is able to create by trading.
The buyer indicator b is used to dene whether the agent is a buyer, b = 1, or a seller,
b = 0, and is initialized to either of the two possible integer values accordingly. Again,
although the buyer indicator is not used in algorithm 1, it still has to initialized and
present, because \the market" needs to know whether the quote submitted is a bid or an
ask.
Algorithm 1 ZI-U trader
Require: valuation v, buyer indicator b 2 f0; 1g
1. Choose valuation q  U(1; 200)
2. Submit q
Results of Gode and Sunder (1993a) suggest that the budget constraint is an important
ingredient for the high allocative eciency of the CDA markets with ZI-traders. The
authors dened the ZI-traders with the budget constraint, henceforth referred to as ZI-C
traders, in a similar manner as the ZI-U traders were dened above. However, the ZI-C
traders do not submit entirely random bids and asks, but instead submit bids and asks
with respect to their individual valuation vi for the i'th unit. Thus, a ZI-C -buyer creates
bids uniformly on a range of integers from minimum price 1 to vi for the i'th unit, and
a ZI-C -seller creates asks uniformly on a range of integers from vi to maximum price
200 for the i'th unit. The behavior of a ZI-C trader is summarized in algorithm 2; it is
in essence similar to the one presented for a ZI-U trader and the main dierence is in
the use of the budget constraint. The dierence between the results from the markets
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with the constrained and unconstrained traders are the most important ndings Gode
and Sunder (1993a) present in their article in terms of this thesis.
Algorithm 2 ZI-C trader
Require: valuation v, buyer indicator b 2 f0; 1g
1. quote q =  1
2. if b then
3. Choose quote q  U(1; v) fbuyerg
4. else
5. Choose quote q  U(v; 200) fsellerg
6. end if
7. Submit quote q
The third type of traders Gode and Sunder (1993a) analyzed were humans. The
authors used 12 unique human traders, who were graduate students of business and were
motivated by the fact that their course grade was dependent on their success in the
markets. Thus, in practice the humans were also informed of the budget constraint,
because they were given individual valuations of the asset in question. Essentially the
idea of Gode and Sunder (1993a) was to compare the humans to the ZI-traders in a
similar environment as the one introduced by Smith (1962).
Gode and Sunder (1993a) also made several modeling choices, which are important to
note when analyzing their model. The rst three decisions are such that Gode and Sunder
(1993a) chose them in their own words to simplify the implementation, while the rest of
the choices are reported here to introduce the characteristics of the model by Gode and
Sunder (1993a) properly. First, the authors assumed that each bid, ask and transaction
was valid only for a single unit. Thus, the traders were limited to trade a single unit at
a time. Second, the transaction price was selected to be the price at which a bid and
ask were matched. In eect, this means that the transaction price equals the price of
the earlier quote, whether it is a bid or an ask. Third, they assumed that a transaction
canceled all unaccepted bids and oers from the limit order book; an assumption better
known in the literature as the resampling assumption20.
When comparing the third assumption to the real markets like NYSE, it seems that
the assumption is unrealistic. Because of the third assumption, the market is started over
after each transaction although that does not happen in reality. Interestingly, recent lit-
erature also seems to suggest that by removing the resampling assumption, the allocative
eciency of the CDA market with ZI-traders decreases as shown by LiCalzi and Pellizzari
(2008). Thus, it may well be that the resampling assumption has actually contributed
a lot to the allocative eciency of CDA markets with ZI-traders. However, it is also
20 For more information one can see for example the discussion by LiCalzi and Pellizzari (2008)
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good to keep in mind that Gode and Sunder (1993a) used a very small population of
traders. Thus, to compensate for the small amount of traders it might have been a good
idea to use resampling. However, LiCalzi and Pellizzari (2008) use substantially larger
populations than Gode and Sunder (1993a). Another point to make is also the fact that
in experiments with human subjects the resampling assumption might have contributed
to keeping the human subjects active in the market.
The rest of the modeling choices reported now are more practical and concern the
exact choices that have to be done when implementing the articial market model of
Gode and Sunder (1993a). The fourth assumption used was that at the beginning of the
auction each trader was endowed with a right to buy one or more units of the asset being
auctioned. Fifth, at the beginning of the auction each trader was given an individual
valuation vi of the i'th asset bought, which makes it possible to dene the prot of a
trader for selling at price p as p   vi and buying at price p as vi   p. Sixth assumption
was that all the traders participating in the markets were divided in each experiment
evenly in the beginning into two distinct groups: buyers and sellers. Thus, although
Gode and Sunder (1993a) varied the number of assets the agents were to trade and the
valuations, they kept the number of buyers and sellers interacting in the market close to
even amounts.
Seventh, in each experiment the authors used a population of only 12 homogeneous
traders. Eight, Gode and Sunder (1993a) specied ve dierent markets with dierent
supply and demand schedules to support their ndings in dierent market conditions.
Apparently, these dierent market conditions were supposed to thoroughly cover the set
of all possible market conditions. However, as noted by Cli and Bruten (1997), there are
certain market types, for example a market with xed supply and demand, that were not
considered by Gode and Sunder (1993a). All the results the authors reported from each
of the markets were for homogeneous populations of traders (humans, ZI-U and ZI-C).
Thus, all in all, the authors reported results for 15 dierent markets: for 3 populations
of traders in each of the ve markets. Ninth, each market was run for six periods, and
each period lasted for a nite time of half a minute for machine traders and 4 minutes for
human traders. Tenth, when each of the periods started, all the market variables were
set to the starting values. This assumption was made to create an environment, which
would resemble the trading from day to another day.
One issue has to be still dened: the arrival of traders to the market. Gode and Sunder
(1993a) must have assumed something about this issue, although it is not explicitly
dened in their article. Without more knowledge about their article, an educated guess
would be that the authors assumed each trader to participate in the CDA market all
the time. This seems to be in line with their presentation and conclusions: the authors
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conclude that as the CDA progresses inside the period (day), the opportunity set of the
traders narrowed and caused the transaction price to tend towards the equilibrium price.
If the authors did not assume that each trader participates all the time in the auction,
then drawing such a conclusion would require reasoning about the probability of a trader
to participate in the auction during the nite life time of the auction. It also seems
that the later presentations about the same subject assumed that all the traders are all
the time actively participating in the market (Cli and Bruten, 1997; Gode and Sunder,
2004).
In addition, the authors give more precise denitions about the trading mechanism
used in their two other articles concerning ZI-traders21. These models can be used to
deduce something about the trading mechanism used in the 1993 article. The former, i.e.
the 1993 article, is actually also cited in the main paper, which introduced ZI-traders for
the rst time to the research community. The authors cite their 1993 article in their main
paper, because it is a model which yielded similar results as the 1993 model described
above, but was restricted to a case where a trader had only a single unit to sell or buy.
As both the 1992 paper and the 2004 paper describe a model that utilizes a continuous
double auction without replacement, I suppose that assuming that also the main paper
used a similar CDA without replacement is justiable.
Thus, trading in ZI-trader markets is divided into rounds. During each round the
trader population, i.e. both sellers and buyers, is sampled without replacement and the
selected trader is given a chance to trade. This process is continued until there is no
trader left to sample or a transaction occurs Gode and Sunder (2004). If a transaction
occurs, then the limit order book is emptied and a new round begins from scratch. On
the other hand, if there is no trader left to sample and no transaction has occured, then a
new round is started. Such a mechanism ensures that each trader gets a chance to trade
before any other trader has had two chances to trade. Now that the model of Gode and
Sunder (1993a) has been thoroughly explained, it is time to have a look at its results.
3.4.2 Results concerning transaction prices by Gode and Sunder (1993a)
The results from the models presented by Gode and Sunder (1993a) seem to support
their claims about the eciency of the markets with ZI-traders. However, the credibility
of their results is partly decreased by the fact that they do not support their ndings by
using statistical signicance tests or by reporting statistical gures of the market, but
instead merely report the simulation results in pictures and interpret them.
The authors report the transaction prices times series and demand-supply schedules
for all of the ve markets, and the results suggest that the dierent traders make a
21 See Gode and Sunder (1993b) and Gode and Sunder (2004).
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dierence. Gode and Sunder (1993a) found out that for the human traders the transaction
prices seem to tend toward the equilibrium price, while the ZI-U -traders seem to act
completely randomly. The ZI-C -traders seemed to be somewhere in between the humans
and ZI-U -traders with certain tend in transaction prices towards the equilibrium price.
The transaction prices of ZI-C -traders are not as volatile as with ZI-U -traders. Still,
the transaction prices of ZI-C traders exhibit more volatility than the transaction prices
of human traders. However, the dierence between ZI-C and human traders is in the
periodicity of transaction prices. The results suggest that while human traders remember
the last closing price from the previous period in both the experiments of Gode and Sunder
(1993a) and Smith (1962), ZI-C traders do not.
Gode and Sunder (1993a) highlight three features of ZI-C transaction price time series,
which are supported by the ndings from all of the ve markets they consider. First,
neither ZI-C of ZI-U traders seem to learn anything from the earlier periods as expected.
In contrast, the humans seem to continue trading with a transaction price close to the
closing price of the latest period. Second, the variance of transaction prices in ZI-U
markets seems to highest, and the variance of transaction prices in the human markets
seems to be lowest. The ZI-C markets seem to be somewhere in the middle between
these two. Third, the transaction prices in the ZI-C markets seem to tend towards the
equilibrium price, while the ZI-U markets show no such development. This argument is
also backed up by a presentation root mean squared deviation (RMSD) of prices from the
equilibrium price for each of the ve markets averaged over the six periods to strengthen
their argument.
RMSD of prices pt, t = 1; 2; ::; n from the equilibrium price p
 is dened as given
in equation 1 above. However, in contrast to Smith (1962), it appears that Gode and
Sunder (1993a) have counted RMSD for each transaction in a market using the data
from the six periods they ran each of the markets. Although Gode and Sunder (1993a)
have not documented their use of RMSD carefully, a later paper by Cli (1997) presents
the calculation of such a RMSD measure thoroughly in the same manner as presented
above. The idea is that the transactions for each period, i.e. day, are matched by their
occurrence: the rst transaction of each day are used to calculate the rst RMSD measure,
and the second trades the second measure.
Results of Gode and Sunder (1993a) suggest that in ZI-C and human markets the
transaction prices converge towards the equilibrium price. The RMSD of prices from
equilibrium in each of the ve markets seems to tend towards zero for ZI-C and human
traders, while this cannot be said about the ZI-U trader markets. According to authors,
this shows that the ZI-C -agents induce the market price to tend towards the equilibrium
price although again no statistical tests are presented. The argument is backed up by a
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regression, which shows that the coecients of RMSD regressed against the transaction
sequence number seem to yield negative slopes in each of the markets. Unfortunately, no
statistical measures, like t- or p-values for the coecients, are reported for the regressions,
which makes it quite impossible to really investigate the quality of their regression anal-
ysis. Thus, the regressions do not seem to really add much value to the more qualitative
results.
The interest in the results of Gode and Sunder (1993a) is especially in the dierence
between the ZI-U and ZI-C traders as the transaction prices of ZI-C traders resemble
more closely the transaction prices of human traders. The authors argue that the tend-
ing towards the equilibrium price in ZI-C markets can be explained by the narrowing
opportunity set of ZI-C -traders. According to them, in the beginning of each period, i.e.
day, the probability of seeing a bid with a price higher than equilibrium price or an ask
with a price lower than the equilibrium price, is larger than in the end of the period. They
heuristically explain it is most probable that a buyer with a valuation higher than the
equilibrium price, i.e. an intramarginal buyer, or a seller with a valuation lower than the
equilibrium price, i.e. an intramarginal seller, trade during the beginning of the period.
In eect this means that the agents trading in the end of the period have valuations closer
to the equilibrium value, because the intramarginal traders have already left the market,
because they traded in the beginning of the period. Although such ideas are intuitively
plausible, the presentation of Gode and Sunder (1993a) lacks all the quantitative proofs.
3.4.3 Results concerning the eciency of the markets by Gode and Sunder
(1993a)
After having presented the tendency of the transaction prices to converge towards the
equilibrium price, Gode and Sunder (1993a) move to presenting results about the e-
ciency of the market. First they dene the maximum total prot that can be earned by
all the traders as the sum of producer and consumer surpluses that can be both counted
using the knowledge about the trader's valuations and the theoretical equilibrium price.
Consumer surplus can be counted iteratively by summing all the positive dierences be-
tween the demand function and the equilibrium price. Similarly the producer surplus can
be counted by summing the positive dierences between the equilibrium price and the
supply function. After that Gode and Sunder (1993a) dene the allocative eciency of a
market to be "the total prot actually earned by all the traders divided by the maximum
total prot that could have been earned by all the traders\.
Gode and Sunder (1993a) continue by reporting the eciencies of the dierent mar-
kets. First, they note that in ZI-U markets all the possible trades took place, while in
ZI-C and human markets some units were not traded. Gode and Sunder (1993a) explain
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this by claiming that without the budget constraint, given enough time, all the possible
trades will take place, while such does not necessarily happen in ZI-C markets. In ZI-U
markets the traders will eventually bid and ask such prices that trades will take place,
while in ZI-C markets it may well be that there are trades that can never take place, be-
cause the budget constraint restrains the traders from quoting sucient prices for trades
to take place.
In general, the eciencies of the ve markets were highest for human trader markets,
who were able to reach almost 100 percent eciency in all markets during all periods.
This nding has been suggested also in the earlier literature about human experiments,
so it seems credible and supports the fact that the experiment was conducted properly. In
addition, the eciencies of ZI-C markets were close to the eciencies of human markets.
However, the eciencies for the ZI-U markets were clearly lower when compared to two
other. Using primarily these arguments Gode and Sunder (1993a) concluded that the
main reason for the high allocative eciency of double auctions is in the market discipline
and not in the capabilities of individual traders.
3.4.4 Other results of Gode and Sunder (1993b, 1997)
Gode and Sunder (1993b) propose in their paper a lower limit for the eciency of the
continuous double auction markets with ZI-C traders. The market structure is otherwise
exactly the same as in the paper discussed above22, but the dierence between the models
is in the fact that Gode and Sunder (1993b) use a model where the traders can trade at
most a single asset during a single period. To derive the expected eciency the authors
dene the extramarginal traders as agents who have a valuation situated to the right
from the intersection of demand and supply curves, and intramarginal traders as agents
who have a valuation that situates them to the left from the intersection of demand and
supply curves. The approximation for the expected eciency of the CDA market with
ZI-C traders presented by Gode and Sunder, is a function of the number of intramarginal
traders participating in the market.
Result of Gode and Sunder (1993b) highlight an important factor contributing to
the price discovery process. According to the results of Gode and Sunder (1993b), the
eciency of continuous double auction is derived from the dierences in the proportions of
intra- and extramarginal traders participating in the market. This virtue is also important
to the price discovery process in ZI-C markets, because as the intramarginal traders
have left the market the trading ceases; the extramarginal traders cannot trade between
themselves.
This simple result can be easily shown to be true by creating an example. Assume
22 See above the discussion about the paper by Gode and Sunder (1993a).
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a market full of extramarginal buyers and sellers with an equilibrium price p. Then the
valuations of all extramarginal buyers are lower than the equilibrium price, which means
that ZI-C buyers can bid only prices that are lower than p. Similarly, the valuations of all
extramarginal sellers are higher than the equilibrium price, which means that the ZI-C
sellers can ask only prices that are larger than p. This means that no trade takes place
in the market, because all the bids are by denition strictly lower than all asks. Thus,
the price discovery process can take place in ZI-trader markets only as long as there are
intramarginal traders left participating in the market.
In a later article, Gode and Sunder (1997) determine the allocative eciency of dier-
ent market types, which include also the continuous double auction. The authors present
a number of exact formulas for the eciency of the dierent market types. The impor-
tance of their results in light of this thesis is again in the fact that the results conrm
and dene more exactly the more earlier results presented by Gode and Sunder (1993b)
mentioned above: the proportions of intra- and extramarginal traders contribute to the
price discovery process.
3.4.5 Critique by Cli and Bruten (1997)
Probably one of the hardest critiques for the ZI-trader model has been presented by Cli
and Bruten (1997)23. The results presented by Cli and Bruten (1997) have been cited
in several publications ever since24, although the analysis of Cli and Bruten itself has
not been widely questioned in the citing publications. In essence, the results of Cli and
Bruten (1997) reject the convergence of ZI-C markets to the equilibrium price in certain
market types that will be dened below. The authors present both mathematical analysis
and simulation experiments, which both lead to the same conclusion. According to them
more than zero-intelligence is in general required from the trading agents to make the
markets behave as if the traders were humans. In addition, according to Cli and Bruten
(1997), only the chosen parameters of the models in the ZI-C markets presented by Gode
and Sunder (1993a) guaranteed the convergence to the equilibrium.
The heart of the argument by Cli and Bruten (1997) is the analysis of probability
density functions for bids and asks in ZI-C markets. Generally, the probability density
function (PDF) of a random variable describes the relative likelihood of that random
variable to have a certain value. More formally, dene the probability space as (
;F ; P ),
where 
 corresponds to the sample space, F to the sigma algebra and P to the probability
measure. Then, a continuous random variable X can be dened as a function X from
the sample space to real numbers, X : 
 ! R, if for all x 2 R we have that f! 2 
 :
23 See also the more elaborated article about the same subject by Cli (1997) 24 For example Google
Scholar gave 9th of March, 2011 216 citations for the paper by Cli (1997).
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X(!) = xg 2 F . Now, a PDF of a random variable X is dened as a function fX  0
such that for any set B  R we have P (X 2 B) = R
B
fX(x)dx and the integral over the
whole space
R
fX(x)dx equals one.
Cli and Bruten (1997) derive the market wide PDFs for bids and asks by rst dening
the PDFs for both ZI-C sellers and buyers. To make the following presentation as simple
as possible, it will be assumed in the following that each agent can trade at most a single
asset as was done also in the previous section. Again, this should not be a problem,
because already the results by Gode and Sunder (1993a) were assured using agents, who
were allowed to trade at most a single good during the experiment. Generally, for ZI-
C agents the PDFs are uniform distributions, which essentially means that the PDF
is constant over its support. For ZI-C buyer the support is dened as an interval of
real numbers from minimum price 1 to valuation v, and for a ZI-C seller the support is
dened as an interval of real numbers from valuation v to maximum price 200. Qualitative
versions of such PDFs are given in gure 1.
Figure 1: Qualitative PDFs of quotes of a ZI-C buyer and seller as proposed by Cli and Bruten
(1997). The range of possible prices in the market is determined by minimum price (min price)
and maximum price (max price), while the valuation vi; i 2 N is an agent specic variable. The
distributions of ZI-C agents are uniform distributions, which essentially means that the PDF is
constant over its support. For a ZI-C buyer the support is dened as an interval of real numbers
from 1 to valuation vi, and for a ZI-C seller the support is dened as an interval of real numbers
from valuation vi to maximum price 200.
Buyer
Price
P D
F
min price valuation max price
Seller
Price
P D
F
min price valuation max price
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Figure 2: Qualitative PDFs of quotes in a market with three ZI-C buyers and sellers with
unequal valuations. The range of possible prices in the market is determined by minimum price
(min price) and maximum price (max price), while the valuations v1 < v2 < v3, are agent
specic. The minimum bid price (min bid) corresponds to lowest valuation in the group of all
buyers in the market, and the maximum bid price (max bid) corresponds to the highest valuation
in the group of all buyers in the market. The minimum ask price (min ask) corresponds to the
lowest valuation in the group of all sellers in the market, and the maximum ask price (max ask)
corresponds to highest valuation in the group of all buyers in the market. The PDF of bids
decreases from valuation v1 to v3, because the number of buyers willing to bid at a higher price
decreases as the price increases. Similarly the PDF of asks increases from valuation v1 to v3,
because the number of sellers ready to sell at a higher price increases as the the price increases.
Buyers with valuations: v_1 < v_2 < v_3
Price
P D
F
min price min bid = v_1 v_2 max bid = v_3 max price
Sellers with valuations: v_1 < v_2 < v_3
Price
P D
F
min price min ask = v_1 v_2 max ask = v_3 max price
Assuming that all the valuations of buyer agents are not the same, means in eect
that the PDF of bids market wide is a decreasing function in price. This is derived from
the fact that the number of buyer agents willing, i.e. having a positive probability, to bid
with at a certain price decreases as the the price increases. For example25, assume that
there exist three buyer agents in the market: agent 1, agent 2 and agent 3 and that they
have valuations v1, v2 and v3 correspondingly. If all the three agents demand a single
good and the valuations are not equal, then the agent with the higher valuation is always
also ready to buy at a price that is accepted by the agent with the lower valuation, but
this is not the case the other way around. Thus, if v1 < v2 < v3, then there exists a single
agent, i.e. agent 3, in the market who has got a positive probability to bid a price, which
25 See gure 2 for an illustration of this example.
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is in the range (v2; v3). Similarly, there exists two agents in the market who have got a
positive probability to bid a price, which is in the range (v1; v2). Thus, the market wide
PDF is decreasing with the price. Similarly, when the valuations of all seller agents are
not the same, then one can easily see that the PDF for market wide asks is an increasing
function in price using similar arguments. The qualitative versions of such PDFs for
market wide bids and asks are presented below in gure 2 for a market with three buyers
and three sellers with valuations fv1; v2; v3g:
By increasing the number of agents participating in the market, the step size in the
market wide PDF for bids and asks decreases. According to Cli and Bruten (1997)
this should result in probability density functions for bids and asks that have constant
slopes. Examples of such qualitative probability density functions are given in gure 3.
At rst sight such result might appear to be correct, but actually the argumentation is
not sucient to really characterize the probability density functions for quotes in ZI-C
markets. I will address this issue further in the Models-section and for now it is enough
to know that the correct probability density functions for quotes dened later are similar
in their characteristics to the ones proposed by Cli and Bruten (1997).
The essence of the argument of Cli and Bruten (1997) is that the probability density
function for the all transaction prices during a SCDA is given by the intersection of
market wide probability density functions for bids and asks. This argument is based
on the heuristic that according to Cli and Bruten (1997) for an ask and a bid to be
valid, it has to be that the transaction prices are determined by the intersection of
the probability density functions for the quotes. The intersection for the market wide
probability density functions for bids and asks is presented in gure 4. Cli and Bruten
(1997) use the intersection argument also to derive analytic measures of the expected
value of the transaction price, and compare the derived expected values to the theoretical
equilibrium price and average transaction prices. Especially, Cli and Bruten (1997)
claim that the expected transaction price is dierent from the equilibrium price when
the supply and demand schedules are changed radically from the ones presented by Gode
and Sunder (1993a). Thus, according to Cli and Bruten (1997) the results of Gode and
Sunder (1993a) were based on appropriately chosen demand and supply schedules
Cli and Bruten (1997) criticize Gode and Sunder (1993a) that all the markets Gode
and Sunder reviewed in their study were in terms of demand and supply schedules in
similar. Cli and Bruten (1997) derive the expected value of the transaction prices for
four market types, which are according to them dierent in terms of supply and demand
schedules. The dierences between the market types reviewed by Cli and Bruten (1997)
are summarized in gure 5. Market A presented in the top left corner of gure 5 can be
characterized as symmetric in terms of demand and supply. Term symmetric is derived
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Figure 3: Qualitative PDFs of quotes in a market with ZI-C buyers and sellers as proposed by
Cli and Bruten (1997). The range of possible prices in the market is determined by minimum
price (min price) and maximum price (max price), while the valuations are agent specic vari-
ables. The minimum bid price (min bid) corresponds to lowest valuation in the group of all
buyers in the market, and the maximum bid price (max bid) corresponds to the highest valua-
tion in the group of all buyers in the market. The minimum ask price (min ask) corresponds to
the lowest valuation in the group of all sellers in the market, and the maximum ask price (max
ask) corresponds to highest valuation in the group of all buyers in the market. The probability
to see a bid decreases from price min bid to max bid, because the number of buyers willing to
bid at a higher price decreases as the price increases. Similarly, the probability to see an asks
increases from price min ask to max ask, because the number of sellers ready to sell at a higher
price increases as the the price increases. See gure 2 for a market with three sellers and three
buyers.
Buyers
Price
P D
F
min price min bid max bid max price
Sellers
Price
P D
F
min price min ask max ask max price
from the fact that demand and supply are geometrically symmetric in terms of a horizontal
line, if such would be drawn at price p0 for market A. I will use henceforth use the
term symmetric demand and supply schedules to refer to a market type as the one now
presented for market A. Market B, the top right corner in gure 5, corresponds to a
situation where all the sellers have the same valuation. This means that the supply curve
is at. Market C, the bottom left corner in gure 5, corresponds to a situation where
both demand and supply curves are at, but in addition there exists excess demand in
the market. In the bottom right market D in gure 5, both demand and supply curves
are also at, but this time the market exhibits excess supply. It is good to notice that
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Figure 4: Intersection of qualitative PDFs of quotes in a market with ZI-C buyers and sellers as
proposed by Cli and Bruten (1997). The range of possible prices in the market is determined
by minimum price (min price) and maximum price (max price), while the valuations are agent
specic variables. The minimum bid price (min bid) corresponds to lowest valuation in the
group of all buyers in the market, and the maximum bid price (max bid) corresponds to the
highest valuation in the group of all buyers in the market. The minimum ask price (min ask)
corresponds to the lowest valuation in the group of all sellers in the market, and the maximum
ask price (max ask) corresponds to highest valuation in the group of all buyers in the market.
Cli and Bruten (1997) argue heuristically that the intersection corresponds to the probability
density function of the transaction prices, because according to their the intersection denes all
the valid bids and asks during the CDA.
Price
P D
F
min price min ask min bid max ask max bid max price
Buyers
Sellers
Intersection
each of the markets have a unique theoretical equilibrium point characterized by the
intersection of demand and supply curves. In a market with multiple equilibrium prices
the characterization of an equilibrium price could be problematic, while in a market with
a single equilibrium there is no such problem.
Cli and Bruten (1997) also present simulation results for all of the four markets,
and the results appear to support their arguments. Only the results from market A with
symmetric demand and supply schedules show that the equilibrium price is equal to the
expected transaction price. In all of the other markets, the equilibrium price diers from
the expected transaction price, and the empirical average transaction price seems to be
in all cases in line with the expected transaction price. For a careless reader, such results
would suggest that in the market other than A, the ZI-C traders do not converge to
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Figure 5: Dierent market types presented as by Cli and Bruten (1997) in their gure 1. In
each of the four markets depicted, horizontal axis corresponds to quantity and the vertical axis
corresponds to price. DD and SS curves correspond to demand and supply curves, while P0 and
Q0 refer to equilibrium price and quantity. Equilibrium price and quantity are determined by
the intersection of DD and SS curves in each of the four markets.
equilibrium. However, it is questionable that Cli and Bruten (1997) report only average
transaction prices and leave out from their contemplation, for example, the closing prices,
which could have shown how strong the tendency towards the equilibrium really is.
This is important as the results of Gode and Sunder (1993a) were in principal about
the tend of the transaction prices towards the equilibrium price during a trading day and
not about the average correctness of equilibrium price as an forecast of the transaction
prices. This problem is noted also by Cli and Bruten (1997), but for some reason the
exact results have been left to the more elaborate version of the same study by Cli
(1997). In the elaborated version, Cli (1997) reports the RMSD of transaction prices
from the equilibrium price as suggested rst by Smith (1962) and used by Gode and
Sunder (1993a) to measure the convergence towards the equilibrium. The results are in
other ways similar to the ones presented using averages, but when using RMSD also the
market B seems to show some tendency of transaction prices towards the equilibrium
price (Cli, 1997).
The general plausibility of the arguments expressed above was rst questioned by
Othman (2008). The argumentation presented by Cli and Bruten (1997) has a blind
spot, because the authors do not have explicitly covered the reasons why the PDF of
transaction prices should be the intersection of PDF's for bids and asks (Othman, 2008).
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Essentially, Othman (2008) presents a counter example that shows how at least in one
market type the intersection of the PDFs of bids and asks does not determine the PDF for
transaction prices in the market correctly. In addition, Othman (2008) also characterizes
the seemingly complex probability density function for the transaction prices, which is
clearly more complex than what Cli and Bruten (1997) proposed. Thus, there are
certainly reasons to question at least parts of the presentation of Cli and Bruten (1997).
Another important problem with the method by Cli and Bruten (1997) is that their
analysis considers only the rst round of SCDA. Thus, actually their analysis of the
intersection tries only to characterize the expected value of the transaction price of the
rst trade after the market is started. The reason for this is that the demand and supply
schedules change after two traders, i.e. a seller and a buyer, are removed from the market,
because they have traded all they were allowed to trade. Cli and Bruten (1997) also
self note vaguely this issue, but claim that as their empirical simulation results seem to
suggest their theory to be close to correct, there is no need to start revising the theory.
However, the results of Othman (2008) seem to suggest that actually the theoretical
results are not correct, but should be instead revised and properly reassessed.
It is also interesting that the analysis of Cli and Bruten (1997) takes no view on
the claim of Gode and Sunder (1993a) about the narrowing range of feasible transaction
prices. This is especially interesting, because the buyers and sellers with the intramarginal
valuations in the SCDA market are the ones that are most likely to trade during the
beginning of the day, while the buyers and sellers with extra marginal valuations seem to
trade closer to the end of the day according to heuristic arguments of Gode and Sunder
(1993a). Thus, it would seem interesting to look quantitatively how the probability
density functions for the bids and asks change during the day when the amount of traders
in the market changes. As it is clear that this issue is important in understanding ZI-C
markets, it will be taken into consideration in the empirical part of this thesis. To the
best of my knowledge, no other author has previously taken a quantitatively look at it
although Brewer et al. (2002) have proposed similar ideas as will be discussed next.
3.4.6 Critique by Brewer et al. (2002)
The critique by Brewer et al. (2002) was pointed towards the convergence of transaction
prices in ZI-C traders markets. As the rst authors in this line of literature, Brewer et al.
(2002) dened the properties of transaction price convergence towards the equilibrium
price explicitly as follows:
1. Initial transaction prices are further from the equilibrium than nal prices.
2. Variance of transaction prices decreases over time.
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3. If a parameter change moves the equilibrium price, then the transaction prices move
towards the new equilibrium.
Although, for example, the study of Gode and Sunder (1993a) lacked similar denition,
Gode and Sunder used similar arguments to argue about the convergence of ZI-markets.
I will essentially use the rst two bullet points of the above denition to measure the
convergence of transaction prices towards the equilibrium price in the following. The
third bullet point is left out of the contemplation, because changes in demand and supply
schedules are outside of the scope of this thesis.
The essential contribution by Brewer et al. (2002) was to dene a setting, which
does not allow the transaction prices of ZI-C trader markets to converge towards the
equilibrium price. The essential ingredient was to create a market, where the amount of
intramarginal traders stays relatively constant. Brewer et al. (2002) named such a market
as the continuously refreshed supply and demand (CRSD) market. Intuitively, in such
a market with ZI-C traders, the transaction prices do not converge to the equilibrium
price, because every time an intramarginal trader leaves the market, a new one arrives
to ll in. Brewer et al. (2002) showed experimentally that in a CRSD market the ZI-C
traders are not able to show transaction price converge towards the equilibrium price.
Brewer et al. (2002) also introduced the idea of a Marshallian path in the context of
ZI-C traders. A Marshallian path is a sequence of trades such that traders are paired
from left to right along supply and demand curves (Brewer et al., 2002). According to
Brewer et al. (2002), trading in ZI-C markets as suggested by Gode and Sunder (1993a)
takes place in a manner that resembles the Marshallian path, and their idea in the rst
place was to design the CRSD markets so that the Marshallian path does not lead to
transaction price convergence. In terms of experimental economics, the results of Brewer
et al. (2002) essentially show that the ZI-C traders are too simplistic to really describe
human behavior, because they showed that with human traders CRSD markets exhibit
transaction price convergence, while with ZI-C traders no such convergence is present.
The idea in this thesis is to explicitly and quantitatively show that the price conver-
gence in ZI-C markets can be explained using the idea of Marshallian path rst introduced
to ZI-C traders context by Brewer et al. (2002). Essentially, I will experimentally show
the proposition by Brewer et al. (2002) that the probability that an intramarginal buyer
trades with an intramarginal seller is higher than any other combination of intra- and
extramarginal traders. In addition, it would be interesting to know the probabilities to
trade between the traders inside the groups of intramarginal buyers and sellers. This is
interesting, because it is reasonable to expect that, for example, a intramarginal buyer
with the highest valuation is the most probable intramarginal trader to trade during a
single round.
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3.4.7 Critique by Gjerstad and Shachat (2007)
Gjerstad and Shachat (2007) criticize the conclusions made by Gode and Sunder (1993a)
from two perspectives. First, according to Gjerstad and Shachat (2007), the transaction
prices do not converge to equilibrium values in the simulations of ZI-C trader markets
presented by Gode and Sunder. The main argument is that the ZI-C traders do not
remember anything from the previous periods, which makes them to start the converge
towards the equilibrium always from scratch when the market is restarted. However, the
arguments about the convergence made by Gode and Sunder (1993a) were mainly about
the convergence inside the periods. Thus, actually the rst critique made by Gjerstad
and Shachat (2007) concerns mainly the denition of convergence, which is not explicitly
dened in either studies.
The second critique posed by Gjerstad and Shachat (2007) concerns the denition of
zero-intelligence. Gjerstad and Shachat show in their paper that the denition of budget
constraint by Gode and Sunder (1993a), is actually an individual rationality constraint.
The dierence in the economic sense is that a budget constraint is only a constraint in the
maximization problem, while an individual rationality constraint means that an agents
takes part only in transactions, which increase or leave her utility constant. Thus, also
the other critique by Gjerstad and Shachat (2007) is mainly directed towards the loose
denitions of the concepts that Gode and Sunder (1993a) used in their presentation.
3.4.8 ZI-trader model today
Ladley and Schenk-Hoppe (2009) presented another model of ZI-C traders, where the
traders were allowed to enter and exit the market with certain probabilities. In addition,
compared to the original model by Gode and Sunder (1993a), the model by Ladley
and Schenk-Hoppe (2009) also incorporated an order book mechanism that allowed the
modied ZI-C traders to also trade more than a single unit at a time. Interestingly,
such an extended model was able to create many of the stylized facts of the order-book,
like the shape of the order book, size of spreads and conditional probabilities of order
submissions that are exhibited by the real markets (Ladley and Schenk-Hoppe, 2009).
As a conclusion, I view that the ZI-C trader model should be evaluated more quan-
titatively than has been done in the past. The present literature seems to suggest that
the ZI-C traders are a simple approach to create some of the stylized facts appearing in
real markets. Thus, it also seems to be important to explain why the markets with ZI-C
traders exhibit such characteristics. In the following, I will explain how an agent-based
model for ZI-traders can be created and what methods will be used to assess the model
more quantitatively than has been done in the previous literature.
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4 Methods
The following presentation will explain how the models used were created and take a
look at the learning process that was went through when implementing the agent-based
model in practice. There are a number of issues that had to be taken into account when
designing and implementing an agent-based model.
4.1 Building an agent-based model using SimPy and Python
One of the rst decisions to make when implementing the model in practice was the selec-
tion of the programming language used. Initially I preferred Python over other possible
languages, because it oers a forceful and minimalistic way to present complex struc-
tures. For example, when comparing Python and its standard library implementation of
list to Java and its comparable standard library class ArrayList, the use of list in Python
requires less lines and denitions. Such abilities in general make the designing of com-
plex structures simpler in Python than, for example, in Java. As Python also oers a
general discrete time simulation package SimPy, it seemed wise to choose Python as the
programming language to be used.
SimPy also seemed to suit the agent-based context well, because it provided the
basics needed for a simulation of simultaneously interacting agents. This means that
the selection of SimPy as the framework for agent-based modeling did not constrict the
implementation of dierent models. This was an important issue when choosing the
framework, because I had no earlier experience from implementing agent-based models
in practice. There are a number of dierent programs used in dierent elds of science26,
and, without a doubt, all of them have their good and bad sides.
Simultaneously interacting agents are implemented in SimPy using Python generators.
This property allows, for example, the agent process to be interrupted at a certain point
in time. After that the generators oer the possibility for the agent to continue the
processing from exactly the same point where the processing was interrupted. In the
agent-based modeling context, this means that many agents may interact simultaneously
with each other. Such a possibility is especially interesting if the agents are supposed to
interact with each other without central coordination. In such a simulation, it may, for
example, happen that an agent, say agent A, tries to acquire a resource, for example, a
limit order book, but another agent, agent B, has already reserved it. This means that
agent A has to take another decision. A simulation environment that does not allow
simultaneous interaction of agents cannot simulate such collisions.
26 A good example of the large number of dierent environments used in agent-based modeling is the
list provided by the agentlink.org: http://eprints.agentlink.org/view/type/software.html, which
was visited 30 January, 2011.
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However, the downside of using SimPy is naturally eciency. Essentially, it means
that the number of agents that can be used in simulations are smaller than with more
ecient approaches. This is derived from the fact that the simulation in an environment
allowing the simultaneous interaction agents, like SimPy, needs more steps than a sim-
ulation in an environment that does not allow the simultaneous interaction of agents.
This is quite an intuitive issue, because the simulation of interacting agents requires the
simulation environment at each time step to check the status of each agent somehow. An
environment not supporting simultaneous interaction can proceed without such checks,
which means that the latter needs less steps. At rst place, this did not seem to be a
problem and the results provided in this thesis are certainly comparable to the results of
Gode and Sunder (1993a) in terms of the number of agents used. However, if one wanted
to increase the number of agents dramatically, then it would be necessary to change from
SimPy to a simpler model, if possible. In the heuristic tests done using SimPy and a
home desktop, it seemed that increasing the number of agents from 150 to 500 increased
the running time of the model dramatically. Thus, in case one wanted to simulate a larger
amount of agents, it would be necessary to optimize the interaction of agents.
It is also good to note that the use of SimPy caused the implementation of a simple
ZI-trader model to become more complex than would have been needed. The ZI-traders
presented by Gode and Sunder (1993a) are centrally coordinated, which means that there
is no need for the simultaneous interaction of agents. Thus, all the checks that SimPy
does for the agents implicitly could have been optimized away. However, in the case of
the models that are based on simultaneous interactions of agents, like the one presented
by Boer-Sorban (2008), one needs to use a package like SimPy or otherwise such models
cannot be implemented. As this thesis has in general been a learning process, it was
certainly a good decision to choose a simulation framework that did not restrict the
implementation of dierent models. However, in practice, it seems that the ZI-trader
models used in this thesis could have been implemented in a more straight forward and
computationally ecient manner than will be presented in the following.
From the point of view of the user, a SimPy simulation builds primarily on three
dierent types of classes: Process, Resource and Simulation. To create the rst ZI-trader
model, agent, market maker and generator were implemented as subclasses of the Process
class, the limit order books were implemented as subclasses of the Resource class and the
simulation itself was implemented as a subclass of the Simulation class as is presented in
gure 6. The following subsection will present the most important decisions regarding the
design of the used classes, while the whole source code can be found from the Appendix
A. The following presentation is supposed to introduce the SimPy to the reader at the
same time with the simplest ZI-trader model.
43
Figure 6: A unied modeling language class diagram for the implemented SimPy simulation.
Agent, market maker and generator were implemented as subclasses of the Process class, the
limit order books were implemented as subclasses of the Resource class and the simulation
itself was implemented as a subclass of the Simulation class.
Simulation
ResourceProcess
Agent GeneratorMarket maker Limit-order book
0...* 0...*
4.1.1 Agent and Market maker
Implemented Agent class has two most important methods: init () and work(), while
the rest of the methods implemented are used to simplify the implementation of the
work()-method. Agents are initalized using the init ()-methods, which is called by
the generator when initializing the agents. Generator initializes all of the agents in the
beginning of the simulation. After that, it does not have any meaning in the simulation,
which is also the reason why it is only briey mentioned here. init ()-method initial-
izes the characteristics of agents by choosing their type to be a seller or a buyer, and
after that according to their type chooses their valuation. When initializing the agents,
init ()-method also counts the demand and supply curves for the market according to
the valuations of the agents that it initializes.
The work()-method is the main method of the Agent class, and implements the actions
of both seller and buyer agents. Principals that govern the actions of both buyers and
sellers are very similar as both of the agents try to trade a single asset once and after
that leave the market. The actions of an agent are restricted in time by the actions of
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both other agents and the market maker. The agents and the market maker use global
elds, selectedBuyer, selectedSeller, buyerQueue and sellerQueue, to communicate with
between themselves about the status of the market; communication is needed to somehow
coordinate the market.
When the simulation starts, all of the agents are initialized and after that all the agents
enqueue themselves either to buyerQueue or sellerQueue. The market maker waits for
all the agents to be in the two queues, and after that selects randomly one agent from
the queues to trade. The traders see the market maker's selection by looking at the two
elds: selectedBuyer and selectedSeller. After one of the elds is changed, all the traders
check the eld corresponding to their type and see if they were selected. The selected
trader then checks, if there exists a limit order that satises her bid/ask. If such a limit
order exists, then she submits a market order by trading at the limit price. If the trader
does not nd a satisable limit order, she leaves an own limit order at her bid/ask price.
After she has traded or left a limit order, the trader sets the corresponding selectedSeller
or selectedBuyer to a value, which informs the other traders that the selected trader is
ready. After the selected trader is ready, the market starts a new round.
MarketMaker class is used to centrally coordinate the interaction of the traders and to
select the trader to trade at each round. The class has only a single method work(), which
is executed as long as the market is functioning. After the market maker is initialized,
she waits until all of the agents are initialized and appended into the buyer and seller
queues. Next, the market maker chooses the agent that is selected to trade. The agent is
selected randomly from the group of agents, who have not traded in the ongoing round;
when all agents have traded on the ongoing round, the market maker starts a new round.
After selecting the trader, the market maker waits until she has traded and after that
starts the while loop from the beginning.
4.2 Random number generation
Random number generation is naturally always an important part of a simulation ex-
periment. However, the earlier literature in agent-based modeling has not in all cases
documented the used pseudo random number generators extensively. For example, Gode
and Sunder (1993a) do not even mention the random number generation and its implica-
tions. On the other hand, for example, Cli and Bruten (1997) use a cookbook algorithm
from the numerical recipes textbook27. Although that algorithm might have been state
of the art in the end of 1990s, today there are better solutions available.
Python oers a good random number generator from the standard library. According
27 For that algorithm refer to the numerical recipes textbook (Press et al., 1992).
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to the documentation for Python's version 2.6.528, those Python's functions that are
used in this thesis and are implemented the module \random", use an algorithm called
Mersenne Twister. It was initially developed by Matsumoto and Nishimura (1998), and
is today by far one of the best pseudo-random number generators available, which means
that the results should stand out in a comparison with any other well-known pseudo-
random number generators available today (L'Ecuyer, 2001).
28 See the webpage http://docs.python.org/release/2.6.5.
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5 Results
This chapter presents the results from of the models created. I will rst present a model
of ZI-traders to benchmark my results to the previous literature29. After that, the second
section will critically review the methods of Cli and Bruten (1997) and introduce a few
additional methods to analyze the ZI-C markets. After that using the created methods,
an analysis of the convergence of bids, asks and transaction prices in symmetric ZI-C
markets is presented. Finally, the third section uses the most essential methods presented
in the second section to briey review the dierent market types introduced by Cli and
Bruten (1997).
5.1 ZI-model with symmetric demand-supply schedule
The rst model is a replication of the model and results presented rst by Gode and
Sunder (1993a) and later by Cli and Bruten (1997). However, to create a model as
simple as possible, the traders are restricted to trade only a single asset; after that they
leave the market. This assumption should not be a problem, as the study by Gode and
Sunder (1993b) suggests that this change should not aect the results. On the other
hand, when using this assumption, it is possible to argue how the population of traders
evolves throughout the continuous double auction, which appears to be a very important
factor contributing to the price discovery process. The analysis presented in the end of
this section is largely based on the fact that the traders leave the market after they have
traded once during a single period of trading.
The model created exhibits similar characteristics for dierent output measures as the
one presented by Gode and Sunder (1993a). These dierent characteristics are divided to
qualitative dierences, eciency of the markets and transaction price time series charac-
teristics in a similar way as was done by Gode and Sunder (1993a). In the following, the
characteristics are reviewed and compared at the same time to the results of Gode and
Sunder (1993a). The results presented in this section are based on the same assumptions
regarding the used market type as described by Cli and Bruten (1997) with the symmet-
ric case. The selected valuations for both buyers and sellers were exactly the same in all
of the runs of the model and can be dened by using the following arithmetic sequence:
pj = p0 + j; (3)
where p0 = 26,  = 2 and j = 0; 1; 2; :::; 74. Thus, the arithmetic sequence presented
in equation 3 denes the valuations as 26; 28; :::; 172; 174. This sequence has 75 distinct
29 As suggested by Davis et al. (2007), it is important to try to verify that the created simulation model
works correctly and one way to do this in practice is to compare the results to the earlier results.
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valuations, and each of the valuations was given to two agents, i.e. to one buyer and
to one seller. This means that the market consisted of 150 agents, which were equally
divided to buyers and sellers. As the market type was exactly the same for both ZI-U and
ZI-C traders, the dierences in the results next presented can be argued to be derived
from the dierences in the capabilities of the two trader types.
According to Cli and Bruten (1997) the symmetric market type is the one that was
chosen by Gode and Sunder (1993a) to arrive at the expected results. It is still a good
starting point, because the results from a symmetric market can be easily compared to
the results of Gode and Sunder. After the basic results have been conrmed, it is possible
to evaluate also the more complex results.
5.1.1 Qualitative dierences
A qualitative view to the results is best acquired by eye-balling the transaction price time
series and demand-supply schedules from single runs of the ZI-C and ZI-U models. The
transaction price time series and demand-supply schedules for a ZI-U market with 150
traders in markets that lasted for 150 rounds are presented in the top panel of gure 7.
A similar graph for a ZI-C market lasting for 150 rounds with 150 traders is presented in
the top panel of gure 8.
Certain qualitative issues seem to be clear already from the two gures presented.
First of all, the traders in the ZI-U markets seem to trade more than ZI-C traders. In the
ZI-U market presented in gure 7, a transaction seems to take place at regular intervals
of rounds as long as the market is active, while in the ZI-C markets presented in gure
8 transactions take place only during the rst 50 rounds. In the particular ZI-U market
presented in gure 7, all the traders participating in the market traded, and the market
was closed after round 77 as all of the traders had left the market. In contrast to this,
in the ZI-C market presented in gure 8, the market was not closed until the maximum
number of rounds, 150, was reached. This happened, because there were still ZI-C buyers
and sellers left in the market trying to trade. However, although the market was active
as long as possible with ZI-C traders, no trades took place after the last transaction that
took place on round number 71.
Table 2 quantitatively shows these dierences for the ZI-U and ZI-C markets. There
the rst column reports some measures from the ZI-U market presented in gure 7, while
the second column reports the same measures for the ZI-C market presented in gure 8.
The table shows that the trading in ZI-U market did not stop before the 75th transaction.
This means that the maximum number of possible transactions with 150 traders were
undertaken, because a single transaction always need two counterparts, one buyer and
one seller. However, in ZI-C markets, the trading ceased after the 41st transaction had
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Figure 7: Transaction price time series, symmetric demand-supply schedules, best quotes and
the amount of bids and ask in the limit order book for a single run of ZI-U market with 150
traders and 150 rounds. The traders were divided into buyers and sellers equally, and the
valuations are specied in equation 3. In all of the three panels, the transaction price times
series is presented by a dark gray solid line as a function of rounds, and the equilibrium price is
presented by black dashed line. In the top panel, demand as a function of quantity is presented
in light gray, and supply as a function of quantity is presented in black. Demand and supply
functions were counted using the valuations of individual traders, and the equilibrium price was
determined by the intersection point of demand and supply functions. In the middle panel, the
\best" quotes in each round are presented; the best quotes are dened as the highest bid and
the lowest ask in each round. Highest bids are reported by light gray triangles and the lowest
asks are reported by black triangles. In the bottom panel, the number of bids is depicted by
light gray line with triangles, while the number of asks is presented by black line with triangles.
The number of both bids and asks are reported for each transaction that took place during the
single run of the model.
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taken place.
The statistics from 100 runs of both ZI-U and ZI-C markets also seem to support
these ndings from single markets. Table 2 also presents the overall results from 100
runs of both ZI-U and ZI-C markets. All of the runs reported in table 2 were executed
using unique seeds for the random number generator, which should guarantee that the
runs were not identical in the sense that the traders would have been participating in the
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Figure 8: Transaction price time series, symmetric demand-supply schedules, best quotes and
the amount of bids and ask in the limit order book for a single run of ZI-C market with 150
traders and 150 rounds. The traders were divided into buyers and sellers equally, and the
valuations are specied in equation 3. In all of the three panels, the transaction price times
series is presented by a dark gray solid line as a function of rounds, and the equilibrium price is
presented by black dashed line. In the top panel, demand as a function of quantity is presented
in light gray, and supply as a function of quantity is presented in black. Demand and supply
functions were counted using the valuations of individual traders, and the equilibrium price was
determined by the intersection point of demand and supply functions. In the middle panel, the
\best" quotes in each round are presented; the best quotes are dened as the highest bid and
the lowest ask in each round. Highest bids are reported by light gray triangles and the lowest
asks are reported by black triangles. In the bottom panel, the number of bids is depicted by
light gray line with triangles, while the number of asks is presented by black line with triangles.
The number of both bids and asks are reported for each transaction that took place during the
single run of the model.
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market in exactly the same manner in all of the runs. The results are reported in the same
way as in Cli and Bruten (1997) by using averages and the standard deviations. The
results from the 100 runs of the ZI-U market show that the number of transaction in all
of the runs is constantly 75, because the mean is exactly 75 and the standard deviation is
equal to zero. In the ZI-C markets, the average number of transactions was 41.5, and the
standard deviation was 1.26. These results also suggest that the number of transactions
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taking place in the ZI-C markets, was in all of the runs just above 40 transactions.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics from 100 runs of the model for both ZI-U and ZI-C markets
with symmetric demand-supply schedules. The traders were divided into buyers and sellers
equally. All the runs were done using the same symmetric demand and supply schedule, which
are depicted in both of the gures 7 and 8. The rst two columns summarize statistics for
two single runs of the models; the same runs are also depicted in the same gures 7 and 8.
The results for the 100 runs are presented in the following four columns by using averages and
standard deviations.
SINGLE RUN AVERAGES
ZI-U ZI-C
ZI-U ZI-C Average St.dev. Average St.dev.
Equilibrium price 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.00 100.0 0.0
Eciency (%) 0.0 98.6 0.0 0.00 96.6 0.016
Number of transactions 75 41 75.0 0.00 41.43 1.29
Mean of prices 93.0 102.6 101.6 6.40 100.6 2.34
Median of prices 101.4 103.8 101.8 9.99 100.8 2.48
Maximum price 197.4 150.2 197.5 2.22 149.5 10.49
Minimum price 3.5 53.6 3.8 2.49 51.6 10.60
Standard deviation of prices 56.5 21.9 57.3 2.72 21.7 2.62
Kurtosis of prices 1.8 2.81 1.82 0.13 3.12 0.58
Skewness of prices 0.01 0.05 -0.02 0.15 -0.01 0.38
25 percentile 35.1 87.3 53.4 10.27 88.2 3.33
75 percentile 139.3 116.4 150.0 8.97 113.3 3.79
Coecient of Convergence 56.6 21.8 57.3 2.64 21.6 2.56
The results presented until now suggests that in the experiments conducted the ZI-
U traders were given an environment, where it was very likely that all of the traders
would trade. Exactly the same results was reported by Gode and Sunder (1993a) as they
pointed out that in their ZI-U markets
\the maximum possible number of units (equal to the lower of the total units
sellers are allowed to sell and the total units the buyers are allowed to buy)
is always traded."
The results for the ZI-C markets seem to also be similar to those reported by Gode and
Sunder (1993a): ZI-C traders trade only as long as their constrained behavior is possible
and a feasible counterpart is found. These results also suggest that the chosen maximum
number of rounds, i.e. 150, used is enough for both the ZI-U and the ZI-C traders to nd
the feasible trades and trade, because the results appear to be similar to the ones given
by other authors.
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5.1.2 Eciency
An important and widely recognized result presented by Gode and Sunder (1993a) is
the dierence in the observed eciencies of ZI-U and ZI-C market models especially
when compared to the eciencies of human markets. Gode and Sunder reported that
ZI-C markets attained eciencies close to the levels that the human traders achieved in
their experiments, while in the markets of ZI-U traders the eciency levels were clearly
lower. Figure 9 shows that the eciency of ZI-C markets was is in all of the 100 runs
of the model consistently close to nearly 100 percent, while the eciency of ZI-U market
was constantly 0.0 percent. Table 2 shows quantitatively the same results: the average
eciency of ZI-U markets was 0.0 with a standard deviation of 0.0 while the average
eciency of ZI-C markets was 96.4 with a standard deviation of 0.016. These results
together conrm the results of Gode and Sunder: the ZI-C markets seem to be clearly
more ecient than ZI-U markets.
The fact that the eciency of ZI-U markets is constant is consistent with the results
of Gode and Sunder (1993a). They found out that the eciency of the ZI-U markets
depended only on the initial demand-supply schedules. The reason for the constant
behavior is the fact that all possible trades always take place in ZI-U markets. Thus,
both the trades that create surplus and the trades that do not create surplus take place,
which means that the eciency does not depend on how the traders are matched to trade.
In addition, if the demand-supply schedules used are symmetric, then the eciency of
the ZI-U markets is also close to zero as will be next shown quantitatively.
Table 3: A simple example about the eciency of ZI-U markets with symmetric demand-supply
schedules. The table denes a ZI-trader market with six agents, who are equally dealt to
buyers and sellers. Each agent is allowed to trade a single asset. In addition, the valuations of
the traders are chosen so that the demand-supply schedule is symmetric. The valuations are
dened as positive real numbers so that there is one buyer and one seller for each valuation
vi 2 R+; i = 1; 2; 3.
Buyers Sellers
Name Valuation Name Valuation
A v1 D v1
B v2 E v2
C v3 F v3
The eciency of ZI-U markets with symmetric demand-supply schedules can be in-
spected more closely by using an example. First assume that the valuations of buyers
and sellers are as given in table 3. In the ZI-trader markets, the surplus of a buyer can be
dened as the dierence between buyer b's valuation vb and the transaction price p in the
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following way: vb   p. Similarly the surplus extracted by the seller can be dened as the
dierence between the transaction price p and the seller s's valuation vs in the following
way: p  vb. By using these two results, the surplus extracted from a single trade, where
one buyer and seller are matched to trade, can be dened as the sum of the surpluses of
the buyer and the seller participating in the trade
vb   p+ p  vs = vb   vs: (4)
As equation 4 shows, the surplus extracted from a single trade depends only on the
valuations of the buyer and the seller participating in the trade. This suggests that
actually the only important issues contributing to the eciency of the ZI-trader market
are the way how the traders are matched to trade and the way how the valuations of
the traders are specied. The dierent ways to match the buyers and sellers given in
table 3 are dened in table 4, which shows why the overall eciency of a market with
symmetric demand and supply schedules is zero when all the traders in the ZI-U market
trade. Table 4 shows that the only issue contributing to the overall eciency of the ZI-U
market are the dierences in the valuations of the traders participating in the market.
In a completely symmetric case, as presented in tables 3 and 4, each of the valuations
v1; v2; v3 is used once on both sides, i.e. buyer and seller sides, in each of the matchings of
traders, which means that the overall eciency is in all cases equal to zero. Thus, all the
dierent ways to match the traders participating in the market lead to the same overall
eciency result, which depends solely on the demand-supply schedules.
In addition, it also seems that, if there are n 2 N buyers with valuations v1b ; v2b ; :::; vnb
and if there are n sellers with valuations v1s ; v
2
s ; :::; v
n
s , then the eciency of the ZI-U
markets with all n trades taking place can be dened as the dierence between the sum
of valuations for buyers and the sum of valuations for sellers as
nX
i=1
vib  
nX
i=1
vis (5)
The claim seems very intuitive, because when all the traders trade once, then also all of
the buyer and seller valuations \contribute" once to the overall surplus measure extracted
from the market. This simple example has shown that the way to match the traders does
not contribute in any way to the eciency in ZI-U trader markets, if we assume that
all traders trade in ZI-U markets. Thus, the only factor contributing to the eciency of
ZI-U markets is the initial market type dened by demand and supply schedules.
A statistical test was also made to measure the credibility of the results presented in
gure 9 and table 2. The directional version of the Wilcoxon signed-rank test30 was made
30 See for example the original paper by Wilcoxon (1945).
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Table 4: The dierent ways to match the traders participating in the ZI-trader market given in
table 3. The extracted surplus of each trade for all possible six ways to match the traders into
three pairs are reported. In addition, the overall surplus extracted from the market when all
of trades take place is also reported as the Total-measure for all of the six matchings. As each
of the valuations v1; v2; v3 is used twice the tree trades that take place, the overall eciency is
in all cases equal to zero. The valuations vi 2 R+; i = 1; 2; 3.
Pair Extracted surplus
Buyer Seller
A D v1   v1
B E v2   v2
C F v3   v3
Total 0
A D v1   v1
C E v3   v2
B F v2   v3
Total 0
A E v1   v2
B D v2   v1
C F v3   v3
Total 0
A E v1   v2
B F v2   v3
C D v3   v1
Total 0
A F v1   v3
B D v2   v1
C E v3   v2
Total 0
A F v1   v3
B E v2   v2
C D v3   v1
Total 0
with the null hypothesis that the location shift should be smaller or equal to zero when
eciencies from ZI-C markets and ZI-U markets are compared in this order, because gure
9 suggests that the location shift should be positive. This test was not used in this context
by Gode and Sunder (1993a) as their work generally lacked statistical signicance tests.
However, LiCalzi and Pellizzari (2008) use the Wilcoxon signed-rank test in a similar
context to strengthen the credibility of their results. To be able to make the test, the
observations for the eciency had to be paired. The pairing was done by using unique
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Figure 9: Eciency, coecient of convergence and root mean squared deviation of transaction
prices from the equilibrium price for 100 runs of ZI-C and ZI-U markets with 150 traders and
150 rounds. The traders were divided into buyers and sellers equally. All the runs were done
using the same symmetric demand and supply schedule, which are depicted in both of gures
7 and 8, while the statistics for the runs are presented in table 2. In all of the three graphs,
the results for ZI-U markets are presented in light gray line and triangles, while the results for
the ZI-C markets are presented in black line and squares. The eciency of the CDA markets is
presented in the top panel. It is determined as the ratio of the total prot the traders actually
earned in the market and the total prot the traders could have earned in the market. In the
bottom panel, the root mean square deviation of transaction prices from the equilibrium price
(RMSD) in ZI-U markets as a function of rounds is presented in light-gray, while the RMSD
in ZI-C markets as a function of rounds is presented in black. Both measures were counted
for each round using the data of transaction prices of either ZI-C markets of ZI-U markets. In
addition to RMSDs, the bottom panel also depicts the number of observations, i.e. the number
of transaction prices from 100 simulations, on each round. The plot does not show RMSDs
in rounds, which had fewer than 10 observations. The number of observations from the ZI-U
markets are depicted in light gray diamonds and the number of observations from ZI-C markets
are depicted in black squares. In the middle panel, the coecient of convergence is presented for
each run of the model. The coecient of convergence was initially presented by Smith (1962)
and is dened as the ratio of RMSD and equilibrium price.
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seeds so that each unique seed was used always twice: once on a ZI-U market model and
once on a ZI-C market model. This way the only dierence between the two eciency
observations is in the abilities of the traders. The test yielded a p-value of 1.97e-18,
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which suggests that the null hypothesis is rejected with a very high probability and the
location shift from ZI-C markets to ZI-U markets is larger than zero. This means that
the test conrms the result that the dierence between the eciencies of ZI-C and ZI-U
markets is greater than zero with a large probability. Thus, the result that the eciency
of ZI-C markets is greater than that of ZI-U markets when the demand-supply schedule
is symmetric is also conrmed using the Wilcoxon signed-rank test.
5.1.3 Transaction price time series characteristics
The two gures 7 and 8 also seem to comply with the two of the three features that Gode
and Sunder (1993a) reported from their experiments with the ZI-market and human mar-
ket for the transaction price time series. One feature, the lack of memory for ZI-traders, is
deliberately this time left unnoticed, because, by denition, the zero-intelligence traders
do not remember anything from the past periods. Thus, it is unimportant to run the
market for several periods instead of independent reruns to investigate this issue. In the
context of Gode and Sunder (1993a), the reruns were justied, because the reruns were
used to compare the results from the ZI-markets to the results from the human markets.
The rst important transaction price time series characteristics is that the standard
deviation of the transaction prices seems to be greater in the ZI-C market when compared
to the ZI-U markets. This can be easily seen from the gures by eye-balling, but it can be
also conrmed by looking at table 2. The table clearly shows that the standard deviation
of the prices in ZI-U markets, 57.3, is signicantly greater than the same measure for
ZI-C markets, 21.7. The results also suggest that the standard deviations of the two
markets seem to vary in similar proportions as measured by the standard deviation of
the standard deviations. Thus, these results seem to comply with the results of Gode and
Sunder (1993a), who found that the ZI-C market transaction price time series was more
volatile than its human market counterpart, while the ZI-U market transaction price time
series was clearly the most volatile of the three.
There is also a second important feature of the transaction price time series that seems
to be present in the top panels of gures 7 and 8. It seems that as time progresses in the
ZI-C market, the transaction prices tend to converge towards the theoretical equilibrium
price. However, the ZI-U market does not seem to show similar convergence towards the
theoretical equilibrium price, but instead the transaction prices oscillate wildly around
the equilibrium price inside the range of all possible transaction prices throughout the
rounds that the market is active. A glance to the same convergence seems to also be
present in the middle panel of gure 8 as the highest bids and the lowest asks presented
seem to converge close to the equilibrium value in the ZI-C trader market. Again, a
similar graph in the middle panel of the gure 7 shows that it is hard to see any such
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convergence in ZI-U markets.
The convergence can also be evaluated by using the root mean squared deviation
(RMSD) of transaction prices from the equilibrium as the previous authors have done.
Both Gode and Sunder (1993a) and Cli and Bruten (1997) use the RMSD of transaction
prices from the equilibrium price to evaluate the convergence to equilibrium inside the
trading period. Essentially, the idea is to measure how the transaction prices evolve
around the equilibrium price as time progresses. The bottom panel of gure 9 shows the
RMSD of transaction prices from the equilibrium price in the ZI-C and the ZI-U markets
for 100 runs of both markets. These results clearly indicate that the RMSD of transaction
prices seems to be lower for the ZI-C markets than for the ZI-U markets throughout the
time the market is open. The bottom panel of gure 9 also appears to show that the
RMSD decreases in ZI-C markets as the rounds increase, while in ZI-U markets no such
development can be found before the few last rounds that the market is active. Such a
result would also be in line with the claims of Gode and Sunder (1993a), as by using the
convergence of RMSD as their principal argument, Gode and Sunder reported that the
ZI-C market converges towards the equilibrium within each trading period.
However, one should not draw hasty conclusions from the results now presented.
Actually, only the result about the ZI-U markets not converging towards the equilibrium
price seems certain, while the convergence in ZI-C markets can be partly questioned,
because of the decreasing number of observations as shown by the light gray diamonds
and black boxes for ZI-U and ZI-C markets correspondingly in the bottom panel of gure
9. As Gode and Sunder (1993a) do not report the number of observations for each round,
it is impossible to say whether their results would have endured similar challenge. From
the bottom panel of gure 9 it seems actually that the RMSD of ZI-C markets starts to
decrease towards the equilibrium exactly at the same time as the number of observations
starts to decrease. The decreasing number of observations could be partly explained by
the fact that the number of observations start to decrease at the same time as the number
of quotes needed for a trade start to increase. This seems a plausible explanation, because
it seems that in ZI-C markets most of the trades take place during the rst 40 rounds,
and from then on it seems less likely to see a trade taking place.31 However, still the slight
decrease of RMSD is heavily questioned by the decreasing number of observations. In
general, it seems that the convergence issue is more or less unsolvable using the methods
presented until now by Gode and Sunder (1993a) and Cli and Bruten (1997).
There is still one measure left that was utilized by Gode and Sunder (1993a) and Cli
and Bruten (1997) to evaluate the convergence to the theoretical equilibrium. Smith
31 This is only a plausible explanation that is based on the fact that the results presented in gure 8 are
a characterizing example of the results for all of the 100 runs that are reported in table 2.
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(1962) dened the coecient of convergence32 as a measure that shows how close to the
theoretical equilibrium price the transaction prices were on average during the experi-
ment. Especially, Smith used a single coecient of convergence to measure all of the
transaction prices in a single experiment. Thus, originally coecient of convergence was
used to compare dierent experiments with each other. The middle panel of gure 9
depicts the coecients of convergence for all of the 100 runs of both ZI-U market and
ZI-C market. These results seem to clearly support the fact that the ZI-C markets trade
at prices closer to the theoretical equilibrium price than the ZI-U markets.
The dierence in closeness of transaction prices to the equilibrium price in ZI-C and
ZI-U markets is also statistically signicant. The signicance was conrmed using a
directional version of the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. To be able to make the test, the ob-
servations of the coecients of convergence were paired in a similar manner as mentioned
earlier with eciencies. The pairing was done by using unique seeds in simulations so
that each seed was used always twice: once on a ZI-U model and once on a ZI-C model.
This way the only dierence between the two markets that provided the eciency obser-
vations shown in gure 9 was in the traders abilities. The null hypothesis used was that
the dierence between coecients of convergence when compared from ZI-C to ZI-U is
greater or equal to zero, because gure 9 suggests that the dierence should be negative.
The test yielded a p-value of 1.98e-18, which suggest with a very high probability that
the null hypothesis is wrong and that the real dierence in negative. This is also exactly
what gure 9 and table 2 also suggest qualitatively as the coecients of convergence
seem to be clearly smaller in ZI-C markets when compared to the ZI-U markets. Thus,
the results presented now suggest that the ZI-C traders make transaction closer to the
equilibrium price than the ZI-U traders. However, it is quite hard to statistically say
anything proper about actual convergence towards the equilibrium.
5.1.4 A more detailed analysis of the convergence to equilibrium
It seems clear that the convergence of transaction prices towards the equilibrium price
should be analyzed further. The methods presented until now do not really look at the
convergence during the trading period, but instead compare the closeness of transaction
prices from the equilibrium price. The analysis now presented is based on the idea that
Gode and Sunder (1993a) explained the convergence to the equilibrium in ZI-C markets
by the progressive narrowing of the opportunity sets of ZI-C traders. However, Gode and
Sunder did not give evidence about the progressive narrowing in their article, but instead
were satised to describe it only. In the following, I will try to argue how the progressive
narrowing of the opportunity sets of ZI-C traders can be quantitatively shown to be
32 Refer to the literature review for the exact denition.
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main driving force of transaction prices in ZI-C markets. This presentation is supposed
to clarify and extend the ideas of Brewer et al. (2002), who heuristically explained the
idea of the progressively narrowing opportunity sets of ZI-C traders and compared the
evolution of the ZI-C market to the Marshallian path.
In essence, the idea is to explain why the intramarginal traders are the most probable
traders to trade during the beginning of the continuous double auction. The middle panel
of gure 8 seems to support the progressive narrowing argument: both the highest bids
and the lowest asks seem to tend towards the equilibrium price as time progresses. This
behavior was repeated in all of the 100 simulations of the ZI-C market, although only
the characterizing example is presented in gure 8. Another view at this same issue can
be taken by looking at the number of quotes in the limit order book before a transaction
takes place. A graphical presentation of the number of quotes in the limit order book is
given in the bottom panel of gure 7 for ZI-U markets and in the bottom panel of gure
8 for ZI-C markets. Figure 7 for ZI-U markets suggests that the number of bids and asks
stays relatively low during the whole time that the market is active, while gure 8 for
ZI-C markets shows that as time progresses also the number of bids and asks needed for
a transaction is increases. This example shows well the idea of the progressive narrowing
of the opportunity sets of ZI-C traders: as time progresses, the number of traders in the
market decreases, which means that also the number of dierent valuations in the trader
population decreases. Especially, the number of traders with intramarginal valuations
has to decrease, because bids and asks tend towards the equilibrium price. In eect, this
means that the range of dierent valuations for both buyers and sellers becomes narrower
as the rounds increase. In ZI-C market this aects the trading, because traders cannot
trade with a price that does not satisfy their valuation: a ZI-C seller cannot sell at a price
that is lower than her valuation and a ZI-C buyer cannot buy at a price that is higher
than her valuation.
There are two empirical arguments presented in gure 8 that support the idea that the
traders with intramarginal valuations trade with a high probability during the beginning
rounds of the ZI-C market. First, in the middle panel of gure 8, the best quotes are lined
so that after 50 rounds the highest bids are just below the equilibrium price and the lowest
asks are just above it. Now, because there are no transactions taking place after the 50
rounds with a price far from the equilibrium price and the best quotes are next to the
equilibrium price, it has to be that there are no traders left with intramarginal valuations.
This claim is based on the counter example: because we do not see any trades with
transaction prices far from the equilibrium value, there are no traders with intramarginal
valuations left to trade. If there was a trader left with an extreme valuation, then she
would trade with a large probability at a price that is far from the equilibrium value.
59
Thus, it has to be that traders with extreme valuations have already left the market,
because in the beginning they were in the market by the design of the experiment and
each trader participating in the market is given on every round a possibility to trade if
no trade occurs during that particular round. However, this is only an empirical result
from the simulations now presented and corresponds only to the gure 8 presented.
Also the second argument is based on the characteristics of ZI-C traders. The bottom
panel of gure 8 shows that as the rounds increase, the number of quotes in the limit
order book also increases. This should be thought of with the ZI-C traders logic in mind:
the ZI-C buyers place bids uniformly on the range from minimum price pmin to trader
specic valuation v and the ZI-C sellers place asks uniformly on the range from the trader
specic valuation v to maximum price pmax. Thus, if the traders need a lot of bids and
asks to trade, it has to mean that there is a very low probability to see a bid that is higher
than the lowest ask in the limit order book and that there is a very low probability to see
an ask that is lower than the highest bid in the limit order book. If the probabilities just
mentioned are very low, it has to be that the maximum of all buyer's valuations bmax has
to be very close to the minimum of seller valuations amin in the population of traders.
The closeness can be also dened more rigorously. Before a trade33, the closeness
can be dened for buyers by looking at the dierence between the bmax   amin and by
determining how large a probability there is, for example, to see a bid that is situated
in the interval from amin to bmax when drawing uniformly a buyer from the population
of buyers participating in the market. A similar measure could be determined for sellers
by looking at the probability of seeing an ask in the same interval when drawing a seller
uniformly from the population of sellers participating in the market. Thus, because the
number of quotes needed to trade increase with every round and the transaction prices are
close to the equilibrium price, it seems that the traders with the intramarginal valuations
actually do trade in the beginning of the continuous double auction, while the traders
with the valuations close to the equilibrium value trade in the end of the continuous
double auction.
The rst of the two claims presented above can also be looked at more extensively
by using the computational methods. By simulating a ZI-C market model for multiple
times, one can create a large number of observations about the best bids and asks at each
round of the CDA. The results from such an experiment are summarized in gure 10 by
plotting the estimated largest bid and lowest ask densities at dierent rounds in the two
33 If a trade takes place, then we know in a ZI-C market that before the trade took place it had to be
that the maximum of all buyer's valuations was greater than then minimum of all sellers valuations or
otherwise no trade could have taken place.
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Figure 10: Estimated transaction price PDFs, best bid PDFs and best ask PFDs at eleven
dierent rounds for a ZI-C market with 150 traders and 150 rounds. The ZI-C market was run
100 times. The demand and supply schedules used are depicted in gure 8, while the statistics
are presented in table 2. For the transaction price densities, also the number of observations, i.e.
the number of transaction prices, accompanied with the their mean are also described for each
estimated density in the legend. For the best bid and ask densities, the number of observations
was 100 in each round, so it was omitted from the graphs, but the means are presented in the
legend. The light gray lines in the picture correspond to densities estimated from the beginning
rounds, while the darker lines corresponds to densities from ending rounds.
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34 The PDFs presented henceforth in this thesis were estimated using the standard library density-routine
of the statistical package R. The advantage of using density functions instead of histograms comes from
the number of needed parameters. For a histogram, one has to select the number of subintervals dealing
the data, the size of the intervals and the locations of the intervals (Tarter and Kronmal, 1976). As a
result, one obtains a discontinuous description of the data. In contrast, when using a non-parametric
kernel density estimate, one needs to only select the size of the intervals, while the endpoints are not
needed. The endpoints can be forgotten, because the kernel function is situated at each observation
instead of grouping observations (Tarter and Kronmal, 1976). As a result one obtains a continuous
density estimate of the data. In kernel density estimation, the size of the intervals corresponds to
the standard deviation of the kernel density and is referred as bandwidth. When estimating density
functions the essential parameters that have to be chosen are the bandwidth and the smoothing kernel.
To avoid making biased judgments, I used the default values of the R-function. This means that the
smoothing kernel was normal and the bandwidth was selected using the Silverman's rule of thumb. Refer
to the documentation of R for more elaborate descriptions: http://cran.r-project.org/. The chosen
parameters should be sucient for making comparisons on the level presented in this thesis although
especially the bandwidth could be selected using more advanced methods (Jones et al., 1996).
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As the gure shows, the lighter densities, i.e. the densities estimated from the quotes
from the beginning rounds, are clearly atter and more spread out on the interval from
1 to 200, while the darker densities, i.e. the densities estimated from the quotes from
the ending rounds, are more peaked close to the value 100, which the equilibrium price
for the demand-supply schedules used in the experiments. Thus, as the rounds increase,
it seems that the bid and asks densities tend to become more peaked and their means
tend towards the equilibrium price. Thus, it appears that the number of intramarginal
bids and asks decreases as the rounds increase in all of the 100 runs of the ZI-C market
exactly the same way as was argued above for best bids and asks given in gure 8 for a
single ZI-C market.
This is a quantication of the argument of Gode and Sunder (1993a), who claimed
that the opportunity sets of ZI-C traders progressively narrows as the rounds increase.
This result also seems to suggest that the arguments presented above about the traders
with intramarginal valuations have been satised in the 100 simulations for which the
results are presented in gure 10. However, it is important to note that the results
presented now only cover the symmetric demand-supply schedule presented in gure 8.
A more extensive inquiry would have to be taken to really nd out which market types
also support empirically these claims.
It is also worth noting that the transaction price densities presented in the top panel
of gure 10 seem to suggest a tend towards the equilibrium price: the transaction price
density becomes more peaked close to the equilibrium price as the rounds increase. This
essentially means that the two properties dened by Brewer et al. (2002) for the conver-
gence are satised: initial transaction prices are further from the equilibrium prices than
nal prices, because the variance of transaction prices decreases as indicated by the more
peaked transaction price densities. However, the problem with drawing conclusions using
the densities for transaction prices is that their number in each round decreases as the
rounds increase beyond a certain limit. Best quotes do not have the problem with the
number of observations, because in each round the bids and asks are delivered at least
by a single seller or a single buyer.
As a conclusion for the rst model, it appears that instead of looking at the trans-
action price density of all trades as suggested by Cli and Bruten (1997), it seems to
be more interesting to look at how the transaction price density evolves round by round
during the continuous double auction experiment. It appears that as the group of traders
participating in the market changes, also the transaction price density evolves dramati-
cally. This result is intuitive and was also suggested already by Gode and Sunder (1993a)
when they described the progressive narrowing of traders opportunity sets. The following
section will evaluate and use the methods rst proposed by Cli and Bruten (1997) to
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draw more precise conclusions about the convergence of transaction prices towards the
equilibrium price and especially about the reasons why the ZI-C markets seem to exhibit
such convergence.
5.2 The progress of the CDA aects bids, asks and transaction
prices
Cli and Bruten (1997) claim that the PDF of transaction prices is given by the inter-
section of PDFs of bids and asks on the market level. The background of this issue was
analyzed in the literature review, and the critique of Othman (2008) was also presented.
However, there appears to be a simpler way to assess the plausibility of the results by Cli
and Bruten than the one presented by Othman (2008). Now proposed method is based
on the idea that the theoretical PDFs of transaction prices, bids and asks as dened by
Cli and Bruten (1997) can be compared to the empirical ones from the simulations by
plotting the dierent PDFs. Thus, this section will rst look at how the theoretical PDFs
of bids and asks can be characterized properly. The results will then used to evaluate the
evolution of bids, asks and transaction prices in the SCDA as time progresses.
5.2.1 Theoretical PDFs of bids and asks
According to Cli and Bruten (1997), the empirical PDFs of bids and asks should be the
same as the theoretical PDFs of bids and asks. An example comparing the theoretical
bids and ask to the empirical ones is presented in gure 11. It plots the theoretical PDFs
of bids and asks as suggested by Cli and Bruten (1997) against the empirical PDFs of
bids and asks obtained in the rst round from 100 runs of the ZI-C market. However,
as gure 11 suggests, it seems that the qualitative description of the method of creating
market wide densities for bids and asks by Cli and Bruten (1997) does not create the
correct PDFs of bids and asks submitted by the traders in the simulations.
Although Cli and Bruten (1997) do not provide an exact description of how they
create the theoretical PDFs, I assume that as their PDFs have constant slopes for a
market with symmetric demand and supply curves, the theoretical pdfs presented in
gure 11 correspond to their description. This assumption is strengthened by the fact
that Cli and Bruten (1997) use an assumption that the intersection of the probability
density functions is shaped as a triangle in their analytic calculations. Using such an
assumption requires the market wide densities for bids and asks to have constant slopes
in the price range from minimum valuation (26) to maximum valuation (174)35, so it
35 Minimum valuation is 26 and maximum valuation is 174 for the market given in gure 11, because
the valuations are from the arithmetic sequence of integers 26; 28; :::; 172; 174.
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seems quite appropriate to claim that the PDFs depicted in gure 11 are exactly the ones
proposed by Cli and Bruten (1997).
Figure 11: The theoretical PDFs of bids and asks as suggested by Cli and Bruten (1997) and
the empirical PDFs of bids and asks submitted by the traders in the rst round in 100 runs
of ZI-C market. The demand and supply schedules used are depicted in gure 8, while the
statistics for the simulations are presented in table 2. The theoretical PDFs of bids and asks
were created using the demand and supply functions, and depict the ideas presented by Cli
and Bruten (1997) as the PDFs have constant slopes. The theoretical PDF of bids is depicted
in light gray and the theoretical PDF of asks is depicted in black. In addition, the black dashed
line depicts the empirical pdf for asks during the rst rounds of the 100 runs, and the light gray
dashed line depicts the empirical pdf for all bids during rst rounds of the 100 runs.
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The characterizing idea in creating the theoretical PDFs of Cli and Bruten (1997) is
to count the number of traders ready to quote at a certain valuation, and weight all val-
uations equally36. The R code for creating the theoretical PDFs using these assumptions
is included in Appendix B. The dierence with empirical results can be qualitatively seen
from gure 11, because the empirical density functions for bids and asks seem to have
an exponential nature in contrast to the theoretical ones presented by Cli and Bruten
(1997). In general, gure 11 suggest that the theoretical PDFs of bids and asks by Cli
36 According to Cli and Bruten (1997), this idea is derived from the fact how the theoretical demand
and supply are derived in the double auction market.
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and Bruten (1997) suggest too much probability mass for bids and asks in the price range
from minimum valuation (26) to maximum valuation (174)37, and too little probability
mass for bids in the price range from minimum price (1) to minimum valuation (26) and
asks in the price range from maximum valuation (174) to maximum price (200). Thus,
the problem is that the theoretical PDFs by Cli and Bruten (1997) are weighting the
dierent prices dierently than what simulations seem to indicate.
It appears that a dierent method has to be used to characterize the real density
functions for bids and asks. Theoretically speaking, in the single-unit continuous double
auction, the market wide PDFs of bids and asks have to take into account precisely
the way how the traders are chosen to trade during each round. Thus, to create the
theoretical market wide PDFs of bids and asks, one has to take into account that each
single trader is selected with an equal probability to submit a quote from the group of
traders, who are still participating in the market and have not submitted a quote during
the ongoing round. This means that in the rst round the probability to get a particular
buyer or seller is 1=75, and this probability is the one that is used when weighting the
probability density functions of individual traders to create the market wide probability
density functions for bids and asks. Thus, in a market with valuations described by
equation 3, the market wide density functions for asks have actually increasing slopes,
because each trader is selected with an equal probability, but the trader's valuations are
restricted to the price range from 26 to 174.
The increase in slope is derived from the fact that each seller draws her ask from a
uniform distribution on interval her valuation v to maximum valuation (200). Thus, when
the valuation is increased, the probability mass of the uniform distribution is divided
equally on a shorter interval as the upper end is xed. Take, for example, a seller,
with a valuation 100: her probability to get selected from a population of n sellers is
1=n = 1=75, while her probability to ask a particular value in the range from 100 to 200
is 1=100. Thus, this trader contributes to the probability to see an ask in the range from
100 to 200 1=75 1=100. Similarly, a seller with a valuation v equal to 150, contributes
to the probability to see an ask in the range from 150 to 200 1=75 1=50. The increase
in the slope is derived from the fact that the contribution of the seller with valuation 150
to the probability to see an ask in the range from 150 to 200, i.e. 1=75 1=50, is larger
than the contribution of the seller with valuation 100, i.e. 1=75 1=100.
I will now generally dene the PDF fS(p) : R ! [0; 1]  R for asks at each price
p 2 [1; 200]  R. First, dene the population of sellers to contain NS agents. Second,
dene the set of valuations for sellers as set S  (1; 200), and assume that all valuations si
in S are indexed uniquely by i = 1; 2; :::; NS. Third, assume that a single seller is selected
37 These numbers are derived from the fact that the valuations in the symmetric market in gure 11 are
from the arithmetic sequence of integers 26; 28; :::; 172; 174.
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from the population of sellers with equal probability 1=NS, which is the case in the model
of Gode and Sunder (1993a). To calculate the PDF fS(p) for asks, the next step is to
sum over all the possibilities that a single seller is selected to trade at a certain price p.
Now, because all the sellers are ZI-C agents, the probability that they ask a certain price
equals the value of their PDF of uniform distribution in the range from si to 200. The
next step is to multiply the latter with the probability to select a single seller from the
group of sellers 1=NS, because all the sellers have equal probability to get chosen. Finally,
one has to sum the probabilities so that all the valuations that are smaller or equal to
price p are taken into account to the probability to see an asks at price p:
fS(p) =
X
si2S;psi
1
NS(200  si) : (6)
With bids, the idea is otherwise similar to the case with asks, but this time one has to
sum the other way around. First, dene the PDF fB(p) : R ! [0; 1]  R for bids at
each price p 2 [1; 200]  R. Second, dene that the population of buyers contains NB
agents. Third, dene the set of valuations for buyers as set B  (1; 200), and assume
that all valuations bi in B are indexed uniquely by i = 1; 2; :::; NB. Third, assume that a
single buyer is selected from the population of buyers with equal probability 1=NB. To
calculate the PDF fB(p) for bids, the next step is to sum over all the possibilities that a
single buyer is selected to trade at a certain price p. Now, because all the buyers are ZI-C
agents, the probability that they asks a certain price equals to the value of their PDF of
uniform distribution in the range from 1 to bi. The next step is to multiply the latter
with the probability to select a single buyer from the group of buyers 1=NB, because all
the buyers have equal probability to get chosen. Last, one has to sum the probabilities
so that all the valuations that are larger or equal to price p are taken into account to the
probability to see a bid at price p:
fB(p) =
X
bi2B;pbi
1
NB(bi   1) : (7)
The functions presented in equations 6 and 7 corresponds to PDFs, because their
integrals over the interval from 1 to 200 equal to one. The intuitive reason for this
property, for example, with sellers is that the PDF of each seller integrate to unity by
denition. Thus, by weighting all of them equally and summing will produce a function
that also integrates to unity. The calculations to create the PDF for bids, which are
similarly decreasing in price, are similar. The PDFs presented in gure 12 for the market
wide asks were created in this manner by summing the probabilities for each possible
valuation. The R code used to do these calculations and to draw the gures is included
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in the Appendix.
Figure 12: Suggestions as the theoretical PDFs of bids and asks and the empirical PDFs of bids
and asks submitted by the traders in the rst round in 100 runs of ZI-C market. The demand
and supply schedules used are depicted in gure 8, while the statistics for the simulations are
presented in table 2. The theoretical PDFs of bids and asks were created using the demand
and supply functions, and the idea was to weight the PDFs of individual traders equally. The
theoretical PDF of bids is depicted in light gray and the theoretical PDF of asks is depicted
in black. In addition, the black dashed line depicts the empirical pdf for asks during the rst
rounds of the 100 runs, and the light gray dashed line depicts the empirical pdf for all bids
during rst rounds of the 100 runs.
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The suggested theoretical PDFs of bids and asks are depicted in the gure 12. It shows
that these theoretical PDFs for bids and asks seem to be in line with the empirical PDFs
estimated from the simulation results, because the modes and slopes of the PDFs seem
to be similar when eye-balling the picture. Thus, it appears that the proposed theoretical
PDFs t the simulated data better than the theoretical PDFs of Cli and Bruten (1997).
Next step is to look how the changes in the trader population participating in the market
change the theoretical and empirical PDFs of bids and asks.
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5.2.2 How the progress of the SCDA aects bids and asks
Cli and Bruten (1997) claim that the shifting of the PDFs of bids and asks as a result
from trades taking place and traders leaving the market can be ignored. According to
them, because their empirical results support their theoretical arguments, the shifting
can be ignored. However, the empirical results of Cli and Bruten (1997) consider only
the expected transaction price. Considering only expected transaction prices seems in-
adequate, because Othman (2008) showed that by choosing the valuations of the traders
in a certain way, the results of Cli and Bruten (1997) can be shown to be false at least
in one situation. Thus, it seems that actually the assumptions of Cli and Bruten (1997)
about the market types t the predictions of their method. I will now rst look at how
the PDFs of bids and asks evolve in symmetric ZI-C markets, and use the results from
this subsection when looking at the PDFs of transaction prices in the next subsection.
Figure 13: PDFs from 100 runs of the ZI-C market for bids and asks for all rounds from 0 to 60.
The demand and supply schedules used in the simulations are depicted in gure 8, while the
statistics are presented in table 2. The lines presented on the left side of the gure correspond
to the PDFs of bids, while the lines presented on the right side of the gure correspond to the
PDFs of asks. The light gray lines depict the PDFs for both bids and asks from the beginning
rounds of the simulations, while as the color of the line changes to darker, the number of round
increases.
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To investigate the importance of changes in the group of traders participating in
the market, the PDFs of bids and asks submitted in all of the 150 rounds in the 100
simulations were estimated using R. The PDFs are depicted in gure 13, which shows that
the PDFs of bids and asks change dramatically as time progresses. Figure 13 indicates
that the change is towards a certain direction: for the PDFs of asks, the probability
mass concentrates around the prices from 150 to 200, while for the PDFs of bids, the
probability mass concentrates around the prices from 1 to 50. This concentration also
seems to mean that in the end of the auction, the probability to see asks with a price
lower than 100 is close to zero, while the probability to see bids with a price higher
than 100 is also close to zero. In practice, this means that seeing a trade far from the
theoretical equilibrium price 100 seems to be impossible, i.e. it has a zero probability,
because neither buyers nor sellers can quote such prices. Thus, it seems that in all of
the 100 simulations now evaluated, the population of traders participating in the market
changed and this change caused the transaction prices to tend towards the equilibrium
price.
Figure 13 seems to support the fact that the intramarginal traders are the most prob-
able traders to trade at the beginning of the SCDA. In addition, comparison of gure 13
to gure 14 suggests that the trading mimics close the theoretical Marshallian path as
predicted by Brewer et al. (2002). Thus, the intramarginal traders with the most intra-
marginal valuations appear to trade before the traders with less intramarginal valuations,
which is exactly the case with the Marshallian path. In practice, this means that the
buyer with the highest valuation is the most probable trader in the group of buyers to
trade in the beginning of the SCDA. Similarly, the seller with the lowest valuation is the
most probable trader in the group of sellers to trade in the beginning of the SCDA. As
the SCDA progresses, the group of traders participating in the market decreases so that
the most probable traders to transact leave the market.
Thus, the probability for an intramarginal trader to trade before an extramarginal
trader in a SCDA seems to be a very important factor contributing to the converge of
transaction prices towards the equilibrium price. Especially, the interesting issue is how
the intramarginal traders are able to displace the extramarginal traders in the beginning
of the SCDA. The displacing is an issue that has already discussed by Gode and Sunder
(1993b, 1997), who were in both articles interested in the overall eciency of the con-
tinuous double auction and did not take the price discovery process into account. The
results now presented show that the price discovery process in ZI-C markets appears to
be governed by the intramarginal traders ability to trade in the beginning of the SCDA.
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Figure 14: Theoretical PDFs for the ZI-C market for bids and asks when trading takes place
exactly according to the Marshallian path. The initial demand and supply used to produce the
theoretical probability density functions are depicted in gure 8. The lines presented on the
left side of the gure correspond to the probability density functions of bids, while the lines
presented on the right side of the gure correspond to the probability density functions of asks.
The light gray depicts the PDFs when only rst trades on the Marshallian path have taken
place, while as the color of the line becomes darker, the number of trades already taken on the
Marshallian path increases. The theoretical densities are depicted after each transaction, i.e.
every time one seller and one buyer exit the market, on the Marshallian path takes place.
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5.2.3 How the progress of the SCDA aects transaction prices
Cli and Bruten (1997) essentially claimed that the intersection of the PDFs of bids
and asks can be used to characterize the PDF of transaction prices in the SCDA. In
contrast to this, the results presented now show that even with symmetric demand and
supply schedules, the intersection as suggested by Cli and Bruten (1997) can be only
used to describe the PDF of transaction prices for the rst round, while the PDF of
transaction prices for all rounds should instead probably be a result of weighting equally
the intersection densities of bids and asks from all of the rounds. In essence, it appears
that the changes in the group of traders participating in the market, are the main reasons
for the results shown next.
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Figure 15: The PDF of the intersection of theoretical PDFs of bids and asks (IPDF), an
empirical PDF of the transaction prices in the rst round and an empirical PDF of transaction
prices in all rounds in 100 runs of ZI-C market. The demand and supply schedules used are
depicted in gure 8, while the statistics for the 100 runs of the ZI-C market are presented in table
2. The IPDF is depicted in light gray line and was created by sampling the theoretical PDFs
of bids and asks using the accept-reject algorithm for which the code is included in appendix
B. First the theoretical PDFs of bids and asks were sampled for 10000 observations, and then
the points from the intersection were chosen as the theoretical transaction prices. The IPDF
was estimated using these sampled points. The dashed black line is the PDF estimated using
the empirical transaction prices only from the rst round, while the solid black line is the PDF
estimated using the transaction prices from all of the rounds.
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The previous sections have shown that the proposed PDFs of bids and asks seem
to characterize the empirical PDFs of bids and asks more accurately than the PDFs of
bids and asks by Cli and Bruten (1997). Thus, it is interesting to look at how the
theoretical transaction prices from the intersection of the PDFs of bids and asks compare
to the empirical transaction prices. Figure 15 shows the PDF of the intersection of
theoretical PDFs of bids and asks (IPDF), an empirical PDF for the transaction prices
in the rst round and an empirical PDF for transaction prices in all rounds in 100 runs
of ZI-C market. The IPDF is depicted in light gray line and was created by sampling the
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theoretical PDFs of bids and asks using the accept-reject algorithm38 for which the code
is included in appendix B.
Figure 16: The PDF of the intersection of theoretical PDFs of bids and asks (IPDF) on the
Marshallian path and an empirical PDF of the transaction prices in all rounds in 100 runs
of ZI-C market. The demand and supply schedules used are depicted in gure 8, while the
statistics for the 100 runs of the ZI-C market are presented in table 2. The IPDF is depicted
in light gray line and was created by sampling the theoretical PDFs of bids and asks on the
Marshallian path using the accept-reject algorithm for which the code is included in appendix
B. Each of the theoretical PDFs of bids and asks on the Marshallian path were sampled for 800
observations, and then the points from the intersection of the two were chosen as the theoretical
transaction prices. The IPDF was estimated using these sampled points. The dashed black line
is the PDF estimated using the empirical transaction prices from all of the rounds.
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Figure 15 suggests that the claim of Cli and Bruten (1997) about the PDF of trans-
action prices of all rounds being characterized by the intersection of the rst round PDF
is false. Although both PDFs have single modes approximately at price 100, the PDF of
transaction prices in all rounds is more peaked around price 100 than the IPDF. However,
the IPDF seems to at least somehow characterize the PDF of empirical transaction prices
38 The purpose of accept-reject method is to simulate a certain known PDF f . The accept-reject method
can be used when one does not know how to simulate f , but there exists a majorizing PDF g such that
for a constant M > 0 we have f Mg in the support of f and one knows how to simulate PDF g. Refer
to the book of Robert and Casella (2005) for more a elaborate description.
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from the rst round. This latter results also seems more intuitive, because IPDF is cre-
ated using the PDFs of bids and asks that were created from the initial demand-supply
schedules. All in all, with this amount of simulations one can only reject the results
of Cli and Bruten (1997), while it is not possible to conrm the results that the IPDF
would be able to characterize the probability density function of transaction prices during
the rst round.
One can also compare the transaction prices on the Marshallian path to the empirical
PDF for transaction prices in all rounds in 100 runs of ZI-C market. As gure 16 shows,
it appears that the theoretical transaction prices from the Marshallian path seem to
characterize the empirical transaction prices from the ZI-C market closely. Thus, it
appears that the heuristic ideas of Cli and Bruten (1997) seem to work correctly when
they are rened in the way presented above. I will next use the methods presented in
this section to look at the dierent market types initially presented in this context by
Cli and Bruten (1997).
5.3 Dierent market types
This section is devoted to the analysis of dierent market types. As the previous section
showed explicitly that the model created exhibits similar characteristics as the original
model of Gode and Sunder (1993a), the created model can be utilized also to analyze
dierent market types. The way to analyze the ZI-C markets with symmetric demand
and supply schedules, henceforth referred to as the symmetric case, can be also utilized
to analyze markets with asymmetric demand and supply schedules.
There are some earlier results from dierent market types that are worth noticing.
Most prominent results were presented by Cli and Bruten (1997), who found that the
transaction prices from simulations deviated clearly from the theoretical equilibrium price
in markets where supply was xed. According to their results the mean daily transaction
price in markets with xed supply was clearly above the equilibrium price, which was
supposed to indicate that the tend towards the theoretical equilibrium did not take place.
I will in the following look at this particular example, but in addition I will also review the
other characterizing examples that are derived from the symmetric demand and supply
schedule by making either demand and/or supply xed and by limiting the number of
traders participating in the market.
In general, it appears that the analysis presented in the previous subsection applies
well also in these dierent cases. Actually, when comparing the cases presented here
to the symmetric base case, it seems that the analysis is actually even simpler in these
cases, because either the population of buyers and/or sellers is permitted to only consist
of agents with same valuations. Thus, essentially this section shows that the analysis
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presented above applies also to all of the dierent market types presented by Cli and
Bruten (1997).
Table 5: Descriptive statistics from 100 runs of the model for ZI-C markets with non-symmetric
demand-supply schedules. The results for the 100 runs are presented in the six columns
by using averages and standard deviations. In the markets with xed supply, all the sellers
were given equal valuations at price 60, while the valuations of the buyers were dened as in
equation 3. In the markets with xed demand, all the buyers were given equal valuations at
price 140, while the valuations of the sellers were dened as in equation 3. In the markets with
excess supply, there were 50 buyers with equal valuations at price 140 and 100 sellers with
equal valuations at price 60.
Fixed supply Fixed demand Excess supply
Average St.dev. Average St.dev. Average St.dev.
Equilibrium price 60.0 0.00 140.0 0.00 60.0 0.00
Eciency (%) 99.9 0.0002 0.99 0.0002 1.0 0.00
Number of transactions 56.9 0.26 56.9 0.29 50.0 0.00
Mean of prices 80.9 2.24 119.7 2.19 99.5 3.28
Median of prices 74.5 2.56 126.2 2.27 99.1 5.44
Maximum price 146.2 12.80 139.8 0.17 138.4 1.55
Minimum price 60.2 0.14 54.5 13.41 61.2 1.25
Standard deviation of prices 20.3 2.33 20.2 2.58 23.4 1.50
Kurtosis of prices 4.4 1.43 4.5 1.25 1.83 0.16
Skewness of prices 1.3 0.33 -1.3 0.29 0.01 0.19
25 percentile 65.1 1.30 110.3 4.57 80.1 4.91
75 percentile 90.7 4.97 135.0 1.24 119.3 4.33
Coecient of Convergence 48.39 5.01 20.4 2.28 76.4 4.71
Table 5 reports the dierent market types and the results for each type from 100 runs
of the model with ZI-C traders. It seems to support the results presented by Cli and
Bruten (1997) as in all of the markets the theoretical equilibrium price does not equal
the mean of transaction prices reported from simulations. Although, at rst sight, this
could be seen as a proof of the fact that the ZI-C markets do not converge in these
markets, the analysis presented next will carefully consider the dierent markets and
show that actually there are good reasons to expect exactly the behavior now witnessed
in the results even when transaction prices do exhibit convergence. Again, it seems that
actually it is not that interesting to speak about the convergence of transaction prices,
but instead look at the evolution of the trader population participating in the single-unit
continuous double auction market.
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Figure 17: Transaction price time series, demand-supply schedules, best quotes and the amount
of bids and ask in the limit order book for a single run of ZI-C market with 150 traders and 150
rounds when supply is xed. The traders were divided into buyers and sellers equally, and the
valuations of the buyers are specied in equation 3, while for all sellers the valuations were set
at price 60. In all of the three panels, the transaction price times series is presented by a dark
gray solid line as a function of rounds, and the theoretical equilibrium price is presented by a
black dashed line. In the top panel, demand as a function of quantity is presented in light gray,
and supply as a function of quantity is presented in black. Demand and supply functions were
counted using the valuations of individual traders, and the equilibrium price was determined by
the intersection point of demand and supply functions. In the middle panel, the \best" quotes
in each round are presented; the best quotes are dened as the highest bid and the lowest ask in
each round. Highest bids are reported by light gray triangles and the lowest asks are reported
by black triangles. In the bottom panel, the number of bids is depicted by light gray line with
triangles, while the number of asks is presented by black line with triangles. The number of
both bids and asks are reported for each transaction that took place during the single run of
the model.
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5.3.1 Fixed supply
The results from a single run of the market with xed supply are reported in gure 17. It
shows exactly the same results as found already by Smith (1962) with human subjects, as
the transaction prices seem to tend towards the equilibrium price from above the supply
schedule, i.e. the transaction price is in all transactions above the price 60. In practice,
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this is a very natural results, because there exists no ZI-C seller with a valuation lower
than price 60 in the population of traders during the simulations. Although the average
of the coecients of convergence reported in table 5 is rather high when compared to the
symmetric case, at least qualitatively it seems that the transaction prices tend towards
the equilibrium price in this one simulation experiment. The quotes seem to cluster
around the equilibrium price and also the distance between the transaction prices and
the equilibrium price seems to decrease as time progresses.
Figure 18: Eciency, coecient of convergence and root mean squared deviation of transaction
prices from the equilibrium price for 100 runs of ZI-C and ZI-U markets with xed supply,
150 traders and 150 rounds. The traders were divided into buyers and sellers equally, and
the valuations of the buyers are specied in equation 3, while for all sellers the valuations
were set at price 60. The eciency of the SCDA markets is presented in the top panel. It is
determined as the ratio of the total prot the traders actually earned in the market and the
total prot the traders could have earned in the market. In the bottom panel, the root mean
square deviation (RMSD) of transaction prices from the equilibrium price in ZI-C markets as a
function of rounds is presented in black. In addition to RMSDs, the bottom panel also depicts
the number of observations, i.e. number of transaction prices from 100 simulations, on each
round. The plot shows RMSDs only in rounds, which had more than 10 observations. The
number of observations from ZI-C markets are depicted in black squares with crosses. In the
middle panel, the coecient of convergence is presented for each run of the model.
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In essence, the results suggest that it is not possible to rule out the convergence argu-
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ment given by Gode and Sunder (1993a) by comparing only the average of the transaction
prices to the theoretical equilibrium price as suggested by Cli and Bruten (1997). At
least in this particular case, it seems that the prices do converge towards the equilib-
rium price although the mean of the transaction prices is denitely above the equilibrium
price. Thus, it seems that the quantitative consideration by Cli and Bruten (1997) does
not take into account the fact that the average transaction price does not need to equal
the equilibrium price to make the transaction prices to converge towards the equilibrium
price during the simulations. Actually, the behavior suggested by Cli and Bruten (1997)
would only be expected if the transaction prices approached the equilibrium price from
both above and below the equilibrium price.
A rst more quantitative look at the convergence can be made using the root mean
squared deviation (RMSD) of transaction prices from the equilibrium price. Although
Cli (1997) claims that the ZI-C markets with xed supply do not converge, he reports
that the RMSD of transaction prices from the equilibrium price seems to decay as the
time progresses. This results is also conrmed in the simulations presented now, as shown
by the RMSD of transaction prices from the equilibrium price depicted in gure 18 for all
of the 100 simulations. This suggests that the convergence is denitely present in the ZI-C
markets with xed supply schedule. However, also in this case, it seems that the number
of observations clearly decreases as the RMSD starts to decay towards the equilibrium
price. This is natural, because there are less intramarginal traders participating in the
market, which makes the trading to demand more quotes for a single trade to take
place. However, to make the concrete judgement about this issue using the RMSD of
transaction prices from the equilibrium price, one would certainly have to increase the
number of simulations.
However, the convergence of transaction prices towards the equilibrium price in ZI-C
markets with xed supply schedule can also be reviewed using the PDFs of bids and asks
estimated from the simulation data as was done with in the symmetric case. Figure 19
shows the PDFs of bids and asks in all of the 150 rounds in the 100 runs of the model.
It clearly shows that as the sellers form a homogeneous population, there seems to be
practically no change in the probability density function of asks during the 150 rounds.
This suggests that the seller population does not seem to change in any meaningful way
during the simulations. However, as the valuations of buyers are still exactly the same as
in the symmetric case, the population of buyers is heterogeneous. This heterogeneity is
also shown in gure 19, because when time progresses, the probability density function
for bids becomes more peaked. This is exactly the same result that was found in the
markets with symmetric demand and supply schedules. Thus, the convergence can be
explained by the fact that the intramarginal buyers leave the market in the beginning of
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Figure 19: PDFs from 100 runs of the ZI-C market with xed supply for bids and asks for
all rounds from 0 to 150. The traders were divided into buyers and sellers equally, and the
valuations of the buyers are specied in equation 3, while for all sellers the valuations were
set at price 60. The lines presented on the left side of the gure correspond to the PDFs of
bids, while the lines presented on the right side of the gure correspond to the PDFs of asks.
The light gray lines depict the PDFs for both bids and asks from the beginning rounds of the
simulations, while as the color of the line becomes darker, the number of rounds increases.
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the simulation after they have traded, and the trading ceases as none of the intramarginal
traders participate in the market any more. The distinction between this case and the
symmetric case is that with xed supply only the characteristics, i.e. the PDF of bids,
of the population of the buyers change as time progresses, while the population of sellers
does not change in any way that would aect the price discovery process.
To strengthen the ideas presented for the ZI-C markets in the symmetric case, it is also
interesting to look at how the theoretical framework presented for the symmetric case ts
this slightly altered situation. Figure 20 shows the theoretical PDF of the intersection of
the PDFs of bids and asks (IPDF) and empirical PDFs of transaction prices for the rst
round and all rounds. In general, gure 20 supports the fact that the results from the
100 simulations are in line with the theoretical ideas presented for the symmetric demand
and supply schedules. It also appears that the transaction prices from the rst round
are well in line with the intersection of the theoretical bid and asks densities, because
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Figure 20: The PDF of the intersection of theoretical PDFs of bids and asks (IPDF), an
empirical PDF of the transaction prices in the rst round and an empirical PDF of transaction
prices in all rounds in 100 runs of ZI-C market when supply is xed. The demand and supply
schedules used are depicted in the gure 17, while the statistics are presented in the table 5.
The IPDF is depicted in light gray line and was created by sampling the theoretical PDFs of
bids and asks using the accept-reject algorithm. First the theoretical PDFs of bids and asks
were sampled for 10000 observations, and then the points from the intersection were chosen as
the theoretical transaction prices. The IPDF was estimated using these sampled points. The
dashed black line is the PDF estimated using the empirical transaction prices only from the
rst round, while the solid black line is the PDF estimated using the transaction prices from
all of the rounds.
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the transaction prices seem to have a very similar distribution as the intersection of the
theoretical bid and asks densities. The slight dierences in the distributions could be
expected to decay as the number of simulations is increased. However, the claim of Cli
and Bruten (1997) that the transaction prices from all rounds would be characterized by
the distribution of the intersection of the theoretical bid and ask densities, is rejected in
this case. The density of the transaction prices from all rounds is clearly more peaked
than the density of the intersection.
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Figure 21: Transaction price time series, demand-supply schedules, best quotes and the amount
of bids and ask in the limit order book for a single run of ZI-C market with 150 traders and 150
rounds when demand is xed. The traders were divided into buyers and sellers equally, and the
valuations of the sellers are specied in equation 3, while for all buyers the valuations were set
at price 140. In all of the three panels, the transaction price times series is presented by a dark
gray solid line as a function of rounds, and the theoretical equilibrium price is presented by a
black dashed line. In the top panel, demand as a function of quantity is presented in light gray,
and supply as a function of quantity is presented in black. Demand and supply functions were
counted using the valuations of individual traders, and the equilibrium price was determined by
the intersection point of demand and supply functions. In the middle panel, the \best" quotes
in each round are presented; the best quotes are dened as the highest bid and the lowest ask in
each round. Highest bids are reported by light gray triangles and the lowest asks are reported
by black triangles. In the bottom panel, the number of bids is depicted by light gray line with
triangles, while the number of asks is presented by black line with triangles. The number of
both bids and asks are reported for each transaction that took place during the single run of
the model.
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5.3.2 Fixed demand
The results from a single run of the market with xed demand are reported in gure 21.
It shows similar results as the previous subsection showed for the ZI-C markets with xed
supply, but this time the interest is directed at the changes in the population of buyers
participating in the market. This time the transaction prices seem to tend towards the
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equilibrium price from below the demand schedule, i.e. the transaction price is in all
transactions below the price 140. In practice, this is a very natural result, because there
exists no ZI-C buyer with a valuation higher than 140 in the population of traders during
the simulations.
Figure 22: Eciency, coecient of convergence and root mean squared deviation of transaction
prices from the equilibrium price for 100 runs of ZI-C and ZI-U markets with xed demand,
150 traders and 150 rounds. The traders were divided into buyers and sellers equally, and
the valuations of the sellers are specied in equation 3, while for all buyers the valuations
were set at price 140. The eciency of the CDA markets is presented in the top panel. It is
determined as the ratio of the total prot the traders actually earned in the market and the
total prot the traders could have earned in the market. In the bottom panel, the root mean
square deviation of transaction prices from the equilibrium price (RMSD) in ZI-C markets as a
function of rounds is presented in black. In addition to RMSDs, the bottom panel also depicts
the number of observations, i.e. number of transaction prices from 100 simulations, on each
round. The plot shows RMSDs only in rounds, which had more than 10 observations. The
number of observations from ZI-C markets are depicted in black squares with crosses. In the
middle panel, the coecient of convergence is presented for each run of the model.
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The average of the coecients of convergence reported in table 5 is slightly, i.e. ap-
proximately 5 percent, lower than in the symmetric case. This indicates that the trans-
action prices in the ZI-C market with xed demand are rather close to the equilibrium
price when compared to the other market types already considered in this thesis. It also
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seems that the transaction prices tend towards the equilibrium price in this one simula-
tion experiment: the quotes cluster around the equilibrium price and also the distance
between the transaction prices and the equilibrium price decreases as time progresses.
Figure 23: PDFs from 100 runs of the ZI-C market with xed demand for bids and asks for
all rounds from 0 to 150. The traders were divided into buyers and sellers equally, and the
valuations of the sellers are specied in equation 3, while for all buyers the valuations were
set at price 140. The lines presented on the left side of the gure correspond to the PDFs of
bids, while the lines presented on the right side of the gure correspond to the PDFs of asks.
The light gray lines depict the PDFs for both bids and asks from the beginning rounds of the
simulations, while as the color of the line becomes darker, the number of rounds increases.
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Round 0, n_bids = 523, n_asks = 456
Round 6, n_bids = 523, n_asks = 454
Round 12, n_bids = 519, n_asks = 489
Round 18, n_bids = 580, n_asks = 502
Round 24, n_bids = 669, n_asks = 652
Round 30, n_bids = 738, n_asks = 721
Round 36, n_bids = 863, n_asks = 877
Round 42, n_bids = 1089, n_asks = 964
Round 48, n_bids = 1643, n_asks = 1646
Round 54, n_bids = 1761, n_asks = 1770
Round 60, n_bids = 1941, n_asks = 1959
Although Cli and Bruten (1997) did not report the results from the ZI-C markets
with xed demand, it seems in general that the results seem to be quite similar to those
reported in this thesis already for the ZI-C markets with xed supply. It seems that the
transaction prices converge towards the equilibrium price as time progresses. Note also
that in this case the average of the transaction prices gives a false indication about the
convergence, because all of the transaction prices are below the equilibrium price. Thus,
the mean of the transaction prices is below the equilibrium price unless all the transaction
take place exactly with the equilibrium price.
Evaluating the convergence of ZI-C markets with xed demand yields the same result
as in the ZI-C markets with xed supply. The RMSD of transaction prices from the
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Figure 24: The PDF of the intersection of theoretical PDFs of bids and asks (IPDF), an
empirical PDF of the transaction prices in the rst round and an empirical PDF of transaction
prices in all rounds in 100 runs of ZI-C market when demand is xed. The traders were divided
into buyers and sellers equally, and the valuations of the sellers are specied in equation 3,
while for all buyers the valuations were set at price 140. The IPDF is depicted in light gray
line and was created by sampling the theoretical PDFs of bids and asks using the accept-reject
algorithm. First the theoretical PDFs of bids and asks were sampled for 10000 observations,
and then the points from the intersection were chosen as the theoretical transaction prices. The
IPDF was estimated using these sampled points. The dashed black line is the PDF estimated
using the empirical transaction prices only from the rst round, while the solid black line is the
PDF estimated using the transaction prices from all of the rounds.
0 50 100 150 200
0 .
0 0
0 .
0 1
0 .
0 2
0 .
0 3
0 .
0 4
Price
P D
F
Intersection, n=6846
Empirical first round, n=100
Empirical all rounds, n=5691
equilibrium price seems to decay as time progresses. To make the result visually concrete,
the RMSD of transaction prices from the equilibrium price is plotted for each round in
the bottom panel of gure 23. Again the same result is repeated as the number of
observations starts to decrease at the same time as the RMSD of transaction prices from
the equilibrium price starts to decay. More concrete results about the convergence can be
obtained by looking at the probability density functions of bids and asks estimated from
the simulations and by examining how the densities change over time presented in gure
23. It appears again that the homogeneous population, i.e. the population of buyers,
stays this time exactly the same, while the heterogeneous population, i.e. the population
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of sellers, seems to change so that the intramarginal traders leave the market and after
there are none of them left the trading ceases.
The nal look at the theoretical framework given in gure 24 shows that also in this
case the theoretical characterizations for the rst round seem to be similar as the results
from the simulations. However, again, the probability density function of all transaction
prices is clearly dierent from the probability density function of the intersection of the
probability density functions of market wide bids and asks. Thus, the claim presented
by Cli and Bruten (1997) is rejected also in this case.
5.3.3 Fixed demand and supply - excess supply
This last case is especially interesting, because Cli and Bruten (1997) claim that with
xed demand and supply transaction prices in the ZI-C markets do not converge towards
the equilibrium price. As the previous presentation has used dierent arguments than
Cli and Bruten (1997), it is interesting to see how the methods presented in the earlier
section ts this particular problem. As the rst note, one should understand that a
market with xed demand and supply schedules is the simplest case to analyze using
the methods presented, because the populations of buyers and sellers are homogeneous.
Thus, one can expect that with xed demand and supply, the changes in the population
of traders should not aect the transaction price in any way. In essence, the expected
transaction price should be random, which in this case means that it should have a
uniform distribution on a certain interval.
The market parameters were chosen so that the market exhibits excess supply. I chose
the parameters so that there were 50 buyers with a common valuation at price 140 and
100 sellers with a common valuation at price 60. This implies that the distribution of the
transaction prices should be a uniform distribution from price 60 to price 140, because
in that interval any seller will accept a bid and any buyer will accept an ask. From the
statistics presented in table 5, one should notice that in each of the runs presented here,
50 transactions took place in each one of the 100 runs of the model. The market was
closed after that, because there were no buyers left in the market, which meant that it was
impossible for the sellers to nd counterparts to trade with. In addition, the eciency of
the ZI-C market with excess supply was in all of the runs 1.0 with a standard deviation
0.00.
The top panel of gure 25 shows the transaction prices for a single run of the model,
and it seems that the hypothesis about the randomly uctuating transaction prices in the
price interval from 60 to 140 seems to have been well satised in this single simulation.
Actually even a more concrete result about this issue can be presented, because table
5 shows that the mean of the maximum prices was 138:4. Although the fact that the
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Figure 25: Transaction price time series, xed demand supply schedules, best quotes and the
amount of bids and ask in the limit order book for a single run of ZI-C markets with 150 traders
and 150 rounds. The traders were not divided into buyers and sellers equally: there were 50
buyers with a common valuation at price 140 and 100 sellers with a common valuation at price
60. In all of the three panels, the transaction price times series is presented by a dark gray solid
line as a function of rounds, and the theoretical equilibrium price is presented by a black dashed
line. In the top panel, demand as a function of quantity is presented in light gray, and supply
as a function of quantity is presented in black. Demand and supply functions were counted
using the valuations of individual traders, and the equilibrium price was determined by the
intersection point of demand and supply functions. In the middle panel, the \best" quotes in
each round are presented; the best quotes are dened as the highest bid and the lowest ask in
each round. Highest bids are reported by light gray triangles and the lowest asks are reported
by black triangles. In the bottom panel, the number of bids is depicted by light gray line with
triangles, while the number of asks is presented by black line with triangles. The number of
both bids and asks are reported for each transaction that took place during the single run of
the model.
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mean of the maximums is lower than 140 does not show that there could not have been a
transaction price higher than 140, in this case, it still shows that there were transaction
prices close to 140. Similarly, as the mean of the minimums of transaction prices is 61:9,
it is clear that there were transaction prices close to the lower bound at price 60. Thus,
it seems that in all of the 100 runs of the model, the transaction prices have varied in the
price range from 60 to 140 with a mean around a price of 100. As also the skewness has
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been very close to zero on average, it seems that the distribution of transaction prices
has been symmetric around its mean.
Figure 26: Eciency, coecient of convergence and root mean squared deviation of transaction
prices from the equilibrium price for 100 runs of ZI-C market with excess supply and xed
demand-supply schedule, 150 traders and 150 rounds. The traders were not divided into buyers
and sellers equally: there were 50 buyers with a common valuation at price 140 and 100 sellers
with a common valuation at price 60. The eciency of the CDA markets is presented in the
top panel. It is determined as the ratio of the total prot the traders actually earned in the
market and the total prot the traders could have earned in the market. In the bottom panel,
the root mean square deviation of transaction prices from the equilibrium price (RMSD) in
ZI-C markets as a function of rounds is presented in black. The measures were counted for each
round using the data of transaction prices of either ZI-C markets. In addition to RMSDs, the
bottom panel also depicts the number of observations, i.e. number of transaction prices from
100 simulations, on each round. The plot shows RMSDs only in rounds, which had more than
10 observations. The number of observations from ZI-C markets are depicted in black squares
with crosses. In the middle panel, the coecient of convergence is presented for each run of the
model.
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The transaction prices shown in gure 25 seem to suggest that there would not be a
convergence towards the equilibrium price. The best bids and asks shown in the middle
panel of the gure 25 also support this story: neither the best bids nor asks seem to
concentrate around the equilibrium more tightly as time progresses. In addition, the
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bottom panel of gure 25 reports the number of bids and asks in the limit order book for
each transaction, and shows that the number of bids and asks needed for a trade seems to
stay on the same level all the time. Thus, it seems as already suggested by the qualitative
analysis that at least in the single simulation presented in gure 25 no convergence of
transaction prices towards the equilibrium price took place.
Figure 27: PDFs from 100 runs of the ZI-C market with xed supply for bids and asks for all
rounds from 0 to 150. The demand and supply schedules used in the simulations are depicted
in the gure 7, while the statistics are presented in table 2. The lines presented on the left
side of the gure correspond to the PDFs of bids, while the lines presented on the right side of
the gure correspond to the PDFs of asks. The light gray lines depict the PDFs for both bids
and asks from the beginning rounds of the simulations, while as the color of the line becomes
darker, the number of rounds increases.
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Round 0, n_bids = 385, n_asks = 312
Round 5, n_bids = 268, n_asks = 261
Round 10, n_bids = 308, n_asks = 295
Round 15, n_bids = 293, n_asks = 290
Round 20, n_bids = 254, n_asks = 342
Round 25, n_bids = 269, n_asks = 326
Round 30, n_bids = 328, n_asks = 314
Round 35, n_bids = 258, n_asks = 284
Round 40, n_bids = 288, n_asks = 339
Round 45, n_bids = 258, n_asks = 487
Round 50, n_bids = 41, n_asks = 1421
A more detailed analysis of the convergence towards the equilibrium price can be
done using the coecients of convergence and the RMSD of transaction prices from the
equilibrium price. Figure 26 depicts in the middle panel the coecients of convergence for
all of the 100 runs of the model. The rst impression from the middle panel of gure 26
is that the coecients of convergence are relatively high in all of the runs when compared
to, for example, the symmetric case. However, the more concrete proof for the lack of
convergence is the fact that the RMSD of transaction prices from the equilibrium price
does not seem to exhibit any convergence. In the round close to the round 50, the RMSD
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of transaction prices from the equilibrium price seems to decay, but it is only a result of
the fact that the number of observations decreases dramatically at the same time. Thus,
both the RMSD and the coecient of convergence support the fact that there seems to
be no convergence of transaction prices towards the equilibrium price.
Figure 28: The PDF of the intersection of theoretical PDFs of bids and asks (IPDF), an
empirical PDF of the transaction prices in the rst round and an empirical PDF of transaction
prices in all rounds in 100 runs of ZI-C market when there is excess supply and both demand
and supply are xed. The demand and supply schedules used are depicted in the gure 25
while the statistics are presented in table 5. The IPDF is depicted in light gray line and was
created by sampling the theoretical PDFs of bids and asks using the accept-reject algorithm.
First the theoretical PDFs of bids and asks were sampled for 10000 observations, and then the
points from the intersection were chosen as the theoretical transaction prices. The IPDF was
estimated using these sampled points. The dashed black line is the PDF estimated using the
empirical transaction prices only from the rst round, while the solid black line is the PDF
estimated using the transaction prices from all of the rounds of the model.
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In the beginning of this subsection, the claim was made that he characteristics of
the ZI-C trader populations, i.e. the buyer and seller populations, do not change during
the auction in any meaningful way from the price discovery perspective in ZI-C markets.
Figure 27 shows that this is indeed the case in the 100 simulations reported now. It
shows that the probability density functions of bids and asks do not essentially change
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in any way as time progresses. This can be seen as the main reason for the lack of
convergence exhibited in the model, because in the earlier markets considered in this
thesis the evolution of the PDFs of bids and asks has been the driving force of the price
discovery in the ZI-C markets. All in all, as the ZI-C traders trade in exactly the same
manner throughout the SCDA, the trading exhibits a similar pattern as the trading of
ZI-U traders, but this time only in the price range from 60 to 140. Thus, by changing the
demand and supply schedules to this extreme case, Cli and Bruten (1997) have chosen
a particular situation, which is not even expected to exhibit convergence of transaction
prices towards the equilibrium price.
Final inspection of the model is done using the theoretical PDFs. Figure 28 shows
the theoretical PDF of the intersection of the PDFs of bids and asks (IPDF) for the
rst round. The most interesting result is that the PDF estimated from the simulated
transaction prices from all rounds seems to be very close to the uniform distribution in the
price range from 60 to 140. This is also exactly what is suggested by the theoretical IPDF.
Thus, as the populations of both buyers and sellers are homogeneous, the transaction price
density stays constant as the time progresses, which makes it possible to use the IPDFs
from the rst round to approximate the PDFs of all transaction prices. In essence, this
example shows that the method proposed by Cli and Bruten (1997) works correctly
when the buyer and seller populations are homogeneous throughout the SCDA. However,
as the previous examples with dierent market types have shown, this method seems to
work correctly only in this particular example.
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6 Conclusions
Agent-based models have been motivated by the possibility to analyze real markets more
accurately when compared to the traditional analytic models. However, at the moment
agent-based modeling in general lacks synthesis about the modeling principles used. One
of the primary objectives of this thesis was to argue how a single step toward the synthesis
could be taken when the interest is in price discovery in double auction markets. The
extensive literature and heterogeneous models led me to choose a model that is as simple
as possible. By constraining to a simple model, it has been possible to account carefully
for the dierent issues that contribute in this model to the price discovery process.
This thesis analyzed single-unit continuous double auction markets and especially the
ZI-trader paradigm that was introduced by Gode and Sunder (1993a). The results of
Gode and Sunder have been widely recognized and also criticized. The most prominent
critique for the ZI-trader approach has been given by Cli and Bruten (1997) and Brewer
et al. (2002). These two studies were used as the starting point of this thesis, and the
method proposed is a renement of the ideas of Cli and Bruten (1997). The new method
proposed to analyze the ZI-C trader markets seems to describe the PDFs of bids, asks
and transaction prices in the SCDA more accurately in dierent types of markets than
the method proposed by Cli and Bruten (1997). In addition, it appears that the ideas by
Cli and Bruten (1997) corresponds only to situations, where there exists no distinction
between intra- and extramarginal traders.
The results presented in this thesis support the results presented by Brewer et al.
(2002). Essentially, the results suggest that by using the ideas presented by Cli and
Bruten (1997) more carefully, it appears to be possible to explain the price discovery
process in the ZI-C trader markets. In addition, when analyzing the behavior of ZI-C
markets, it is important to look at how the population of traders changes over time and
how the changes contribute to the characteristics of the market. Generally, it seems
that the earlier literature has overlooked the importance of the evolution in the trader
population participating in the ZI-C market. In addition, I nd that the trading in ZI-C
markets seems to approximate the trading that takes place exactly on the Marshallian
path as was heuristically suggested also by Brewer et al. (2002).
The results are especially interesting in the light of recent research. Although the ZI-
trader framework abstract quite far from the real markets, it is interesting that a recent
study by Ladley and Schenk-Hoppe (2009) found that a modied ZI-C trader market was
able to produce many of the characteristics of real-life order book markets. Thus, it is
important to understand how the ZI-C trader markets actually function, and this thesis
has presented quantitative results that show how the trading in ZI-C markets seems to
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approximate the trading along the Marshallian path.
There appears to be two main areas of further research. First, the results presented in
this thesis should be conrmed using a larger amount of simulations to be able to compare
the results to the ones presented by Othman (2008). However, such an experiment would
require a new and more ecient implementation of the ZI-model than the one presented
in this thesis. Second, it could also be interesting to look at the bid and ask densities
from real markets and, for example, compare the evolution of the two to the dierent
market regimes appearing in the real markets at a certain moment. This could be done
for example by somehow estimating the demand and supply in the market at a certain
moment, and looking how the bid and ask densities develop after that.
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A Source code for Python
"""
8.2.2011, Niklas Jahnsson
Zero-intelligence traders implemented for a master's thesis in Finance.
This file has got a model of both zero-Intelligence traders with and
without budget constraint. The model is implemented using a simulation
framework SimPy for Python. Essentially the model was created to replicate
the results of both Gode and Sunder (1993) and Cliff and Bruten (1997).
Thus, the market implemented is a continuous double auction without
replacement.
Uses
-SimPy, Rpy
-r.library('moments'), r.library('coin'), r.library('colorRamps')
It is important to note that if the model is used to review the convergence
using root mean squared deviation of transaction prices from the equilibrium
price, then the market parameters implemented in function initializeDemandAndSupply
should be kept the same in all of the runs.
commandline arguments available are
"debug" to see debugging texts
"trades" to see how trading takes place
"conv" to force the using of same seed for random number generator in all
of the runs
"singleSeed" to force the using of single seed
Note that output parameters are set so that a run with 150 agents for 150 rounds
is outputted correctly. Set outPaths yourself to change the output directories.
"""
from SimPy.Simulation import *
from rpy import r
import random, time, math, sys
# Auxiliary variables
debug = False
trades = False
convergenceRun = False
singleSeed = False
if 'debug' in sys.argv:
debug = True
if 'trades' in sys.argv:
trades = True
if 'conv' in sys.argv:
convergenceRun = True
if 'singleSeed' in sys.argv:
singleSeed = True
OutPath = ""
outPathC = "/home/nikke/SimPyOut/ZI/C/080211/big/ZI_C_i_"
outPathU = "/home/nikke/SimPyOut/ZI/U/080211/big/ZI_U_i_"
outPathZI = "/home/nikke/SimPyOut/ZI/080211/big/ZI_n_"
# Experiment data -------------------------
numberOfRuns = 100
SEED = time.ctime()
equilibriumPrice = 100
numberOfRounds = 150
numberOfAgents= 150
simulationIndex = 1
maximumAssetValue = 200
budgetConstraint = True
# Model components ------------------------
# Variables
numberOfBuyers = 0
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numberOfSellers = 0
# Queues for buyers and sellers
selectedBuyer = -1
selectedSeller = -1
buyerQueue = []
sellerQueue = []
selectedBuyers = []
selectedSellers = []
# Logging for output data
prices = []
bestBids = []
bestAsks = []
buyerValuations = []
sellerValuations = []
demand = []
supply = []
extractedProfit = 0
statistics = []
allBids = []
allAsks = []
allBids0 = []
allAsks0 = []
# For output using Rpy
rheight = rwidth = 500
# Auxiliary functions
def initializeDemandAndSupply():
"""
Initialize buyer and seller valuations so that they are not stochastic, but
instead sequences from 25 to 175 using equal intervals. The valuations are
casted to integers, because integers are used later when determining demand,
supply and equilibrium price.
"""
global buyerValuations, sellerValuations, numberOfAgents, numberOfBuyers,\
numberOfSellers
numberOfBuyers = 0
numberOfSellers = 0
buyerValuations = []
sellerValuations = []
increment = round(1.0*(174-26)/(1.0*numberOfAgents/2))
i = 26
count = 0
while count < 1.0*numberOfAgents/2:
buyerValuations.append(int(i))
sellerValuations.append(int(i))
i += increment
count += 1
def RMSD(priceSeries,eqPrice):
"""
Parameters
priceSeries: a list of prices
eqPrice: equilibrium price
Calculates the standard deviation of the prices
in the priceSeries around the equilibrium price
rather than around the mean of priceSeries prices.
"""
if eqPrice < 0:
raise Exception("RMSD: eqPrice < 0")
if len(priceSeries) > 0:
ret = 0
for i in range(0,len(priceSeries)):
ret += 1.0*pow((priceSeries[i]-eqPrice),2)
return pow(1.0*ret/len(priceSeries),0.5)
else:
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raise Exception("RMSD: length of priceSeries < 0")
def returnAgentNames(agentList):
"""
Assumes that input is a list of agents, and returns all the names of the
agents concatenated. Used for debugging purposes.
"""
try:
output = ""
for agent in agentList:
output += agent.name+","
return output
except Exception as inst:
raise Exception("returnAgentNames: Exception: "+str(inst))
class Book(Resource):
"""
Implements a generic limit order book as a common resource using the
Resource class of SimPy. Both bids and asks need their own limit order
books, because of this implementation. The book consists of a list, which
can be allocated to a single trader at the time if they request it.
"""
def __init__(self,sim):
try:
Resource.__init__(self,capacity=1,sim=sim)
self.list = []
except Exception as inst:
raise Exception("Book: __init__(): Exception: "+str(inst))
class MarketMaker(Process):
"""
Responsible for gathering both all buyer and seller agents
and picking one of them uniformly to trade. Waits first for all
agents to gather to the market, then chooses one and waits until
the chosen one has acted. Stops market if the number of buyers AND
sellers equals zero. Only one method, i.e. work(), implemented as
it is the only thing market maker does.
"""
def work(self):
if debug:
print "Market maker waiting for market to initialize"
yield waituntil,self,self.sim.marketInitialized
while True:
global buyerQueue, sellerQueue, numberOfBuyers, numberOfSellers
if debug:
print "Market maker waiting for market to get ready. "+\
"len(buyerQueue) = "+str(len(buyerQueue))+" and "+\
"len(sellerQueue) = "+str(len(sellerQueue))+\
" while numberOfBuyers = "+str(numberOfBuyers)+\
" and numberOfSellers = "+str(numberOfSellers)
if numberOfBuyers == 0 or numberOfSellers == 0:
raise Exception("Buyers and sellers equal to zero: market done")
yield waituntil,self,self.sim.marketReady
try:
global selectedSellers, selectedBuyers, returnAgentNames
if debug:
print "selectedSellers = "+returnAgentNames(selectedSellers)
print "selectedBuyers = "+returnAgentNames(selectedBuyers)
# Check if a new round should begin
if (len(selectedSellers)+len(selectedBuyers)) == (numberOfBuyers+\
numberOfSellers):
if len(self.sim.bidB.list) > 0:
bestBids.append([self.sim.now(),self.sim.bidB.list[-1][0]])
if len(self.sim.askB.list) > 0:
bestAsks.append([self.sim.now(),self.sim.askB.list[0][0]])
selectedSellers = []
selectedBuyers = []
yield hold,self,1
if trades:
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print "At "+str(self.sim.now())+": no trades in"+\
" this round: beginning a new round"
# See if only buyers or sellers left, select the other group if
# other group is entirely consumed. If agents left in both groups,
# then select either a buyer or a seller from their queues randomly.
selectedGroup = -1
# First check for the agents left
allBuyers = set(buyerQueue)
usedBuyers = set(selectedBuyers)
buyersLeft = list(allBuyers-usedBuyers)
allSellers = set(sellerQueue)
usedSellers = set(selectedSellers)
sellersLeft = list(allSellers-usedSellers)
# Then see their amounts and decide about the group
if len(buyersLeft) == 0:
selectedGroup = 1
elif len(sellersLeft) == 0:
selectedGroup = 0
else:
selectedGroup = random.randint(0,1)
if selectedGroup == 0:
# Select buyer from unselected buyers left in this round
global selectedBuyer
if len(buyersLeft) == 1:
selectedBuyer = buyersLeft[0]
else:
selectedBuyer = buyersLeft[random.randint(0,\
len(buyersLeft)-1)]
selectedBuyers.append(selectedBuyer)
if debug:
print "Market maker ready, chose buyer "+\
selectedBuyer.name
else:
# Select seller from unselected sellers left in this round
global selectedSeller
if len(sellersLeft) == 1:
selectedSeller = sellersLeft[0]
else:
selectedSeller = sellersLeft[random.randint(0,\
len(sellersLeft)-1)]
selectedSellers.append(selectedSeller)
if debug:
print "Market maker ready, chose seller "+\
selectedSeller.name
yield waituntil,self,self.sim.marketDone
except ValueError as inst:
print "len(buyersLeft) == "+str(len(buyersLeft))+\
" and len(sellersLeft) == "+str(len(sellersLeft))
raise Exception("Market maker: ValueError: "+str(inst))
except Exception as inst:
raise Exception("Market maker: Exception: "+str(inst))
class Agent(Process):
"""
Responsible for agents work. The main method is work(), but also other
auxiliary methods are used by the agents.
Agents characteristics
- self.type: 0 = buyer, 1 = seller
- self.valuation: any integer in range (1,maximumAssetValue)
- self.hasTrader: 0 = has not, 1 = has
- selfname: agent + str(integer), identifies the each agents uniquely
"""
def __init__(self,name,sim):
"""
Initialize agents with their characteristics, name is initialized by the
Generator() defined below. Note that if the number of agents is uneven, then
this function initializes agents so that there is one buyer more than sellers.
"""
global numberOfBuyers, numberOfSellers, maximumAssetValue, demand, supply,\
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buyerValuations, sellerValuations, numberOfAgents
Process.__init__(self,name,sim)
self.hasTraded = 0
self.type = -1
self.valuation = -1
try:
if numberOfBuyers < 1.0*numberOfAgents/2:
self.type = 0
self.valuation = buyerValuations[numberOfBuyers]
numberOfBuyers += 1
for i in range(0,self.valuation):
demand[i][1] += 1
else:
self.type = 1
self.valuation = sellerValuations[numberOfSellers]
numberOfSellers += 1
for i in range(self.valuation-1,len(supply)):
supply[i][1] += 1
except ValueError as inst:
raise Exception("Agent: __init__: ValueError: "+str(inst))
except Exception as inst:
raise Exception("Agent: __init__: Exception: "+str(inst))
def appendBid(self,bid,amount):
"""
Inserts a bid and sorts bids from smallest to largest
"""
global allBids, allBids0
allBids.append([self.sim.now(),bid])
if (self.sim.now() == 0):
allBids0.append(bid)
self.sim.bidB.list.append([bid,amount,self])
self.sim.bidB.list = sorted(self.sim.bidB.list, key = lambda bid: bid[0])
def appendAsk(self,ask,amount):
"""
Inserts an ask and sorts asks from smallest to largest.
"""
global allAsks, allAsks0
allAsks.append([self.sim.now(),ask])
if (self.sim.now() == 0):
allAsks0.append(ask)
self.sim.askB.list.append([ask,amount,self])
self.sim.askB.list = sorted(self.sim.askB.list, key = lambda ask: ask[0])
def selectBid(self):
"""
Returns the largest bid and remove it from the list. Largest bid is
found from the last place in the list.
"""
if(len(self.sim.bidB.list) == 0):
return -1
return self.sim.bidB.list.pop()
def selectAsk(self):
"""
Return the smallest ask and remove it from the list. Smallest ask is
found from the first place in the list.
"""
if(len(self.sim.askB.list) == 0):
return -1
aux = self.sim.askB.list[0]
self.sim.askB.list.remove(aux)
return aux
def seeBid(self):
"""
Returns the value of the largest bid, which is found from the last place
in the list
"""
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if(len(self.sim.bidB.list) == 0):
return -1
return self.sim.bidB.list[-1][0] #bids[len(bids)-1]
def seeAsk(self):
"""
Returns the value of the smallest ask, which is found from the first
place in the list
"""
if(len(self.sim.askB.list) == 0):
return -1
return self.sim.askB.list[0][0]
def cancelOldLimitBids(self):
"""
Cancels all limit bids from the bid limit order book for the
agent, who is given as a parameter.
"""
try:
# First find orders to be cancelled
aux = []
for order in self.sim.bidB.list:
if order[2] == self:
aux.append(order)
# Then cancel them
for order in aux:
self.sim.bidB.list.remove(order)
except ValueError as inst:
print "cancelOldLimitBids(): ValueError: "+str(inst)
except Exception:
print "cancelOldLimitBids(): Exception: "+str(inst)
def cancelOldLimitAsks(self):
"""
Cancels all limit asks from the ask limit order book for the
agent, who is given as a parameter.
"""
try:
# First find orders to be cancelled
aux = []
for order in self.sim.askB.list:
if order[2] == self:
#print "cancelling ask for agent %s"%agent.name
aux.append(order)
# Then cancel them
for order in aux:
self.sim.askB.list.remove(order)
except ValueError as inst:
print "cancelOldLimitAsks(): ValueError: "+str(inst)
except Exception:
print "cancelOldLimitAsks(): Exception: "+str(inst)
def work(self):
"""
The main routine for agent: agents push themselves into buyer or seller
queues, and wait if they got selected. If a particular agent is selected,
then she looks at either limit asks or bids, depending whether the agent
is a buyer or a seller, and if any of them satisfy her, then she trades.
If the agent doesn't wan't to trade at the quotes available, then she
appends her bid or ask to the corresponding limit order book.
Because agent is implemented in SimPy and the limit order books are derived
from the resource class, the agents always request the particular limit
order book they need when they trade. This is heavy structure for a simple
ZI-market, but offers possibilities to create more complex market structures.
"""
global maximumAssetValue, numberOfBuyers, numberOfSellers, selectedSeller,\
selectedBuyer, buyerQueue, sellerQueue, extractedProfit,\
selectedSellers,selectedBuyers, bestAsks, bestBids,\
budgetConstraint
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if debug:
print self.name+" initialized"
while (not self.hasTraded):
if self.type == 0:
# Self a buyer
buyerQueue.append(self)
yield waituntil,self,self.sim.marketMakerDone
# First check if a buyer of a seller was chosen
if selectedBuyer != -1:
if(self == selectedBuyer):
if debug:
print self.name+" came to market"
# Trade
yield request,self,self.sim.bidB
if budgetConstraint:
u = random.uniform(1,self.valuation)
else:
u = random.uniform(1,maximumAssetValue)
askPrice = self.seeAsk()
if askPrice != -1 and u >= askPrice:
bestAsks.append([self.sim.now(),askPrice])
if self.seeBid() > 0:
bestBids.append([self.sim.now(),self.seeBid()])
sellingAsk = self.selectAsk()
prices.append([self.sim.now(),askPrice,\
len(self.sim.bidB.list),\
len(self.sim.askB.list)])
sellingAsk[2].hasTraded = 1
self.hasTraded = 1
numberOfSellers -= 1
numberOfBuyers -= 1
selectedSellers = []
selectedBuyers = []
increaseInProfit = self.valuation-\
sellingAsk[2].valuation
#if increaseInProfit > 0:
extractedProfit += increaseInProfit
if trades:
print self.name+" bought and "+sellingAsk[2].name+\
" has sold and profit was "+\
str(self.valuation-sellingAsk[2].valuation)
print "price = "+str(askPrice)+" "+\
str(self.valuation-sellingAsk[2].valuation)
else:
self.appendBid(u,1)
# Try to clear books if traded
if self.hasTraded:
if debug:
print self.name+" clearing the books"
yield request,self,self.sim.askB
self.sim.askB.list = []
yield release,self,self.sim.askB
self.sim.bidB.list = []
yield hold,self,1
if trades:
print "At "+str(self.sim.now())+\
": trade took place: beginning new round"
# Release resources
yield release,self,self.sim.bidB
buyerQueue = []
sellerQueue = []
selectedBuyer = -1
if debug:
print "Buyer "+self.name+" left market and"+\
" selectedBuyer == -1 now"
print "selectedSeller == "+str(selectedSeller)+\
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" and selectedBuyer == "+str(selectedBuyer)
else:
# Another buyer was chosen
if debug:
print "Buyer "+self.name+\
" waiting for market to be done"
yield waituntil,self,self.sim.marketDone
else:
# A seller was chosen
if debug:
print "Buyer "+self.name+\
" waiting for market to be done"
yield waituntil,self,self.sim.marketDone
else:
# Self a seller
sellerQueue.append(self)
yield waituntil,self,self.sim.marketMakerDone
# First check if a buyer of a seller was chosen
if selectedSeller != -1:
if(self == selectedSeller):
if debug:
print self.name+" came to market"
# Trade
yield request,self,self.sim.askB
if budgetConstraint:
u = random.uniform(self.valuation,maximumAssetValue)
else:
u = random.uniform(1,maximumAssetValue)
bidPrice = self.seeBid()
if bidPrice != -1 and u <= bidPrice:
bestBids.append([self.sim.now(),bidPrice])
if self.seeAsk() > 0:
bestAsks.append([self.sim.now(),self.seeAsk()])
buyingBid = self.selectBid()
prices.append([self.sim.now(),bidPrice,\
len(self.sim.bidB.list),\
len(self.sim.askB.list)])
buyingBid[2].hasTraded = 1
self.hasTraded = 1
numberOfSellers -= 1
numberOfBuyers -= 1
selectedSellers = []
selectedBuyers = []
increaseInProfit = buyingBid[2].valuation-\
self.valuation
#if increaseInProfit > 0:
extractedProfit += increaseInProfit
if trades:
print self.name+" has sold and "+\
buyingBid[2].name+" has bought and"+\
" profit was "+str(buyingBid[2].valuation-\
self.valuation)
print "price = "+str(bidPrice)+" "+\
str(buyingBid[2].valuation-self.valuation)
else:
self.appendAsk(u,1)
# Try to clear books if traded
if self.hasTraded:
if debug:
print self.name+" clearing the books"
yield request,self,self.sim.bidB
self.sim.bidB.list = []
yield release,self,self.sim.bidB
self.sim.askB.list = []
yield hold,self,1
if trades:
print "At "+str(self.sim.now())+": trade took"+\
" place: beginning new round"
102
# Release resources
yield release,self,self.sim.askB
sellerQueue = []
buyerQueue = []
selectedSeller = -1
if debug:
print "Seller "+self.name+" left market and"+\
" selectedSeller == -1 now"
print "selectedSeller == "+str(selectedSeller)+\
" and selectedBuyer == "+str(selectedBuyer)
else:
# Another seller was chosen
if debug:
print "Buyer "+self.name+\
" waiting for market to be done"
yield waituntil,self,self.sim.marketDone
else:
# A buyer was chosen
if debug:
print "Buyer "+self.name+\
" waiting for market to be done"
yield waituntil,self,self.sim.marketDone
# Leave market
if self.type == 0:
self.cancelOldLimitBids()
else:
self.cancelOldLimitAsks()
class Generator(Process):
"""
Responsible for generating all agents at the
beginning of the simulation. Initializes the names
of the agents and puts them acting in the market.
"""
def execute(self,agentNumber):
for i in range(agentNumber):
a = Agent("Trader "+str(i), sim=self.sim)
self.sim.activate(a,a.work())
yield hold,self,0
### Model -----------------------------------
class NeedResourcesModel(Simulation):
"""
Implements the simulation itself. The first four functions are
used by the market maker and the agents to communicate between
themselves. The main method is run: it initializes all the model
variables, runs the model and outputs data.
"""
def marketReady(self):
"""
Market maker waits for this to return True before she starts
to choose which trader gets to trade.
"""
global numberOfSellers, numberOfBuyers, buyerQueue, sellerQueue
return (len(buyerQueue) == numberOfBuyers) and\
(len(sellerQueue) == numberOfSellers)
def marketDone(self):
"""
Both market maker and the agents who did not got chosen as the
trading agent wait for this to become True. After the agent, who
was selected to trade, is ready, she sets either the selectedBuyer
or selectedSeller again to -1, and releases all the
"""
global selectedBuyer, selectedSeller
return (selectedBuyer == -1) and (selectedSeller == -1)
def marketMakerDone(self):
"""
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Used by agents to check if the market maker has done his decision
about the fact that which agents was chosen to trade.
"""
global selectedBuyer, selectedSeller
return (selectedBuyer != -1) or (selectedSeller != -1)
def marketInitialized(self):
"""
Used by the market maker to check that the generator has initialized
all agents. Needed, because otherwise it could be that the market maker
would start to act, because the marketReady() may return True although all
agents were not initalized.
"""
global numberOfAgents, numberOfSellers, numberOfBuyers
return ((numberOfBuyers + numberOfSellers) == numberOfAgents)
def run(self):
"""
Runs the model. First initializes all needed variables for the model and
output. Then runs the model, and after that outputs data from the single
run.
"""
global numberOfAgents, numberOfRounds, prices, numberOfBuyers,\
numberOfSellers,selectedBuyer, selectedSeller, buyerQueue,\
sellerQueue, maximumAssetValue, supply, demand, extractedProfit,\
selectedBuyers, selectedSellers, buyerValuations,\
sellerValuations, statistics, rheight, rwidth, bestBids,\
bestAsks, RMSD, initializeDemandAndSupply, EquilibriumPrice
# Initializations of variables
initializeDemandAndSupply()
selectedBuyer = -1
selectedSeller = -1
buyerQueue = []
sellerQueue = []
selectedBuyers = []
selectedSellers = []
# Initializations of logs
# output data
prices = []
bestBids = []
bestAsks = []
demand = []
supply = []
statistics = []
for i in range(1,maximumAssetValue+1):
demand.append([i,0])
supply.append([i,0])
extractedProfit = 0
# Initialization of simulation components
self.initialize()
self.bidB = Book(sim=self)
self.askB = Book(sim=self)
g = Generator(name='gen',sim=self)
self.activate(g,g.execute(agentNumber=numberOfAgents))
marketMaker = MarketMaker(sim=self)
self.activate(marketMaker,marketMaker.work())
# Simulation
print "Simulation started at "+str(time.ctime())
try:
print self.simulate(until=numberOfRounds)
except Exception as inst:
print "\n*** Exception occured during Simulation ***\n"
print inst
print "Simulation ended at "+str(time.ctime())
if debug:
print "Bids in the end:"
for i in self.bidB.list:
104
print "price = %f, amount = %f" %(i[0],i[1])
print "Asks in the end:"
for i in self.askB.list:
print "price = %f, amount = %f" %(i[0],i[1])
print "Prices:"
for i in prices:
print "price = "+str(i)
# Plotting
if(len(prices) > 1):
global outPath
# Separate data
rets = []
pricesOnly = []
pricesTimes = []
pricesBids = []
pricesAsks = []
outstr = outPath+str(simulationIndex)+"_n_"+\
str(numberOfAgents)+"_r_"+str(numberOfRounds)
f = open(outstr+".txt", 'w')
fret = open(outstr+"_ret.txt", 'w')
for i in range(0,len(prices)):
if i != 0:
ret = math.log(prices[i][1]/prices[i-1][1])
rets.append(ret)
fret.write(str(ret)+"\n")
f.write(str(prices[i])+"\n")
pricesAsks.append(prices[i][3])
pricesBids.append(prices[i][2])
pricesOnly.append(prices[i][1])
pricesTimes.append(prices[i][0])
f.close()
fret.close()
# Plots using Rpy
# Draw density estimate for returns using R
if len(rets) > 1:
densityData = r.density(rets,kernel="gaussian")
densityData = [densityData['x'],densityData['y']]
r.postscript(outstr+"_density_rets.ps",width=rwidth,height=rheight)
r.plot(densityData[0],densityData[1],xlab='Logreturn',
ylab='Probability',type='l',col="blue4",lty=1,lwd=1)
r.dev_off()
# Draw histogram of returns using R
r.postscript(outstr+"_hist_rets.ps",width=rwidth,height=rheight)
r.hist(rets,breaks=10,xlab="Logreturn",ylab="Number of observations",\
main="",col="blue4")
r.dev_off()
if len(pricesOnly) > 1:
# Draw density estimate for prices using R
densityData = r.density(pricesOnly,kernel="gaussian")
densityData = [densityData['x'],densityData['y']]
r.postscript(outstr+"_density_prices.ps",width=rwidth,\
height=rheight)
r.plot(densityData[0],densityData[1],xlab='Price',\
ylab='Probability',type='l',col="blue4",lty=1,lwd=1)
r.dev_off()
# Draw histogram for prices using R
r.postscript(outstr+"_hist_prices.ps",width=rwidth,height=rheight)
r.hist(pricesOnly,breaks=10,xlab="Price",\
ylab="Number of observations",main="",col="blue4")
r.dev_off()
# Index for printing statistics
statIndex = 0
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# Equilibrium price
statistics.append(equilibriumPrice)
print "Equilibrium price was "+str(statistics[statIndex])
statIndex += 1
# Draw pricesprocess + demand and sypply schedule using R
supplyQ = []
supplyP = []
demandQ = []
demandP = []
maxSupply = 0
for i,item in enumerate(supply):
supplyQ.append(supply[i][1])
supplyP.append(supply[i][0])
demandQ.append(demand[i][1])
demandP.append(demand[i][0])
if supply[i][1] > demand[i][1] and supply[i][1] > maxSupply:
maxSupply = supply[i][1]
else:
if demand[i][1] > maxSupply:
maxSupply = demand[i][1]
r.postscript(outstr+"_price_demand_supply.ps",width=rwidth,\
height=rheight)
r.par(mfrow=r.c(3,1))
r.plot([0,numberOfRounds],[0,maximumAssetValue],type="n",\
xlab="Round/Quantity",ylab="Price",main="")
r.lines(pricesTimes,pricesOnly,col="blue4",lty=1,lwd=1)
r.lines(demandQ,demandP,col="darkorange",lty=1,lwd=1)
r.lines(supplyQ,supplyP,col="darkgreen",lty=1,lwd=1)
r.abline(equilibriumPrice,0,col="darkred",lwd=1,lty=2)
# legend
colors = r.c("blue4","darkorange","darkgreen","darkred")
linetype = r.c(1,1,1,2)
names = r.c("Priceprocess","Demand","Supply","Equilibrium price = "+\
str(equilibriumPrice))
r.legend(numberOfRounds-15,maximumAssetValue,names, cex=0.8, col=colors,\
lty=linetype, lwd=1)
# Draw priceprocess + best bids + best asks
bidsOnly = []
asksOnly = []
bidsTimes = []
asksTimes = []
for item in bestBids:
bidsTimes.append(item[0])
bidsOnly.append(item[1])
for item in bestAsks:
asksTimes.append(item[0])
asksOnly.append(item[1])
r.plot([0,numberOfRounds],[0,maximumAssetValue],type="n",\
xlab="Round",ylab="Price",main="")
r.lines(pricesTimes,pricesOnly,col="blue4",lty=1,lwd=1)
r.points(bidsTimes,bidsOnly,col="darkorange",pch=2)
r.points(asksTimes,asksOnly,col="darkgreen",pch=6)
r.abline(equilibriumPrice,0,col="darkred",lwd=1,lty=2)
# legend
colors = r.c("blue4","darkorange","darkgreen","darkred")
names = r.c("Transaction price","Highest bid","Lowest ask",\
"Equilibrium price = "+str(equilibriumPrice))
r.legend(numberOfRounds-14,maximumAssetValue,names, cex=0.8,\
col=colors,lty=r.c(1,0,0,2),lwd=1,pch=r.c(-1,2,6,-1))
# Draw priceprocess + number of quotes, bids and asks, eq. price
r.plot([0,numberOfRounds],[0,max(maximumAssetValue,max(pricesBids),\
max(pricesAsks))],type="n",xlab="Round",ylab="Price, Amount",\
main="")
r.lines(pricesTimes,pricesOnly,col="blue4",lty=1,lwd=1)
r.lines(pricesTimes,pricesBids,col="darkorange",type="o",lty=1,\
lwd=1,pch=2)
r.lines(pricesTimes,pricesAsks,col="darkgreen",type="o",lty=1,\
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lwd=1,pch=6)
r.abline(equilibriumPrice,0,col="darkred",lwd=1,lty=2)
# legend
colors = r.c("blue4","darkorange","darkgreen","darkred")
names = r.c("Transaction price","Number of bids","Number of asks",\
"Equilibrium price = "+str(equilibriumPrice))
r.legend(numberOfRounds-14,max(maximumAssetValue,max(pricesBids),\
max(pricesAsks)),names,cex=0.8, col=colors,lty=r.c(1,1,1,2),\
lwd=1,pch=r.c(-1,2,6,-1))
r.par(mfrow=r.c(1,1)) # need to be here to prevent a pop-up window
r.dev_off()
# Efficiency
possibleProfit = 0
for item in buyerValuations:
if equilibriumPrice < item:
possibleProfit += item-equilibriumPrice
for item in sellerValuations:
if equilibriumPrice > item:
possibleProfit += equilibriumPrice-item
statistics.append(1.0*extractedProfit/possibleProfit)
print "Efficiency was "+str(statistics[statIndex])+" composed of "+\
str(extractedProfit)+" and "+str(possibleProfit)
# number of transactions
statistics.append(len(prices))
statIndex += 1
print "Number of transactions was "+str(statistics[statIndex])
# Mean of prices
statistics.append(r.mean(pricesOnly))
statIndex += 1
print "Mean was of prices "+str(statistics[statIndex])
# Median of prices
statistics.append(r.median(pricesOnly))
statIndex += 1
print "Median was of prices "+str(statistics[statIndex])
# Maximum of prices
statistics.append(max(pricesOnly))
statIndex += 1
print "Maximum of prices was "+str(statistics[statIndex])
# Minimum of prices
statistics.append(min(pricesOnly))
statIndex += 1
print "Minimum of prices was "+str(statistics[statIndex])
# stdev of prices
statistics.append(r.sd(pricesOnly))
statIndex += 1
print "Stdev of prices was "+str(statistics[statIndex])
# moments-package
r.library('moments')
# Kurtosis of prices
statistics.append(r.kurtosis(pricesOnly))
statIndex += 1
print "Kurtosis of prices was "+str(statistics[statIndex])
# Skewness prices
statistics.append(r.skewness(pricesOnly))
statIndex += 1
print "Skewness prices was "+str(statistics[statIndex])
aux = r.quantile(pricesOnly)
statistics.append(aux['25%'])
statIndex += 1
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print "25% quantile of prices was "+str(statistics[statIndex])
statistics.append(aux['75%'])
statIndex += 1
print "75% quantile of prices was "+str(statistics[statIndex])
# Mean of rets
statistics.append(r.mean(rets))
statIndex += 1
print "Mean was of rets "+str(statistics[statIndex])
# Median of rets
statistics.append(r.median(rets))
statIndex += 1
print "Median was of rets "+str(statistics[statIndex])
# Maximum of rets
statistics.append(max(rets))
statIndex += 1
print "Maximum of rets was "+str(statistics[statIndex])
# Minimum of rets
statistics.append(min(rets))
statIndex += 1
print "Minimum of rets was "+str(statistics[statIndex])
# stdev of rets
statistics.append(r.sd(rets))
statIndex += 1
print "Stdev of rets was "+str(statistics[statIndex])
# Kurtosis of returns
statistics.append(r.kurtosis(rets))
statIndex += 1
print "Kurtosis of returns was "+str(statistics[statIndex])
# Skewness returns
statistics.append(r.skewness(rets))
statIndex += 1
print "Skewness returns was "+str(statistics[statIndex])
# Coefficient of convergence
# Taa pitaa laskea sd:na eq-hinnan ymparilla!
statistics.append(100.0*RMSD(pricesOnly,\
equilibriumPrice)/equilibriumPrice)
statIndex += 1
print "Coeff. of convergence (Smith) was "+str(statistics[statIndex])
# Jarque-Bera test for normality of returns
jarqueBera = r.jarque_test(rets)
statistics.append(jarqueBera['p.value'])
statIndex += 1
print "p-value for jarque-bera test for the normality of"+\
" returns was "+str(statistics[statIndex])
statistics.append(jarqueBera['statistic']['JB'])
statIndex += 1
else:
print "No trading occured"
# Experiment ------------------------------
seeds = range(1,numberOfRuns+1)
seedInd = 0
random.seed(SEED)
statsAll = []
statisticsC = []
statisticsU = []
pricesAll = []
pricesC = []
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pricesU = []
bestBidsAll = []
bestAsksAll = []
bestBidsAllC = []
bestAsksAllC = []
bestBidsAllU = []
bestAsksAllU = []
outPath = outPathC
for ind in range(1,numberOfRuns*2+1):
print "** Run number "+str(ind)+" **"
if ind == numberOfRuns+1:
budgetConstraint = False
statisticsC = statsAll
pricesC = pricesAll
bestBidsAllC = bestBidsAll
bestAsksAllC = bestAsksAll
statsAll = []
pricesAll = []
bestAsksAll = []
bestBidsAll = []
fstats = open(outPathZI+"allBidsC.txt", 'w')
for item in allBids:
fstats.write(str(item)+";")
fstats = open(outPathZI+"allAsksC.txt", 'w')
for item in allAsks:
fstats.write(str(item)+";")
fstats = open(outPathZI+"allBids0C.txt", 'w')
for item in allBids0:
fstats.write(str(item)+",")
fstats = open(outPathZI+"allAsks0C.txt", 'w')
for item in allAsks0:
fstats.write(str(item)+",")
allBids = []
allAsks = []
allBids0 = []
allAsks0 = []
simulationIndex = 1
fstats = open(outPath+str(simulationIndex)+"_n_"+\
str(numberOfAgents)+"_r_"+\
str(numberOfRounds)+"_stats.txt", 'w')
for row in statisticsC:
fstats.write(str(row)+"\n")
fstats.close()
seedInd = 0
outPath = outPathU
print "\n **Beginning runs with ZI-U agents** \n"
if convergenceRun:
print "Seed set back to 1"
random.seed(1)
elif singleSeed:
# Do nothing
print "No change in seed"
else:
random.seed(seeds[seedInd])
print "Seed set to next from the seeds-array: "+str(seeds[seedInd])
seedInd += 1
NeedResourcesModel().run()
simulationIndex += 1
statsAll.append(statistics)
pricesAll.append(prices)
bestBidsAll.append(bestBids)
bestAsksAll.append(bestAsks)
# for output
statisticsU = statsAll
pricesU = pricesAll
bestBidsAllU = bestBidsAll
bestAsksAllU = bestAsksAll
# statisticsU
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fstats = open(outPath+str(simulationIndex)+"_n_"+str(numberOfAgents)+"_r_"+\
str(numberOfRounds)+"_stats.txt", 'w')
for row in statisticsU:
fstats.write(str(row)+"\n")
fstats.close()
# Statistics for the whole experiment
indexList = [1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,19]
auxStats = []
fstats = open(outPathZI+str(simulationIndex)+"_n_"+str(numberOfAgents)+"_r_"+\
str(numberOfRounds)+"_stats.txt", 'w')
for index in indexList:
aux = []
for row in statisticsC:
aux.append(row[index])
auxStats.append(r.mean(aux))
auxStats.append(r.sd(aux))
auxStats.append(len(aux))
fstats.write(str(auxStats)+"\n")
auxStats = []
for index in indexList:
aux = []
for row in statisticsU:
aux.append(row[index])
auxStats.append(r.mean(aux))
auxStats.append(r.sd(aux))
auxStats.append(len(aux))
fstats.write(str(auxStats)+"\n")
fstats.close()
# Tests for differences between constrained and unconstrained agents
efficienciesC = []
coefsConvergC = []
efficienciesU = []
coefsConvergU = []
for row in statisticsC:
efficienciesC.append(100.0*row[1])
coefsConvergC.append(row[19])
for row in statisticsU:
efficienciesU.append(100.0*row[1])
coefsConvergU.append(row[19])
r.library('coin')
wilcoxTestEff = r.wilcox_test(efficienciesC,efficienciesU,paired=1,\
alternative="greater")
print "p-value for efficiencies using Wilcoxon test "+\
str(wilcoxTestEff['p.value'])
wilcoxTestCoef = r.wilcox_test(coefsConvergC,coefsConvergU,paired=1,\
alternative="less")
print "p-value of coefficients of convergence using Wilcoxon test "+\
str(wilcoxTestCoef['p.value'])
fstats = open(outPathZI+str(numberOfRuns)+".txt", 'w')
fstats.write(str(wilcoxTestCoef)+"\n")
fstats.write(str(wilcoxTestEff)+"\n")
fstats.close()
# Print efficiencies and coefs of convergence and RMSD together
r.postscript(outPathZI+str(numberOfRuns)+"_eff_conv_RMSD.ps",\
width=rwidth,height=rheight)
r.par(mfrow=r.c(3,1))
# Efficiencies
r.plot([0,numberOfRuns],[0,100],type="n",xlab="Run",\
ylab="Efficiency",main="")
r.lines(efficienciesC,col="blue4",type="o",lty=1,lwd=1,pch=15)
r.lines(efficienciesU,col="darkorange",type="o",lty=1,lwd=1,pch=17)
colors = r.c("blue4","darkorange")
names = r.c("With budget constraint","Without budget constraint")
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r.legend(numberOfRuns-10,30,names,cex=0.8,col=colors,lty=r.c(1,1),\
lwd=1,pch=r.c(15,17))
# Coefs of convergence
r.plot([0,numberOfRuns],[0,100],type="n",xlab="Run",\
ylab="Coefficient of Convergence",main="")
r.lines(coefsConvergC,col="blue4",type="o",lty=1,lwd=1,pch=15)
r.lines(coefsConvergU,col="darkorange",type="o",lty=1,lwd=1,pch=17)
colors = r.c("blue4","darkorange")
names = r.c("With budget constraint","Without budget constraint")
r.legend(numberOfRuns-10,100,names,cex=0.8,col=colors,lty=r.c(1,1),\
lwd=1,pch=r.c(15,17))
# Convergence using RMSD, results applicable only if same seed in all runs!
# Match prices buy their transaction rounds
# Only rounds with more than 10 observations accepted
pricesOnlyC = []
pricesOnlyU = []
for i in range(0,numberOfRounds+1):
pricesOnlyC.append([])
pricesOnlyU.append([])
for pricesItem in pricesC:
for item in pricesItem:
pricesOnlyC[item[0]].append(item[1])
for pricesItem in pricesU:
for item in pricesItem:
pricesOnlyU[item[0]].append(item[1])
convsC = []
convsCT = []
convsCN = []
convsU = []
convsUT = []
convsUN = []
for i,item in enumerate(pricesOnlyC):
if len(item)>10:
convsC.append(RMSD(item,statistics[0]))
convsCT.append(i)
convsCN.append(len(item))
for i,item in enumerate(pricesOnlyU):
if len(item)>10:
convsU.append(RMSD(item,statistics[0]))
convsUT.append(i)
convsUN.append(len(item))
r.plot([0,numberOfRounds],[0,100],type="n",xlab="Round",\
ylab="RMSD / Number of observations ",main="")
r.lines(convsCT,convsC,col="blue4",type="o",lty=1,lwd=1,pch=15)
r.lines(convsUT,convsU,col="darkorange",type="o",lty=1,lwd=1,pch=17)
r.points(convsCT,convsCN,col="blue4",pch=12)
r.points(convsUT,convsUN,col="darkorange",pch=9)
colors = r.c("blue4","darkorange","blue4","darkorange")
names = r.c("With budget constraint","Without budget constraint",\
"N with budget constraint","N without budget constraint")
r.legend(numberOfRounds-16,100,names,cex=0.8,col=colors,lty=r.c(1,1,0,0),\
lwd=1,pch=r.c(15,17,12,9))
r.par(mfrow=r.c(1,1))
r.dev_off()
# Output to files
fstats = open(outPathZI+str(numberOfRuns)+"_pricesC_0.txt", 'w')
fstats.write(str(pricesOnlyC[0])+"\n")
fstats.close()
fstats = open(outPathZI+str(numberOfRuns)+"_pricesC.txt", 'w')
for item in pricesOnlyC:
for price in item:
fstats.write(str(price)+",")
fstats.close()
fstats = open(outPathZI+str(numberOfRuns)+"_convergence.txt", 'w')
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fstats.write(str(coefsConvergC)+"\n")
fstats.write(str(coefsConvergU)+"\n")
fstats.close()
fstats = open(outPathZI+str(numberOfRuns)+"_efficiencies.txt", 'w')
fstats.write(str(efficienciesC)+"\n")
fstats.write(str(efficienciesU)+"\n")
fstats.close()
fstats = open(outPathZI+str(numberOfRuns)+"_RMSD.txt", 'w')
fstats.write(str(convsC)+"\n")
fstats.write(str(convsCT)+"\n")
fstats.write(str(pricesOnlyC)+"\n")
fstats.write(str(convsU)+"\n")
fstats.write(str(convsUT)+"\n")
fstats.write(str(pricesOnlyU)+"\n")
fstats.close()
# Draw estimates for the ask, bid and price densities
# first separate prices, bids and asks from time data
bidsOnlyAllC = []
asksOnlyAllC = []
pricesOnlyAllC = []
bidsOnlyAllU = []
asksOnlyAllU = []
pricesOnlyAllU = []
for i in range(0,numberOfRounds+1):
bidsOnlyAllC.append([])
asksOnlyAllC.append([])
pricesOnlyAllC.append([])
bidsOnlyAllU.append([])
asksOnlyAllU.append([])
pricesOnlyAllU.append([])
for pricesItem in pricesC:
for item in pricesItem:
pricesOnlyAllC[item[0]].append(item[1])
for bidsItem in bestBidsAllC:
for item in bidsItem:
bidsOnlyAllC[item[0]].append(item[1])
for asksItem in bestAsksAllC:
for item in asksItem:
asksOnlyAllC[item[0]].append(item[1])
for pricesItem in pricesU:
for item in pricesItem:
pricesOnlyAllU[item[0]].append(item[1])
for bidsItem in bestBidsAllU:
for item in bidsItem:
bidsOnlyAllU[item[0]].append(item[1])
for asksItem in bestAsksAllU:
for item in asksItem:
asksOnlyAllU[item[0]].append(item[1])
fstats = open(outPathZI+str(numberOfRuns)+"_bidsOnlyAllC.txt", 'w')
fstats.write(str(bidsOnlyAllC))
fstats.close()
fstats = open(outPathZI+str(numberOfRuns)+"_asksOnlyAllC.txt", 'w')
fstats.write(str(asksOnlyAllC))
fstats.close()
fstats = open(outPathZI+str(numberOfRuns)+"_pricesOnlyAllC.txt", 'w')
fstats.write(str(pricesOnlyAllC))
fstats.close()
fstats = open(outPathZI+str(numberOfRuns)+"_bidsOnlyAllU.txt", 'w')
fstats.write(str(bidsOnlyAllU))
fstats.close()
fstats = open(outPathZI+str(numberOfRuns)+"_asksOnlyAllU.txt", 'w')
fstats.write(str(asksOnlyAllU))
fstats.close()
fstats = open(outPathZI+str(numberOfRuns)+"_pricesOnlyAllU.txt", 'w')
fstats.write(str(pricesOnlyAllU))
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fstats.close()
# Then take only those prices and quotes, which are from
# Rounds 0,10,20,...,150
asksGroupedC = []
bidsGroupedC = []
pricesGroupedC = []
asksGroupedU = []
bidsGroupedU = []
pricesGroupedU = []
densityStepSize = 15
for i in range(0,numberOfRounds+1,densityStepSize):
asksGroupedC.append([i,asksOnlyAllC[i]])
bidsGroupedC.append([i,bidsOnlyAllC[i]])
asksGroupedU.append([i,asksOnlyAllU[i]])
bidsGroupedU.append([i,bidsOnlyAllU[i]])
densityStepSize = 5
for i in range(0,numberOfRounds+1,densityStepSize):
pricesGroupedC.append([i,pricesOnlyAllC[i]])
pricesGroupedU.append([i,pricesOnlyAllU[i]])
fstats = open(outPathZI+str(numberOfRuns)+"_bidsGroupedC.txt", 'w')
fstats.write(str(bidsGroupedC))
fstats.close()
fstats = open(outPathZI+str(numberOfRuns)+"_asksGroupedC.txt", 'w')
fstats.write(str(asksGroupedC))
fstats.close()
fstats = open(outPathZI+str(numberOfRuns)+"_pricesGroupedC.txt", 'w')
fstats.write(str(pricesGroupedC))
fstats.close()
fstats = open(outPathZI+str(numberOfRuns)+"_bidsGroupedU.txt", 'w')
fstats.write(str(bidsGroupedU))
fstats.close()
fstats = open(outPathZI+str(numberOfRuns)+"_asksGroupedU.txt", 'w')
fstats.write(str(asksGroupedU))
fstats.close()
fstats = open(outPathZI+str(numberOfRuns)+"_pricesGroupedU.txt", 'w')
fstats.write(str(pricesGroupedU))
fstats.close()
# Draw density estimate for prices, asks and bids at different times using R
# with budget constraint
r.postscript(outPathZI+str(numberOfRuns)+"C_densities.ps",width=rwidth,\
height=rheight)
r.par(mfrow=r.c(3,1))
r.library('colorRamps')
numberOfColors = int(1.0*numberOfRounds/densityStepSize)+2
colorsA = r.matlab_like(numberOfColors*2)[numberOfColors:numberOfColors*2]
# Price
try:
r.plot([0,200],[0,0.2],type="n", xlab="Price",ylab="PDF",main="Prices")
namesA = []
ltyA = []
for i,item in enumerate(pricesGroupedC):
if len(item[1]) > 10:
densityData = r.density(item[1],kernel="gaussian")
r.lines(densityData['x'],densityData['y'],type="l",\
col=colorsA[i],lty=1,lwd=1)
namesA.append("Round "+str(item[0])+", mean = "+\
str(round(r.mean(item[1]),1))+", n = "+str(len(item[1])))
ltyA.append(1)
r.lines([equilibriumPrice,equilibriumPrice],[-1,10],col="darkred",lwd=1,lty=2)
r.legend(173,0.1,namesA,cex=0.8,col=colorsA,lty=ltyA,lwd=1)
except Exception as inst:
print inst
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# bids
try:
r.plot([0,200],[0,1.4],type="n", xlab="Price",ylab="PDF",main="Bids")
namesA = []
ltyA = []
for i,item in enumerate(bidsGroupedC):
if len(item[1]) > 10:
densityData = r.density(item[1],kernel="gaussian")
r.lines(densityData['x'],densityData['y'],type="l",\
col=colorsA[i],lty=1,lwd=1)
namesA.append("Round "+str(item[0])+", mean = "+\
str(round(r.mean(item[1]),1)))
ltyA.append(1)
r.lines([equilibriumPrice,equilibriumPrice],[-1,10],col="darkred",lwd=1,lty=2)
r.legend(180,1.4,namesA,cex=0.8,col=colorsA,lty=ltyA,lwd=2)
except Exception as inst:
print inst
# Asks
try:
r.plot([0,200],[0,1.4],type="n", xlab="Price",ylab="PDF",main="Asks")
namesA = []
ltyA = []
for i,item in enumerate(asksGroupedC):
if len(item[1]) > 10:
densityData = r.density(item[1],kernel="gaussian")
r.lines(densityData['x'],densityData['y'],type="l",\
col=colorsA[i],lty=1,lwd=1)
namesA.append("Round "+str(item[0])+", mean = "+\
str(round(r.mean(item[1]),1)))
ltyA.append(1)
r.lines([equilibriumPrice,equilibriumPrice],[-1,10],col="darkred",lwd=1,lty=2)
r.legend(180,1.4,namesA,cex=0.8,col=colorsA,lty=ltyA,lwd=2)
r.par(mfrow=r.c(1,1))
r.dev_off()
except Exception as inst:
print inst
# Without budget constraint
r.postscript(outPathZI+str(numberOfRuns)+"U_densities.ps",\
width=rwidth,height=rheight)
r.par(mfrow=r.c(3,1))
# Price
try:
r.plot([0,200],[0,0.1],type="n", xlab="Price",ylab="PDF",main="")
namesA = []
ltyA = []
for i,item in enumerate(pricesGroupedU):
if len(item[1]) > 10:
densityData = r.density(item[1],kernel="gaussian")
r.lines(densityData['x'],densityData['y'],type="l",\
col=colorsA[i],lty=1,lwd=1)
namesA.append("Round "+str(item[0])+", mean = "+\
str(round(r.mean(item[1]),1))+\
", n = "+str(len(item[1])))
ltyA.append(1)
r.legend(173,0.1,namesA,cex=0.8,col=colorsA,lty=ltyA,lwd=2)
except Exception as inst:
print inst
# bids
try:
r.plot([0,200],[0,0.1],type="n", xlab="Price",ylab="PDF",main="")
namesA = []
ltyA = []
for i,item in enumerate(bidsGroupedU):
if len(item[1]) > 10:
densityData = r.density(item[1],kernel="gaussian")
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r.lines(densityData['x'],densityData['y'],type="l",\
col=colorsA[i],lty=1,lwd=1)
namesA.append("Round "+str(item[0])+", mean = "+\
str(round(r.mean(item[1]),1)))
ltyA.append(1)
r.legend(180,0.1,namesA,cex=0.8,col=colorsA,lty=ltyA,lwd=2)
except Exception as inst:
print inst
# Asks
try:
r.plot([0,200],[0,0.1],type="n", xlab="Price",ylab="PDF",main="")
namesA = []
ltyA = []
for i,item in enumerate(asksGroupedU):
if len(item[1]) > 10:
densityData = r.density(item[1],kernel="gaussian")
r.lines(densityData['x'],densityData['y'],type="l",\
col=colorsA[i],lty=1,lwd=1)
namesA.append("Round "+str(item[0])+", mean = "+\
str(round(r.mean(item[1]),1)))
ltyA.append(1)
r.legend(180,0.1,namesA,cex=0.8,col=colorsA,lty=ltyA,lwd=2)
r.par(mfrow=r.c(1,1))
r.dev_off()
except Exception as inst:
print inst
# End of file
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B Source code for R
## 9.3.2011, Niklas Jahnsson
##
## .r-file
## to show how the generalized market wide bid and ask densities are created
##
## to generate pictures that show transaction price densities
## -for theoretical bids and asks on the Marshallian path
## -for theoretical bids, asks and transaction prices
## -for theoretical transaction prices according to Cliff and Bruten 1997
## -for transaction prices on first round
## -for transaction prices on all rounds
##
## Three different demand-supply types are investigated: symmetric, fixed supply
## and fixed demand.
##
## Uses accept-reject method to generate a sample from the theoretical
## market bid and ask densities, and then selects those values that are
## in the intersection of the two densities.
##
## As a input needs
## sellerValuations, buyerValuations
## transactionPrices0
## transactionPricesAll
## bids
## asks
##
## An example of the general approach to calculate market wide
## bids and asks presented in equations 8 and 9.
sellerValuations = seq(26,174,2)
buyerValuations = seq(174,26,-2)
supplyPDF = function(p){
ret = 0
if(p<=200){
for(i in 1:length(sellerValuations)){
if(p>=sellerValuations[i]){
ret = ret + 1/(length(sellerValuations)*(200-sellerValuations[i]))
}
}
}
ret
}
integrandS = function(x){
y = numeric(length(x))
for(i in 1:length(x)){
y[i] = supplyPDF(x[i])
}
y
}
integrate(integrandS,0,200)
# 0.999957 with absolute error < 9.2e-05
demandPDF = function(p){
ret = 0
if(p>=1){
for(i in 1:length(buyerValuations)){
if(p<=buyerValuations[i]){
ret = ret + 1/(length(buyerValuations)*(buyerValuations[i]-1))
}
}
}
ret
}
integrandD = function(x){
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y = numeric(length(x))
for(i in 1:length(x)){
y[i] = demandPDF(x[i])
}
y
}
integrate(integrandD,0,200,subdivisions=2000)
# 0.9999982 with absolute error < 1.1e-05
## Figures (14,16) for pdfs in the theoretical Marshallian path
# With colors
#library('colorRamps')
#colors = matlab.like(148)
#colors = colors[70:144]
#library('TeachingDemos')
#colors = col2gray(colors)
# With greyscale colors
library('grDevices')
colors = grey.colors(38,start=0.95,end=0.0)
# Output
postscript("/home/nikke/Kuvat/kehittyminen_intra_extra_symmetric.ps",\
width=100,height=100)
plot(c(0,200),c(0,0.04),type="n",xlab="Price",ylab="PDF")
namesA = character(11)
colA = character(11)
ltyA = numeric(11)
nAR = 600
sampledPrices = 100
for(i in 1:38){
sellerValuations = seq(24+2*i,174,2)
buyerValuations = seq(26,176-2*i,2)#seq(174,26,-2)
xsPDF = seq(0,200,1)
ysPDF = numeric(201)
for(j in 1:200){
ysPDF[j] = supplyPDF(xsPDF[j])
}
if((i-1)%%1 == 0){
lines(xsPDF,ysPDF,lwd=1,col=colors[i])
}
xdPDF = seq(0,200,1)
ydPDF = numeric(201)
for(j in 1:200){
ydPDF[j] = demandPDF(xdPDF[j])
}
if((i-1)%%1 == 0){
lines(xdPDF,ydPDF,lwd=1,col=colors[i])
}
if(((i-1)%%4) == 0){
print(i)
namesA[((i-1)/4)+1] = paste("Round ",(i-1),sep="")
colA[((i-1)/4)+1] = colors[i]
ltyA[((i-1)/4)+1] = 1
}
if(i == 38){
print(i)
namesA[11] = paste("Round ",(i),sep="")
colA[11] = colors[i]
ltyA[11] = 1
}
# ACCEPT-REJECT
# Demand
xd=numeric(nAR)
yd=numeric(nAR)
for(j in 1:nAR){
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while(1){
z=runif(1,1,176-2*i)
u=runif(1,0,1)
if(u<(demandPDF(z)/(4/174))){
print(j)
xd[j]=z
yd[j]=u*4/174
break
}
}
}
#points(xd,yd,pch=".",col="gray40")
# Supply
xs=numeric(nAR)
ys=numeric(nAR)
for(j in 1:nAR){
while(1){
z=runif(1,24+2*i,200)
u=runif(1,0,1)
if(u<(supplyPDF(z)/(4/174))){
print(j)
xs[j]=z
ys[j]=4/174*u
break
}
}
}
#points(xs,ys,pch=".",col="black")
accepted2 = -1
accepted2y = -1
index = 1
for(j in 1:nAR){
if(ys[j]<=demandPDF(xs[j])){
accepted2[index] = xs[j]
accepted2y[index] = ys[j]
index = index + 1
}
if(yd[j]<=supplyPDF(xd[j])){
accepted2[index] = xd[j]
accepted2y[index] = yd[j]
index = index + 1
}
}
#points(accepted2,accepted2y,col="darkred",pch=".")
sampledPrices = c(sampledPrices,accepted2)
}
legend(174,0.04,namesA,cex=0.8,col=colA,lty=ltyA,lwd=2)
dev.off()
dev.off()
# Compare prices on Marshallian path to all transaction prices
aux = read.csv("/home/nikke/SimPyOut/ZI/050211/big3/ZI_n_100_pricesC.txt",\
sep=",",header=FALSE)
aux = data.matrix(aux)
transactionPricesAll = numeric(length(aux))
for(i in 1:length(aux)){
transactionPricesAll[i] = aux[i][1]
}
postscript("/home/nikke/Kuvat/vertailu_prices_Marshall.ps",width=100,height=100)
sampledPrices = sampledPrices[sampledPrices>0]
plot(c(0,200),c(0,0.03),type="n",xlab="Price",ylab="PDF")
lines(density(sampledPrices),col="gray40",lty=1,lwd=2)
lines(density(transactionPricesAll),col="black",lty=2,lwd=2)
colors = c("grey40","black")
names = c(paste("Intersection, n=",length(sampledPrices),sep=""),\
paste("Empirical all rounds, n=",length(transactionPricesAll),sep=""))
legend(150,0.03,names,cex=0.8,col=colors,lty=c(1,2),pch=c(-1,-1),lwd=2)
dev.off()
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## fixed demand and supply: excess demand correct analysis
sellerValuations = array(60,dim=50)
buyerValuations = array(140,dim=100)
xsPDF = seq(0,200,0.1)
ysPDF = numeric(2001)
for(i in 1:2000){
ysPDF[i] = supplyPDF(xsPDF[i])
}
plot(c(0,200),c(0,0.02),type="n",xlab="Price",ylab="PDF")
lines(xsPDF,ysPDF)
area = 0
for(i in 1:200){
area = area + supplyPDF(i)
}
area
xdPDF = seq(0,200,0.1)
ydPDF = numeric(2001)
for(i in 1:2000){
ydPDF[i] = demandPDF(xdPDF[i])
}
lines(xdPDF,ydPDF,col="gray40")
area = 0
for(i in 1:200){
area = area + demandPDF(i)
}
area
## Accept-reject sampling
n=10000
# Demand
xd=numeric(n)
yd=numeric(n)
for(i in 1:n){
while(1){
z=runif(1,1,174)
u=runif(1,0,1)
if(u<(demandPDF(z)/(2/174))){
print(i)
xd[i]=z
yd[i]=u*2/174
break
}
}
}
points(xd,yd,pch=".",col="gray40")
# Supply
xs=numeric(n)
ys=numeric(n)
for(i in 1:n){
while(1){
z=runif(1,26,200)
u=runif(1,0,1)
if(u<(supplyPDF(z)/(2/174))){
print(i)
xs[i]=z
ys[i]=2/174*u
break
}
}
}
points(xs,ys,pch=".",col="black")
accepted2 = -1
accepted2y = -1
index = 1
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for(i in 1:n){
if(ys[i]<=demandPDF(xs[i])){
accepted2[index] = xs[i]
accepted2y[index] = ys[i]
index = index + 1
}
if(yd[i]<=supplyPDF(xd[i])){
accepted2[index] = xd[i]
accepted2y[index] = yd[i]
index = index + 1
}
}
## Output
points(accepted2,accepted2y,col="grey35",pch=".")
lines(density(accepted2),col="grey35",lty=2,lwd=2)
transactionPrices0 = c(...)
bids0 = c(...)
asks0 = c(...)
lines(density(transactionPrices0),col="black",lty=3,lwd=2)
lines(density(asks0),col="black",lty=4,lwd=2)
lines(density(bids0),col="gray40",lty=4,lwd=2)
colors = c("grey35","black","gray40","black")
names = c(paste("Intersection, n=",length(accepted2),sep=""),\
paste("Empirical first round, n=",length(transactionPrices0),sep=""),\
"Demand, n=10000","Supply, n=10000")
legend(152,0.02,names,cex=0.8,col=colors,lty=c(1,1,1,1),pch=c(-1,-1,-1,-1),lwd=2)
postscript("/home/nikke/Kuvat/vertailu_intersection_fixedDS2_140211.ps",width=100,height=100)
plot(c(0,200),c(0,0.02),type="n",xlab="Price",ylab="PDF")
lines(xsPDF,ysPDF,lwd=2)
lines(xdPDF,ydPDF,col="gray40",lwd=2)
#points(xd,yd,pch=".",col="gray40")
#points(xs,ys,pch=".",col="black")
#points(accepted2,accepted2y,col="grey35",pch=".")
lines(density(accepted2),col="grey35",lty=2,lwd=2)
lines(density(transactionPrices0),col="black",lty=3,lwd=2)
lines(density(asks0),col="black",lty=4,lwd=2)
lines(density(bids0),col="gray40",lty=4,lwd=2)
colors = c("grey35","black","gray40","black","gray40","black")
names = c(paste("Intersection, n=",length(accepted2),sep=""),\
paste("Empirical first round, n=",length(transactionPrices0),sep=""),\
"Demand, n=10000","Supply, n=10000",paste("Empirical first round bids, n=",\
length(bids0),sep=""),paste("Empirical first round asks, n=",length(asks0),sep=""))
legend(142,0.02,names,cex=0.8,col=colors,lty=c(2,3,1,1,4,4),pch=c(-1,-1,-1,-1,-1,-1),lwd=2)
dev.off()
# mukana kaikki transaction pricet
aux = read.csv("/home/nikke/SimPyOut/ZI/130211/big2/ZI_n_100_pricesC.txt",sep=",",header=FALSE)
aux = data.matrix(aux)
transactionPricesAll = numeric(length(aux))
for(i in 1:length(aux)){
transactionPricesAll[i] = aux[i][1]
}
postscript("/home/nikke/Kuvat/vertailu_intersection_fixedDS22_140211.ps",width=100,height=100)
plot(c(0,200),c(0,0.02),type="n",xlab="Price",ylab="PDF")
lines(xsPDF,ysPDF,lwd=2)
lines(xdPDF,ydPDF,col="gray40",lwd=2)
#points(xd,yd,pch=".",col="gray40")
#points(xs,ys,pch=".",col="black")
#points(accepted2,accepted2y,col="grey35",pch=".")
lines(density(accepted2),col="grey35",lty=2,lwd=2)
lines(density(transactionPrices0),col="black",lty=3,lwd=2)
lines(density(asks0),col="black",lty=4,lwd=2)
lines(density(bids0),col="gray40",lty=4,lwd=2)
lines(density(transactionPricesAll),col="black",lty=2,lwd=2)
colors = c("grey35","black","black","gray40","black","gray40","black")
names = c(paste("Intersection, n=",length(accepted2),sep=""),paste("Empirical first round, n=",\
length(transactionPrices0),sep=""),paste("Empirical all rounds, n=",\
length(transactionPricesAll),sep=""),"Demand, n=10000","Supply, n=10000",\
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paste("Empirical first round bids, n=",length(bids0),sep=""),\
paste("Empirical first round asks, n=",length(asks0),sep=""))
legend(142,0.02,names,cex=0.8,col=colors,lty=c(2,3,2,1,1,4,4),pch=c(-1,-1,-1,-1,-1,-1,-1),lwd=2)
dev.off()
## fixed demand and supply: excess supply correct analysis
sellerValuations = array(60,dim=100)
buyerValuations = array(140,dim=50)
xsPDF = seq(0,200,0.1)
ysPDF = numeric(2001)
for(i in 1:2000){
ysPDF[i] = supplyPDF(xsPDF[i])
}
plot(c(0,200),c(0,0.02),type="n",xlab="Price",ylab="PDF")
lines(xsPDF,ysPDF)
area = 0
for(i in 1:200){
area = area + supplyPDF(i)
}
area
xdPDF = seq(0,200,0.1)
ydPDF = numeric(2001)
for(i in 1:2000){
ydPDF[i] = demandPDF(xdPDF[i])
}
lines(xdPDF,ydPDF,col="gray40")
area = 0
for(i in 1:200){
area = area + demandPDF(i)
}
area
# Accept-reject sampling
n=10000
# Demand
xd=numeric(n)
yd=numeric(n)
for(i in 1:n){
while(1){
z=runif(1,1,174)
u=runif(1,0,1)
if(u<(demandPDF(z)/(2/174))){
print(i)
xd[i]=z
yd[i]=u*2/174
break
}
}
}
points(xd,yd,pch=".",col="gray40")
# Supply
xs=numeric(n)
ys=numeric(n)
for(i in 1:n){
while(1){
z=runif(1,26,200)
u=runif(1,0,1)
if(u<(supplyPDF(z)/(2/174))){
print(i)
xs[i]=z
ys[i]=2/174*u
break
}
}
}
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points(xs,ys,pch=".",col="black")
accepted2 = -1
accepted2y = -1
index = 1
for(i in 1:n){
if(ys[i]<=demandPDF(xs[i])){
accepted2[index] = xs[i]
accepted2y[index] = ys[i]
index = index + 1
}
if(yd[i]<=supplyPDF(xd[i])){
accepted2[index] = xd[i]
accepted2y[index] = yd[i]
index = index + 1
}
}
# Output
points(accepted2,accepted2y,col="grey35",pch=".")
lines(density(accepted2),col="grey35",lty=2,lwd=2)
transactionPrices0 = c(...)
bids0 = c(...)
asks0 = c(...)
lines(density(transactionPrices0),col="black",lty=3,lwd=2)
lines(density(asks0),col="black",lty=4,lwd=2)
lines(density(bids0),col="gray40",lty=4,lwd=2)
colors = c("grey35","black","gray40","black")
names = c(paste("Intersection, n=",length(accepted2),sep=""),\
paste("Empirical first round, n=",length(transactionPrices0),sep="")\
,"Demand, n=10000","Supply, n=10000")
legend(152,0.02,names,cex=0.8,col=colors,lty=c(1,1,1,1),pch=c(-1,-1,-1,-1),lwd=2)
postscript("/home/nikke/Kuvat/vertailu_intersection_fixedDS_140211.ps",width=100,height=100)
plot(c(0,200),c(0,0.02),type="n",xlab="Price",ylab="PDF")
lines(xsPDF,ysPDF,lwd=2)
lines(xdPDF,ydPDF,col="gray40",lwd=2)
#points(xd,yd,pch=".",col="gray40")
#points(xs,ys,pch=".",col="black")
#points(accepted2,accepted2y,col="grey35",pch=".")
lines(density(accepted2),col="grey35",lty=2,lwd=2)
lines(density(transactionPrices0),col="black",lty=3,lwd=2)
lines(density(asks0),col="black",lty=4,lwd=2)
lines(density(bids0),col="gray40",lty=4,lwd=2)
colors = c("grey35","black","gray40","black","gray40","black")
names = c(paste("Intersection, n=",length(accepted2),sep=""),\
paste("Empirical first round, n=",length(transactionPrices0),sep=""),\
"Demand, n=10000","Supply, n=10000",paste("Empirical first round bids, n=",\
length(bids0),sep=""),paste("Empirical first round asks, n=",length(asks0),sep=""))
legend(142,0.02,names,cex=0.8,col=colors,lty=c(2,3,1,1,4,4),pch=c(-1,-1,-1,-1,-1,-1),lwd=2)
dev.off()
# including all transaction prices
aux = read.csv("/home/nikke/SimPyOut/ZI/130211/big/ZI_n_100_pricesC.txt",sep=",",header=FALSE)
aux = data.matrix(aux)
transactionPricesAll = numeric(length(aux))
for(i in 1:length(aux)){
transactionPricesAll[i] = aux[i][1]
}
postscript("/home/nikke/Kuvat/vertailu_intersection_fixedDS2_140211.ps",width=100,height=100)
plot(c(0,200),c(0,0.02),type="n",xlab="Price",ylab="PDF")
lines(xsPDF,ysPDF,lty=3,lwd=2)
lines(xdPDF,ydPDF,lty=3,col="gray40",lwd=2)
#points(xd,yd,pch=".",col="gray40")
#points(xs,ys,pch=".",col="black")
#points(accepted2,accepted2y,col="grey35",pch=".")
lines(density(accepted2),col="grey35",lty=1,lwd=2)
lines(density(transactionPrices0),col="black",lty=4,lwd=2)
lines(density(asks0),col="black",lty=2,lwd=2)
lines(density(bids0),col="gray40",lty=2,lwd=2)
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lines(density(transactionPricesAll),col="black",lty=1,lwd=2)
colors = c("grey35","black","black","gray40","black","gray40","black")
names = c(paste("Intersection, n=",length(accepted2),sep=""),\
paste("Empirical first round, n=",length(transactionPrices0),sep=""),\
paste("Empirical all rounds, n=",length(transactionPricesAll),sep=""),\
"Demand, n=10000","Supply, n=10000",paste("Empirical first round bids, n=",\
length(bids0),sep=""),paste("Empirical first round asks, n=",length(asks0),sep=""))
legend(142,0.02,names,cex=0.8,col=colors,lty=c(1,4,1,3,3,2,2),pch=c(-1,-1,-1,-1,-1,-1,-1),lwd=2)
dev.off()
# Only bids and asks
postscript("/home/nikke/Kuvat/vertailu_intersection_fixedDS2_quotes_090311.ps",width=100,height=100)
plot(c(0,200),c(0,0.015),type="n",xlab="Price",ylab="PDF")
lines(xsPDF,ysPDF,lty=1,lwd=2)
lines(xdPDF,ydPDF,lty=1,col="gray40",lwd=2)
#points(xd,yd,pch=".",col="gray40")
#points(xs,ys,pch=".",col="black")
#points(accepted2,accepted2y,col="grey35",pch=".")
#lines(density(accepted2),col="grey35",lty=1,lwd=2)
#lines(density(transactionPrices0),col="black",lty=4,lwd=2)
lines(density(asks0),col="black",lty=2,lwd=2)
lines(density(bids0),col="gray40",lty=2,lwd=2)
#lines(density(transactionPricesAll),col="black",lty=1,lwd=2)
colors = c("gray40","black","gray40","black")
names = c("Demand, n=10000","Supply, n=10000",paste("Empirical first round bids, n=",\
length(bids0),sep=""),paste("Empirical first round asks, n=",length(asks0),sep=""))
legend(142,0.015,names,cex=0.8,col=colors,lty=c(1,1,2,2),pch=c(-1,-1,-1,-1),lwd=2)
dev.off()
postscript("/home/nikke/Kuvat/vertailu_intersection_fixedDS2_prices_090311.ps",width=100,height=100)
plot(c(0,200),c(0,0.02),type="n",xlab="Price",ylab="PDF")
#lines(xsPDF,ysPDF,lty=3,lwd=2)
#lines(xdPDF,ydPDF,lty=3,col="gray40",lwd=2)
#points(xd,yd,pch=".",col="gray40")
#points(xs,ys,pch=".",col="black")
#points(accepted2,accepted2y,col="grey35",pch=".")
lines(density(accepted2),col="grey35",lty=1,lwd=2)
lines(density(transactionPrices0),col="black",lty=4,lwd=2)
#lines(density(asks0),col="black",lty=2,lwd=2)
#lines(density(bids0),col="gray40",lty=2,lwd=2)
lines(density(transactionPricesAll),col="black",lty=1,lwd=2)
colors = c("grey35","black","black")
names = c(paste("Intersection, n=",length(accepted2),sep=""),paste("Empirical first round, n=",\
length(transactionPrices0),sep=""),paste("Empirical all rounds, n=",length(transactionPricesAll),sep=""))
legend(142,0.02,names,cex=0.8,col=colors,lty=c(1,4,1),pch=c(-1,-1,-1),lwd=2)
dev.off()
## Symmetric demand and supply: correct analysis
sellerValuations = seq(26,174,2)
buyerValuations = seq(26,174,2)
xsPDF = seq(0,200,0.1)
ysPDF = numeric(2001)
for(i in 1:2000){
ysPDF[i] = supplyPDF(xsPDF[i])
}
plot(c(0,200),c(0,0.02),type="n",xlab="Price",ylab="PDF")
lines(xsPDF,ysPDF)
area = 0
for(i in 1:200){
area = area + supplyPDF(i)
}
area
xdPDF = seq(0,200,1)
ydPDF = numeric(201)
for(i in 1:200){
ydPDF[i] = demandPDF(xdPDF[i])
}
lines(xdPDF,ydPDF,col="gray40")
area = 0
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for(i in 1:200){
area = area + demandPDF(i)
}
area
## Accept-reject sampling
n=10000
# Demand
xd=numeric(n)
yd=numeric(n)
for(i in 1:n){
while(1){
z=runif(1,1,174)
u=runif(1,0,1)
if(u<(demandPDF(z)/(3/174))){
print(i)
xd[i]=z
yd[i]=u*3/174
break
}
}
}
points(xd,yd,pch=".",col="gray40")
# Supply
xs=numeric(n)
ys=numeric(n)
for(i in 1:n){
while(1){
z=runif(1,26,200)
u=runif(1,0,1)
if(u<(supplyPDF(z)/(3/174))){
print(i)
xs[i]=z
ys[i]=3/174*u
break
}
}
}
points(xs,ys,pch=".",col="black")
accepted2 = -1
accepted2y = -1
index = 1
for(i in 1:n){
if(ys[i]<=demandPDF(xs[i])){
accepted2[index] = xs[i]
accepted2y[index] = ys[i]
index = index + 1
}
if(yd[i]<=supplyPDF(xd[i])){
accepted2[index] = xd[i]
accepted2y[index] = yd[i]
index = index + 1
}
}
# Output
points(accepted2,accepted2y,col="grey35",pch=".")
lines(density(accepted2),col="grey35",lty=2,lwd=2)
transactionPrices0 = c(...)
bids0 = c(...)
asks0 = c(...)
lines(density(transactionPrices0),col="black",lty=3,lwd=2)
lines(density(asks0),col="black",lty=4,lwd=2)
lines(density(bids0),col="gray40",lty=4,lwd=2)
colors = c("grey35","black","gray40","black")
names = c(paste("Intersection, n=",length(accepted2),sep=""),\
paste("Empirical first round, n=",length(transactionPrices0),sep=""),\
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"Demand, n=10000","Supply, n=10000")
legend(152,0.02,names,cex=0.8,col=colors,lty=c(1,1,1,1),pch=c(-1,-1,-1,-1),lwd=2)
postscript("/home/nikke/Kuvat/vertailu_intersection_symmetric_080211.ps",width=100,height=100)
plot(c(0,200),c(0,0.02),type="n",xlab="Price",ylab="PDF")
lines(xsPDF,ysPDF,lwd=2)
lines(xdPDF,ydPDF,col="gray40",lwd=2)
#points(xd,yd,pch=".",col="gray40")
#points(xs,ys,pch=".",col="black")
#points(accepted2,accepted2y,col="grey35",pch=".")
lines(density(accepted2),col="grey35",lty=2,lwd=2)
lines(density(transactionPrices0),col="black",lty=3,lwd=2)
lines(density(asks0),col="black",lty=4,lwd=2)
lines(density(bids0),col="gray40",lty=4,lwd=2)
colors = c("grey35","black","gray40","black","gray40","black")
names = c(paste("Intersection, n=",length(accepted2),sep=""),\
paste("Empirical first round, n=",length(transactionPrices0),sep=""),\
"Demand, n=10000","Supply, n=10000",paste("Empirical first round bids, n=",length(bids0),sep=""),\
paste("Empirical first round asks, n=",length(asks0),sep=""))
legend(142,0.02,names,cex=0.8,col=colors,lty=c(2,3,1,1,4,4),pch=c(-1,-1,-1,-1,-1,-1),lwd=2)
dev.off()
# including all transaction prices
aux = read.csv("/home/nikke/SimPyOut/ZI/090311/big/ZI_n_100_pricesC.txt",sep=",",header=FALSE)
aux = data.matrix(aux)
transactionPricesAll = numeric(length(aux))
for(i in 1:length(aux)){
transactionPricesAll[i] = aux[i][1]
}
postscript("/home/nikke/Kuvat/vertailu_intersection_symmetric2_080211.ps",width=100,height=100)
plot(c(0,200),c(0,0.025),type="n",xlab="Price",ylab="PDF")
lines(xsPDF,ysPDF,lty=3,lwd=2)
lines(xdPDF,ydPDF,lty=3,col="gray40",lwd=2)
#points(xd,yd,pch=".",col="gray40")
#points(xs,ys,pch=".",col="black")
#points(accepted2,accepted2y,col="grey35",pch=".")
lines(density(accepted2),col="grey35",lty=1,lwd=2)
lines(density(transactionPrices0),col="black",lty=4,lwd=2)
lines(density(asks0),col="black",lty=2,lwd=2)
lines(density(bids0),col="gray40",lty=2,lwd=2)
lines(density(transactionPricesAll),col="black",lty=1,lwd=2)
colors = c("grey35","black","black","gray40","black","gray40","black")
names = c(paste("Intersection, n=",length(accepted2),sep=""),paste("Empirical first round, n=",\
length(transactionPrices0),sep=""),paste("Empirical all rounds, n=",length(transactionPricesAll),sep=""),\
"Demand, n=10000","Supply, n=10000",paste("Empirical first round bids, n=",length(bids0),sep=""),\
paste("Empirical first round asks, n=",length(asks0),sep=""))
legend(142,0.025,names,cex=0.8,col=colors,lty=c(1,4,1,3,3,2,2),pch=c(-1,-1,-1,-1,-1,-1,-1),lwd=2)
dev.off()
# Only bids and asks
postscript("/home/nikke/Kuvat/vertailu_intersection_symmetric2_quotes_080211.ps",width=100,height=100)
plot(c(0,200),c(0,0.02),type="n",xlab="Price",ylab="PDF")
lines(xsPDF,ysPDF,lty=1,lwd=2)
lines(xdPDF,ydPDF,lty=1,col="gray40",lwd=2)
#points(xd,yd,pch=".",col="gray40")
#points(xs,ys,pch=".",col="black")
#points(accepted2,accepted2y,col="grey35",pch=".")
#lines(density(accepted2),col="grey35",lty=1,lwd=2)
#lines(density(transactionPrices0),col="black",lty=4,lwd=2)
lines(density(asks0),col="black",lty=2,lwd=2)
lines(density(bids0),col="gray40",lty=2,lwd=2)
#lines(density(transactionPricesAll),col="black",lty=1,lwd=2)
colors = c("gray40","black","gray40","black")
names = c("Demand, n=10000","Supply, n=10000",paste("Empirical first round bids, n=",\
length(bids0),sep=""),paste("Empirical first round asks, n=",length(asks0),sep=""))
legend(142,0.02,names,cex=0.8,col=colors,lty=c(1,1,2,2),pch=c(-1,-1,-1,-1),lwd=2)
dev.off()
postscript("/home/nikke/Kuvat/vertailu_intersection_symmetric2_prices_080211.ps",width=100,height=100)
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plot(c(0,200),c(0,0.025),type="n",xlab="Price",ylab="PDF")
#lines(xsPDF,ysPDF,lty=3,lwd=2)
#lines(xdPDF,ydPDF,lty=3,col="gray40",lwd=2)
#points(xd,yd,pch=".",col="gray40")
#points(xs,ys,pch=".",col="black")
#points(accepted2,accepted2y,col="grey35",pch=".")
lines(density(accepted2),col="grey35",lty=1,lwd=2)
lines(density(transactionPrices0),col="black",lty=4,lwd=2)
#lines(density(asks0),col="black",lty=2,lwd=2)
#lines(density(bids0),col="gray40",lty=2,lwd=2)
lines(density(transactionPricesAll),col="black",lty=1,lwd=2)
colors = c("grey35","black","black")
names = c(paste("Intersection, n=",length(accepted2),sep=""),paste("Empirical first round, n=",\
length(transactionPrices0),sep=""),paste("Empirical all rounds, n=",\
length(transactionPricesAll),sep=""))
legend(150,0.025,names,cex=0.8,col=colors,lty=c(1,4,1),pch=c(-1,-1,-1),lwd=2)
dev.off()
## Symmetric demand and supply: Cliff & Bruten 1997
sellerValuations = seq(26,174,2)
buyerValuations = seq(26,174,2)
supplyF = function(p){
ret = 0
index = 1
while (sellerValuations[index]<=p){
index = index + 1
ret = ret + 1
if (index==76){break;}
}
if (p>200){ret = 0;}
ret
}
supplyArea = 0
for(i in 1:200){
supplyArea = supplyArea + supplyF(i)
}
supplyArea
supply = function(p){
ret = 0
index = 1
while (sellerValuations[index]<=p){
index = index + 1
ret = ret + 1
if (index==76){break;}
}
if (p>200){ret = 0;}
ret/supplyArea
}
demandF = function(p){
ret = 0
index = 75
while (buyerValuations[index]>=p){
index = index - 1
ret = ret + 1
if (index ==0){break;}
}
if (p<1){ret = 0;}
ret
}
demandArea = 0
for(i in 1:200){
demandArea = demandArea + demandF(i)
}
demandArea
demand = function(p){
ret = 0
index = 75
while (buyerValuations[index]>=p){
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index = index - 1
ret = ret + 1
if (index ==0){break;}
}
if (p<1){ret = 0;}
ret/demandArea
}
s = -1
d = -1
x = seq(1,200,1)
for(i in 1:200){
s[i] = supply(i)
d[i] = demand(i)
}
plot(c(0,200),c(0,0.02),type="n",xlab="Price",ylab="PDF")
lines(x,s,col="black",lwd=2)
lines(x,d,col="gray40",lwd=2)
## Accept-reject sampling
n=10000
# Demand
xd=numeric(n)
yd=numeric(n)
for(i in 1:n){
while(1){
z=runif(1,1,174)
u=runif(1,0,1)
if(u<(demand(z)/(2/173))){
print(i)
xd[i]=z
yd[i]=u*2/173
break
}
}
}
points(xd,yd,pch=".",col="gray40")
# Supply
xs=numeric(n)
ys=numeric(n)
for(i in 1:n){
while(1){
z=runif(1,26,200)
u=runif(1,0,1)
if(u<(supply(z)/(2/173))){
print(i)
xs[i]=z
ys[i]=2/173*u
break
}
}
}
points(xs,ys,pch=".",col="black")
accepted2 = -1
accepted2y = -1
index = 1
for(i in 1:n){
if(ys[i]<=demand(xs[i])){
accepted2[index] = xs[i]
accepted2y[index] = ys[i]
index = index + 1
}
if(yd[i]<=supply(xd[i])){
accepted2[index] = xd[i]
accepted2y[index] = yd[i]
index = index + 1
}
}
127
# Output
points(accepted2,accepted2y,col="grey35",pch=".")
lines(density(accepted2),col="grey35",lty=2,lwd=2)
transactionPrices0 = c(...)
bids0 = c(...)
asks0 = c(...)
lines(density(transactionPrices0),col="black",lty=3,lwd=2)
lines(density(asks0),col="black",lty=4,lwd=2)
lines(density(bids0),col="gray40",lty=4,lwd=2)
colors = c("grey35","black","gray40","black")
names = c(paste("Intersection, n=",length(accepted2),sep=""),\
paste("Empirical first round, n=",length(transactionPrices0),sep=""),"Demand, n=10000","Supply, n=10000")
legend(152,0.02,names,cex=0.8,col=colors,lty=c(1,1,1,1),pch=c(-1,-1,-1,-1),lwd=2)
postscript("/home/nikke/Kuvat/vertailu_Cliff_intersection_symmetric_080211.ps",width=100,height=100)
plot(c(0,200),c(0,0.025),type="n",xlab="Price",ylab="PDF")
lines(x,s,lwd=2)
lines(x,d,col="gray40",lwd=2)
#points(xd,yd,pch=".",col="gray40")
#points(xs,ys,pch=".",col="black")
#points(accepted2,accepted2y,col="grey35",pch=".")
lines(density(accepted2),col="grey35",lty=2,lwd=2)
lines(density(transactionPrices0),col="black",lty=3,lwd=2)
lines(density(asks0),col="black",lty=4,lwd=2)
lines(density(bids0),col="gray40",lty=4,lwd=2)
colors = c("grey35","black","gray40","black","gray40","black")
names = c(paste("Intersection, n=",length(accepted2),sep=""),\
paste("Empirical first round, n=",length(transactionPrices0),sep=""),\
"Demand, n=10000","Supply, n=10000",paste("Empirical first round bids, n=",length(bids0),sep=""),\
paste("Empirical first round asks, n=",length(asks0),sep=""))
legend(142,0.025,names,cex=0.8,col=colors,lty=c(2,3,1,1,4,4),pch=c(-1,-1,-1,-1,-1,-1),lwd=2)
dev.off()
# including all transaction prices
aux = read.csv("/home/nikke/SimPyOut/ZI/050211/big3/ZI_n_100_pricesC.txt",sep=",",header=FALSE)
aux = data.matrix(aux)
transactionPricesAll = numeric(length(aux))
for(i in 1:length(aux)){
transactionPricesAll[i] = aux[i][1]
}
postscript("/home/nikke/Kuvat/vertailu_Cliff_intersection_symmetric2_080211.ps",width=100,height=100)
plot(c(0,200),c(0,0.025),type="n",xlab="Price",ylab="PDF")
lines(x,s,lty=3,lwd=2)
lines(x,d,lty=3,col="gray40",lwd=2)
#points(xd,yd,pch=".",col="gray40")
#points(xs,ys,pch=".",col="black")
#points(accepted2,accepted2y,col="grey35",pch=".")
lines(density(accepted2),col="grey35",lty=1,lwd=2)
lines(density(transactionPrices0),col="black",lty=4,lwd=2)
lines(density(asks0),col="black",lty=2,lwd=2)
lines(density(bids0),col="gray40",lty=2,lwd=2)
lines(density(transactionPricesAll),col="black",lty=1,lwd=2)
colors = c("grey35","black","black","gray40","black","gray40","black")
names = c(paste("Intersection, n=",length(accepted2),sep=""),paste("Empirical first round, n=",\
length(transactionPrices0),sep=""),paste("Empirical all rounds, n=",length(transactionPricesAll),sep=""),\
"Demand, n=10000","Supply, n=10000",paste("Empirical first round bids, n=",length(bids0),sep=""),\
paste("Empirical first round asks, n=",length(asks0),sep=""))
legend(142,0.025,names,cex=0.8,col=colors,lty=c(1,4,1,3,3,2,2),pch=c(-1,-1,-1,-1,-1,-1,-1),lwd=2)
dev.off()
# Only bids and asks
postscript("/home/nikke/Kuvat/vertailu_Cliff_intersection_symmetric2_quotes_080211.ps",width=100,height=100)
plot(c(0,200),c(0,0.02),type="n",xlab="Price",ylab="PDF")
lines(x,s,lty=1,lwd=2)
lines(x,d,lty=1,col="gray40",lwd=2)
#points(xd,yd,pch=".",col="gray40")
#points(xs,ys,pch=".",col="black")
#points(accepted2,accepted2y,col="grey35",pch=".")
#lines(density(accepted2),col="grey35",lty=1,lwd=2)
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#lines(density(transactionPrices0),col="black",lty=4,lwd=2)
lines(density(asks0),col="black",lty=2,lwd=2)
lines(density(bids0),col="gray40",lty=2,lwd=2)
#lines(density(transactionPricesAll),col="black",lty=1,lwd=2)
colors = c("gray40","black","gray40","black")
names = c("Demand, n=10000","Supply, n=10000",paste("Empirical first round bids, n=",length(bids0),sep=""),\
paste("Empirical first round asks, n=",length(asks0),sep=""))
legend(142,0.02,names,cex=0.8,col=colors,lty=c(1,1,2,2),pch=c(-1,-1,-1,-1),lwd=2)
dev.off()
postscript("/home/nikke/Kuvat/vertailu_Cliff_intersection_symmetric2_prices_080211.ps",width=100,height=100)
plot(c(0,200),c(0,0.025),type="n",xlab="Price",ylab="PDF")
#lines(xsPDF,ysPDF,lty=3,lwd=2)
#lines(xdPDF,ydPDF,lty=3,col="gray40",lwd=2)
#points(xd,yd,pch=".",col="gray40")
#points(xs,ys,pch=".",col="black")
#points(accepted2,accepted2y,col="grey35",pch=".")
lines(density(accepted2),col="grey35",lty=1,lwd=2)
lines(density(transactionPrices0),col="black",lty=4,lwd=2)
#lines(density(asks0),col="black",lty=2,lwd=2)
#lines(density(bids0),col="gray40",lty=2,lwd=2)
lines(density(transactionPricesAll),col="black",lty=1,lwd=2)
colors = c("grey35","black","black")
names = c(paste("Intersection, n=",length(accepted2),sep=""),paste("Empirical first round, n=",\
length(transactionPrices0),sep=""),paste("Empirical all rounds, n=",length(transactionPricesAll),sep=""))
legend(142,0.025,names,cex=0.8,col=colors,lty=c(1,4,1),pch=c(-1,-1,-1),lwd=2)
dev.off()
## Non symmetric demand and supply: fixed demand
## Correct analysis
buyerValuations = array(data=140,dim=75)
sellerValuations = seq(26,174,2)
xsPDF = seq(0,200,0.1)
ysPDF = numeric(2001)
for(i in 1:2000){
ysPDF[i] = supplyPDF(xsPDF[i])
}
plot(c(0,200),c(0,0.02),type="n",xlab="Price",ylab="PDF")
lines(xsPDF,ysPDF)
area = 0
for(i in 1:200){
area = area + supplyPDF(i)
}
area
xdPDF = seq(0,200,0.1)
ydPDF = numeric(2001)
for(i in 1:2000){
ydPDF[i] = demandPDF(xdPDF[i])
}
lines(xdPDF,ydPDF,col="gray40")
area = 0
for(i in 1:200){
area = area + demandPDF(i)
}
area
## Accept-reject sampling
n=10000
# Demand
xd=numeric(n)
yd=numeric(n)
for(i in 1:n){
while(1){
z=runif(1,1,174)
u=runif(1,0,1)
if(u<(demandPDF(z)/(1/139))){
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print(i)
xd[i]=z
yd[i]=u*1/139
break
}
}
}
points(xd,yd,pch=".",col="gray40")
# Supply
xs=numeric(n)
ys=numeric(n)
for(i in 1:n){
while(1){
z=runif(1,26,200)
u=runif(1,0,1)
if(u<(supplyPDF(z)/(3/174))){
print(i)
xs[i]=z
ys[i]=3/174*u
break
}
}
}
points(xs,ys,pch=".",col="black")
accepted2 = -1
accepted2y = -1
index = 1
for(i in 1:n){
if(ys[i]<=demandPDF(xs[i])){
accepted2[index] = xs[i]
accepted2y[index] = ys[i]
index = index + 1
}
if(yd[i]<=supplyPDF(xd[i])){
accepted2[index] = xd[i]
accepted2y[index] = yd[i]
index = index + 1
}
}
# Output
points(accepted2,accepted2y,col="grey35",pch=".")
lines(density(accepted2),col="grey35",lty=2,lwd=2)
transactionPrices0 = c(...)
bids0 = c(...)
asks0 = c(...)
lines(density(transactionPrices0),col="black",lty=3,lwd=2)
lines(density(asks0),col="black",lty=4,lwd=2)
lines(density(bids0),col="gray40",lty=4,lwd=2)
colors = c("grey35","black","gray40","black")
names = c(paste("Intersection, n=",length(accepted2),sep=""),paste("Empirical first round, n=",\
length(transactionPrices0),sep=""),"Demand, n=10000","Supply, n=10000")
legend(152,0.02,names,cex=0.8,col=colors,lty=c(1,1,1,1),pch=c(-1,-1,-1,-1),lwd=2)
postscript("/home/nikke/Kuvat/vertailu_intersection_fixed_demand_080211.ps",width=100,height=100)
plot(c(0,200),c(0,0.025),type="n",xlab="Price",ylab="PDF")
lines(xsPDF,ysPDF,lwd=2)
lines(xdPDF,ydPDF,col="gray40",lwd=2)
#points(xd,yd,pch=".",col="gray40")
#points(xs,ys,pch=".",col="black")
points(accepted2,accepted2y,col="grey35",pch=".")
lines(density(accepted2),col="grey35",lty=2,lwd=2)
lines(density(transactionPrices0),col="black",lty=3,lwd=2)
lines(density(asks0),col="black",lty=4,lwd=2)
lines(density(bids0),col="gray40",lty=4,lwd=2)
colors = c("grey35","black","gray40","black","gray40","black")
names = c(paste("Intersection, n=",length(accepted2),sep=""),paste("Empirical first round, n=",\
length(transactionPrices0),sep=""),"Demand, n=10000","Supply, n=10000",\
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paste("Empirical first round bids, n=",length(bids0),sep=""),\
paste("Empirical first round asks, n=",length(asks0),sep=""))
legend(142,0.025,names,cex=0.8,col=colors,lty=c(2,3,1,1,4,4),pch=c(-1,-1,-1,-1,-1,-1),lwd=2)
dev.off()
# including all transaction prices
aux = read.csv("/home/nikke/SimPyOut/ZI/050211/big/ZI_n_100_pricesC.txt",sep=",",header=FALSE)
aux = data.matrix(aux)
transactionPricesAll = numeric(length(aux))
for(i in 1:length(aux)){
transactionPricesAll[i] = aux[i][1]
}
postscript("/home/nikke/Kuvat/vertailu_intersection_fixed_demand2_080211.ps",width=100,height=100)
plot(c(0,200),c(0,0.04),type="n",xlab="Price",ylab="PDF")
lines(xsPDF,ysPDF,lty=3,lwd=2)
lines(xdPDF,ydPDF,lty=3,col="gray40",lwd=2)
#points(xd,yd,pch=".",col="gray40")
#points(xs,ys,pch=".",col="black")
points(accepted2,accepted2y,col="grey35",pch=".")
lines(density(accepted2),col="grey35",lty=1,lwd=2)
lines(density(transactionPrices0),col="black",lty=4,lwd=2)
lines(density(asks0),col="black",lty=2,lwd=2)
lines(density(bids0),col="gray40",lty=2,lwd=2)
lines(density(transactionPricesAll),col="black",lty=1,lwd=2)
colors = c("grey35","black","black","gray40","black","gray40","black")
names = c(paste("Intersection, n=",length(accepted2),sep=""),\
paste("Empirical first round, n=",length(transactionPrices0),sep=""),\
paste("Empirical all rounds, n=",length(transactionPricesAll),sep=""),
"Demand, n=10000","Supply, n=10000",paste("Empirical first round bids, n=",\
length(bids0),sep=""),paste("Empirical first round asks, n=",length(asks0),sep=""))
legend(142,0.04,names,cex=0.8,col=colors,lty=c(1,4,1,3,3,2,2),pch=c(-1,-1,-1,-1,-1,-1,-1),lwd=2)
dev.off()
# Only bids and asks
postscript("/home/nikke/Kuvat/vertailu_intersection_fixed_demand_quotes_080211.ps",width=100,height=100)
plot(c(0,200),c(0,0.02),type="n",xlab="Price",ylab="PDF")
lines(xsPDF,ysPDF,lty=1,lwd=2)
lines(xdPDF,ydPDF,lty=1,col="gray40",lwd=2)
#points(xd,yd,pch=".",col="gray40")
#points(xs,ys,pch=".",col="black")
#points(accepted2,accepted2y,col="grey35",pch=".")
#lines(density(accepted2),col="grey35",lty=1,lwd=2)
#lines(density(transactionPrices0),col="black",lty=4,lwd=2)
lines(density(asks0),col="black",lty=2,lwd=2)
lines(density(bids0),col="gray40",lty=2,lwd=2)
#lines(density(transactionPricesAll),col="black",lty=1,lwd=2)
colors = c("gray40","black","gray40","black")
names = c("Demand, n=10000","Supply, n=10000",paste("Empirical first round bids, n=",\
length(bids0),sep=""),paste("Empirical first round asks, n=",length(asks0),sep=""))
legend(142,0.02,names,cex=0.8,col=colors,lty=c(1,1,2,2),pch=c(-1,-1,-1,-1),lwd=2)
dev.off()
postscript("/home/nikke/Kuvat/vertailu_intersection_fixed_demand_prices_080211.ps",width=100,height=100)
plot(c(0,200),c(0,0.04),type="n",xlab="Price",ylab="PDF")
#lines(xsPDF,ysPDF,lty=3,lwd=2)
#lines(xdPDF,ydPDF,lty=3,col="gray40",lwd=2)
#points(xd,yd,pch=".",col="gray40")
#points(xs,ys,pch=".",col="black")
#points(accepted2,accepted2y,col="grey35",pch=".")
lines(density(accepted2),col="grey35",lty=1,lwd=2)
lines(density(transactionPrices0),col="black",lty=4,lwd=2)
#lines(density(asks0),col="black",lty=2,lwd=2)
#lines(density(bids0),col="gray40",lty=2,lwd=2)
lines(density(transactionPricesAll),col="black",lty=1,lwd=2)
colors = c("grey35","black","black")
names = c(paste("Intersection, n=",length(accepted2),sep=""),paste("Empirical first round, n=",\
length(transactionPrices0),sep=""),paste("Empirical all rounds, n=",length(transactionPricesAll),sep=""))
legend(150,0.04,names,cex=0.8,col=colors,lty=c(1,4,1),pch=c(-1,-1,-1),lwd=2)
dev.off()
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## Non symmetric demand and supply: fixed supply
## Correct analysis
buyerValuations = seq(26,174,2)
sellerValuations = array(data=60,dim=75)
xsPDF = seq(0,200,0.1)
ysPDF = numeric(2001)
for(i in 1:2000){
ysPDF[i] = supplyPDF(xsPDF[i])
}
plot(c(0,200),c(0,0.02),type="n",xlab="Price",ylab="PDF")
lines(xsPDF,ysPDF)
area = 0
for(i in 1:200){
area = area + supplyPDF(i)
}
area
xdPDF = seq(0,200,0.1)
ydPDF = numeric(2001)
for(i in 1:2000){
ydPDF[i] = demandPDF(xdPDF[i])
}
lines(xdPDF,ydPDF,col="gray40")
area = 0
for(i in 1:200){
area = area + demandPDF(i)
}
area
## Accept-reject sampling
n=10000
# Demand
xd=numeric(n)
yd=numeric(n)
for(i in 1:n){
while(1){
z=runif(1,1,174)
u=runif(1,0,1)
if(u<(demandPDF(z)/(2/139))){
print(i)
xd[i]=z
yd[i]=u*2/139
break
}
}
}
points(xd,yd,pch=".",col="gray40")
# Supply
xs=numeric(n)
ys=numeric(n)
for(i in 1:n){
while(1){
z=runif(1,60,200)
u=runif(1,0,1)
if(u<(supplyPDF(z)/(1/140))){
print(i)
xs[i]=z
ys[i]=1/140*u
break
}
}
}
points(xs,ys,pch=".",col="black")
accepted2 = -1
accepted2y = -1
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index = 1
for(i in 1:n){
if(ys[i]<=demandPDF(xs[i])){
accepted2[index] = xs[i]
accepted2y[index] = ys[i]
index = index + 1
}
if(yd[i]<=supplyPDF(xd[i])){
accepted2[index] = xd[i]
accepted2y[index] = yd[i]
index = index + 1
}
}
# Output
points(accepted2,accepted2y,col="grey35",pch=".")
lines(density(accepted2),col="grey35",lty=2,lwd=2)
transactionPrices0 = c(...)
asks0 = c(...)
bids0 = c(...)
lines(density(transactionPrices0),col="black",lty=3,lwd=2)
lines(density(asks0),col="black",lty=4,lwd=2)
lines(density(bids0),col="gray40",lty=4,lwd=2)
colors = c("grey35","black","gray40","black")
names = c(paste("Intersection, n=",length(accepted2),sep=""),\
paste("Empirical first round, n=",length(transactionPrices0),sep=""),"Demand, n=10000","Supply, n=10000")
legend(152,0.02,names,cex=0.8,col=colors,lty=c(1,1,1,1),pch=c(-1,-1,-1,-1),lwd=2)
postscript("/home/nikke/Kuvat/vertailu_intersection_fixed_supply_080211.ps",width=100,height=100)
plot(c(0,200),c(0,0.025),type="n",xlab="Price",ylab="PDF")
lines(xsPDF,ysPDF,lwd=2)
lines(xdPDF,ydPDF,col="gray40",lwd=2)
#points(xd,yd,pch=".",col="gray40")
#points(xs,ys,pch=".",col="black")
points(accepted2,accepted2y,col="grey35",pch=".")
lines(density(accepted2),col="grey35",lty=2,lwd=2)
lines(density(transactionPrices0),col="black",lty=3,lwd=2)
lines(density(asks0),col="black",lty=4,lwd=2)
lines(density(bids0),col="gray40",lty=4,lwd=2)
colors = c("grey35","black","gray40","black","gray40","black")
names = c(paste("Intersection, n=",length(accepted2),sep=""),paste("Empirical first round, n=",\
length(transactionPrices0),sep=""),"Demand, n=10000","Supply, n=10000",\
paste("Empirical first round bids, n=",length(bids0),sep=""),\
paste("Empirical first round asks, n=",length(asks0),sep=""))
legend(142,0.025,names,cex=0.8,col=colors,lty=c(2,3,1,1,4,4),pch=c(-1,-1,-1,-1,-1,-1),lwd=2)
dev.off()
# including all transaction prices
aux = read.csv("/home/nikke/SimPyOut/ZI/050211/big2/ZI_n_100_pricesC.txt",sep=",",header=FALSE)
aux = data.matrix(aux)
transactionPricesAll = numeric(length(aux))
for(i in 1:length(aux)){
transactionPricesAll[i] = aux[i][1]
}
postscript("/home/nikke/Kuvat/vertailu_intersection_fixed_supply2_080211.ps",width=100,height=100)
plot(c(0,200),c(0,0.04),type="n",xlab="Price",ylab="PDF")
lines(xsPDF,ysPDF,lty=3,lwd=2)
lines(xdPDF,ydPDF,lty=3,col="gray40",lwd=2)
#points(xd,yd,pch=".",col="gray40")
#points(xs,ys,pch=".",col="black")
points(accepted2,accepted2y,col="grey35",pch=".")
lines(density(accepted2),col="grey35",lty=1,lwd=2)
lines(density(transactionPrices0),col="black",lty=4,lwd=2)
lines(density(asks0),col="black",lty=2,lwd=2)
lines(density(bids0),col="gray40",lty=2,lwd=2)
lines(density(transactionPricesAll),col="black",lty=1,lwd=2)
colors = c("grey35","black","black","gray40","black","gray40","black")
names = c(paste("Intersection, n=",length(accepted2),sep=""),paste("Empirical first round, n=",\
length(transactionPrices0),sep=""),paste("Empirical all rounds, n=",\
length(transactionPricesAll),sep=""),"Demand, n=10000","Supply, n=10000",\
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paste("Empirical first round bids, n=",length(bids0),sep=""),\
paste("Empirical first round asks, n=",length(asks0),sep=""))
legend(142,0.04,names,cex=0.8,col=colors,lty=c(1,4,1,3,3,2,2),pch=c(-1,-1,-1,-1,-1,-1,-1),lwd=2)
dev.off()
# Only bids and asks
postscript("/home/nikke/Kuvat/vertailu_intersection_fixed_supply_quotes_080211.ps",width=100,height=100)
plot(c(0,200),c(0,0.02),type="n",xlab="Price",ylab="PDF")
lines(xsPDF,ysPDF,lty=1,lwd=2)
lines(xdPDF,ydPDF,lty=1,col="gray40",lwd=2)
#points(xd,yd,pch=".",col="gray40")
#points(xs,ys,pch=".",col="black")
#points(accepted2,accepted2y,col="grey35",pch=".")
#lines(density(accepted2),col="grey35",lty=1,lwd=2)
#lines(density(transactionPrices0),col="black",lty=4,lwd=2)
lines(density(asks0),col="black",lty=2,lwd=2)
lines(density(bids0),col="gray40",lty=2,lwd=2)
#lines(density(transactionPricesAll),col="black",lty=1,lwd=2)
colors = c("gray40","black","gray40","black")
names = c("Demand, n=10000","Supply, n=10000",paste("Empirical first round bids, n=",\
length(bids0),sep=""),paste("Empirical first round asks, n=",length(asks0),sep=""))
legend(142,0.02,names,cex=0.8,col=colors,lty=c(1,1,2,2),pch=c(-1,-1,-1,-1),lwd=2)
dev.off()
postscript("/home/nikke/Kuvat/vertailu_intersection_fixed_supply_prices_080211.ps",width=100,height=100)
plot(c(0,200),c(0,0.04),type="n",xlab="Price",ylab="PDF")
#lines(xsPDF,ysPDF,lty=3,lwd=2)
#lines(xdPDF,ydPDF,lty=3,col="gray40",lwd=2)
#points(xd,yd,pch=".",col="gray40")
#points(xs,ys,pch=".",col="black")
#points(accepted2,accepted2y,col="grey35",pch=".")
lines(density(accepted2),col="grey35",lty=1,lwd=2)
lines(density(transactionPrices0),col="black",lty=4,lwd=2)
#lines(density(asks0),col="black",lty=2,lwd=2)
#lines(density(bids0),col="gray40",lty=2,lwd=2)
lines(density(transactionPricesAll),col="black",lty=1,lwd=2)
colors = c("grey35","black","black")
names = c(paste("Intersection, n=",length(accepted2),sep=""),paste("Empirical first round, n=",\
length(transactionPrices0),sep=""),paste("Empirical all rounds, n=",length(transactionPricesAll),sep=""))
legend(150,0.04,names,cex=0.8,col=colors,lty=c(1,4,1),pch=c(-1,-1,-1),lwd=2)
dev.off()
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